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Abstract 
 Ideally, democratic citizens enjoy equal opportunity to deliberate, vote, and 
express feedback, as well as equal voice enabling them to civically participate in order to 
further their projects and interests.  To take full advantage of these equalities, journalism 
must serve as an effective mechanism to ensure that citizens are able to participate 
effectively.  Many news stories feature personal and dramatic elements of events 
exclusively (narrow-context information), but those hoping to become informed and 
motivated require socially contextualized (broad-context) information as well.  In this 
dissertation, I argue that the journalistic presentation of hybrid accounts consisting of 
narrow- and broad-context information best enables citizens to become informed about, 
and motivated to resolve, societal problems. 
 In chapter one, I argue that seeking resolution to social issues is best 
accomplished via deliberating, voting, and expressing feedback.  Because of this, I argue 
that journalists should aim to produce informed citizens who are motivated to resolve 
social issues.  To show how journalists can meet this aim, I describe narrow- and broad- 
context accounts, and demonstrate how journalists can weave such accounts together to 
form hybrid narratives.  In chapter two, I examine the notion of journalistic objectivity, 
questioning its status as an ideal journalists should strive to attain.  I argue that because 
framing decisions are grounded upon value-laden appraisals, constructing an objective, 
value-free account of an event is impossible.  In chapter three, I argue by appeal to work 
in cognitive psychology that some types of framing inhibit citizens’ ability to form 
contextually rich views of events.  Doing so buttresses my claim that journalists should 
avoid framing stories in ways that feature narrow-context information exclusively, and 
	  
	  
iv 
instead frame accounts that present both narrow- and broad-context information.  In 
chapter four, I investigate the psychological ground of emotional arousal to show why 
both standalone narrow- and broad-context accounts fail to render citizens informed and 
motivated and why accounts must include both narrow- and broad context information.  
In chapter five, I examine empirical evidence that shows that citizens prefer consuming 
narrow-context accounts to hybrid narratives, and argue that this is because citizens lack 
confidence about their ability to acquire political knowledge, use that knowledge 
effectively, as well as the likelihood of seeing any governmental response due to their 
efforts.  Citizens can gain such confidence by using information presented via hybrid 
accounts to participate effectively.  Upon feeling empowered by such narratives, citizens 
will readily seek them out. 
 While it may appear obvious to some that presenting hybrid accounts is desirable, 
such is not what we see in the media today.  I provide philosophical and psychological 
arguments in support of doing so.  For instance, while some accounts providing support 
for contextualized reporting have addressed the pernicious effects of the presentation of 
narrow-context accounts, this work has failed to examine deep seated biases rooted in 
perceptual processing that make such accounts unattractive.  While many have cast doubt 
on the possibility of achieving journalistic objectivity, no one has provided a 
philosophical account of why doing so is impossible.  Thus, my dissertation seeks to 
bring normative and descriptive theory to clarify the epistemic responsibilities of 
journalists in a democratic society. 
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Chapter One 
Democracy and the Press: Journalists’ Role within Democratic States 
§1.1 Introduction 
 Democratic deliberation, voting, and feedback function politically and 
epistemically to legitimize government.  The political function of democracy legitimizes 
the use of force and coercion over citizens, which requires that individuals enjoy equal 
opportunity under the law to deliberate, vote, and express feedback.  Policies enacted 
must preserve and enhance citizens’ opportunities to achieve such equality.  The 
epistemic function of democracy enables citizens to come to the right answers under the 
right conditions, which requires that individuals enjoy equal voice so that they can make 
full use of the opportunity to deliberate, vote, and express feedback in order to further 
their projects and interests1.  To take advantage of these equalities, citizens must become 
informed about social issues in ways that enable them to reasonably understand problems 
and possible solutions, their consequences, and their costs.  Remaining uninformed 
makes it likely that citizens will fail to make full use of the equal opportunity and equal 
voice they share, as doing so requires that citizens be well informed. 
 In modern democratic states, journalism can serve as an effective mechanism to 
ensure that citizens are able to deliberate, vote, and express feedback after becoming 
informed, rather than leaving them to participate civically while uninformed.  To 
accomplish this, journalists must be free to disseminate whatever information they deem 
pertinent to their audience.  While a free press that presents contextually rich information 
to democratic citizens is required for the latter to make full use of the equal opportunity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Throughout this dissertation, I consider the term ‘concerns’ to mean one’s projects and interests and vice 
versa. 
	  
	  
2 
and equal voice they enjoy, only some journalistic methods are reliable generators of the 
type of narratives citizens require.  Many stories produced by journalists come in the 
form of narratives that focus on an event’s most dramatic elements about one or two 
individuals.  While such stories often do a great job enticing new audience members (and 
retaining the attention of current ones), they do not encourage citizens to develop views 
that consist of anything more than an awareness of the personal and dramatic elements of 
events, which can be called a “narrow-context” view.  This is problematic, as 
disseminating stories that present information through narrow-context accounts fails to 
encourage citizens to become informed.  Informed citizens necessarily possess 
knowledge about the socio-economic and political causal foundation and significance of 
events2, that is, they hold “broad-context” views.  Throughout the course of this 
dissertation, the case will be made that journalists should present hybrid narrow- and 
broad-context accounts that relay the subjective experiences of individuals to the 
audience, as well as contextually rich information about the causal foundation and future 
significance of events.  
§1.2 Citizen Responsibility 
To best be able to resolve social issues through civic participation, citizens must 
first develop contextually rich views about societal problems and possible solutions, their 
consequences, and their costs.  Second, citizens must develop responsiveness so that they 
will be properly motivated to resolve such issues.  In this dissertation, I assume that 
citizens participating in a representative democracy should share the desire to positively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I consider socio-economic and political origination and significance as a conglomeration of societal, 
economic, and political factors said to give rise to a particular issue or problem.  For instance, concerning 
the shooting at Virginia Tech, the shooter’s social status, the economic hardships experienced by his 
parents, and the state of Virginia’s privacy laws all served as contributing factors that led to the shooting (I 
recognize that there was a multitude of other contributing factors as well). 
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affect society and their government, as well as discover solutions to societal problems.  
Further, I assume that as democratic participants, citizens play an important role in 
decisions concerning public policy, the definition and shaping of issues, and elections.  
To perform this role effectively, it is necessary for citizens to be able to deliberate, vote, 
and express feedback.  To best enable citizens to perform these functions, they must form 
contextually rich views about various issues they face both domestically and 
internationally. 
 While citizens could attempt to wield political influence as isolated, solitary 
entities in hopes of individually affecting governmental decisions, such efforts may 
frequently fail.  A more effective means to influence government within democratic 
societies comes via collaborative efforts featuring deliberation, voting, and feedback.  
One need not look very far for examples (e.g., the Civil Rights movement, the American 
suffragist movement, etc.).  In each of these cases, citizens first became informed about 
the issues with which they were passionate and then proceeded to participate civically 
collectively3.  In these instances, citizens wielded political influence by engaging in 
debate with their peers, paving the way for them to cast informed votes and express 
feedback. 
§1.3 Democracy and Press Freedom 
The press enhances democracy by ensuring that citizens become informed and 
motivated to participate civically.  Reflecting upon the nature of democracy and citizens’ 
role within it will show why this is the case.  Dēmokratía (δηµοκρατία), a compound of 
demos (δῆµος) ‘people’ and krátos (κράτος) ‘power’, denotes ‘people power’.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In this dissertation, I consider civic participation as the performance of three democratic functions: 
deliberation, voting, and feedback. 
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Democracies that afford citizens’ direct control, or power, are known as direct 
democracies.  Direct democracy involves the direct participation of citizens concerning 
the creation, shaping, and ratification of policy initiatives and laws.  In addition, citizens 
are able to elect officials by popular vote, as opposed to having a representative body 
(e.g., an electoral college) that formally elects leaders, such as the president and vice-
president. 
The form of democracy that I am most interested in exploring, however, is 
representative democracy, as my investigation focuses upon how journalists can best 
enhance civic participation within the democratic arrangement existing at present in the 
United States of America.  In representative democracies, citizens elect representatives 
that create, shape, and ratify policy initiatives and laws on behalf of the interests of those 
citizens they represent.  In addition, in the case of the United States, an electoral college 
formally elects the president and vice-president.  Rather than allowing citizens to directly 
elect such leaders via a popular vote, each state designates a certain number of Electoral 
College delegates who pledge to cast their votes according to the will of the people they 
represent.  Constituents hold their representatives accountable for the latter’s voting 
record on issues, as well as legislature they craft or sponsor, and the degree to which their 
efforts adequately embody the interests of those citizens residing in the district that they 
serve4.  Within representative democracies, civic participation: 
[i]s intended to serve a number of functions: the protection of private 
interests, the selection of competent leaders, the expression of the public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Kakabadse, A., Kakabadse, N., Kouzmin, A., & Kalu, K. (2010). Calling on Jefferson: The ‘Custodiary’ 
as the fourth estate in the democratic project. Contemporary Politics, 16(3), 279-299, Fiorina; M.P., 1981. 
Retrospective voting in American national elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Manning, J., 
1996. Voting records of members of Congress – CSR report for Congress. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. 
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good, and the making and implementing of public policy (Carpini and 
Keeter, 1996, p. 40). 
 
Representative democracies are arranged to facilitate civic participation so that 
citizens can further their projects and interests by selecting political 
representatives that best further those concerns through the policy initiatives they 
construct and enact. 
 A free press serves democratic states in the following three ways.  One, it can 
serve as an unofficial “fourth estate”, operating as a mechanism that enables citizens to 
learn about governmental operations, as well as actions taken by other citizens.  Through 
this function, journalists serve as a safeguard against the tyranny of political 
representatives, as well as the majority of other citizens.  Two, the press can provide a 
soundboard for citizen participation that enables the latter to make full use of the 
equalities afforded to them (i.e., equal opportunity and equal voice).  Three, the press can 
make public dire conditions and inadequate governmental response, whether manmade or 
natural disasters, that cannot be ignored by government.  For instance, press coverage of 
the devastation of New Orleans due to Hurricane Katrina and FEMA’s subpar 
performance to resolve the issue prompted citizens and government officials to reflect 
upon those efforts and work to improve the handling of natural disasters in the future. 
Some general remarks about the separation of powers as they exist in the United 
States will help situate an account of how the press serves as a fourth, unofficial estate.  
There are three official estates that comprise the U.S. government: the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches.  The writings of John Locke and Charles Secondat, 
Baron de Montesquieu played an integral role in the formation of the U.S. government’s 
tripartite structure.  In Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil Government, he argues that the 
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executive and legislative branch must be separately operating bodies.  Justifying his 
insistence that the executive branch remain separate from the legislative, he claims: 
[t]hey [i.e., the executive branch] may exempt themselves from obedience 
to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making and execution, 
to their own private advantage (Locke, 2008, p. 88). 
 
If the executive branch were to both make the laws and enforce them, it could create 
exemptions for itself that might allow it to operate outside of the laws it created.  It is 
important to note that Locke considers the legislative branch as holding “supreme power” 
over the executive estate because the former holds mere fiduciary power and best 
embodies the collective will of the people.  In other words, the legislature retains power 
as a trust with citizens, creating laws that best suit their interests.  Since it derives its 
power via this trust, it does not hold supreme authority over the will of the people; the 
legislature is a mere extension of authority that ultimately resides with citizens. 
 Montesquieu advocates a horizontal separation of powers that includes three 
branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.  While various configurations of 
polypartite governments exist in modern liberal democracies, one central feature remains: 
a system of checks and balances.  For without such a configuration, one branch of 
government (or two if joined in confederation) might become despotic and seize too 
much control.  As Montesquieu claims: 
[w]ere the executive power not to have a right of restraining the 
encroachments of the legislative body, the latter would become despotic; 
for as it might arrogate to itself what authority it pleased, it would soon 
destroy all the other powers (Montesquieu, 2004, p. 157). 
 
An estate successful in its attempt to circumvent the authority of the others could see to 
their elimination.  To avoid this, Montesquieu proposes that governments be organized to 
ensure that those who make laws do not enforce them and those who interpret whether 
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laws made accord to the principles inherent in the nation’s constitution do not make nor 
enforce them. 
 As Kakabadse, et.al. note, the framers of the U.S. constitution agreed with 
Montesquieu and established clear lines of demarcation between the three newly created 
branches of the American government.  As they claim: 
US Federalists, whose leaders included three men who helped develop the 
Constitution, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, and two 
national heroes whose support greatly aided the Federalists’ cause, George 
Washington and Benjamin Franklin, embraced Montesquieu’s governing 
philosophy of the threefold division (Kakabadse, et.al., 2010, p. 281). 
 
The framers’ effort to establish a division of power between the executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches was aimed at reducing the possibility that one branch of 
government would gain too much power over the others to avoid the stronger from 
becoming despotic. 
 A free press helps bolster the effectiveness of this division of power, since 
journalists provide transparency to both citizens and political representatives by 
illuminating the activities of each estate.  For instance, without information pertaining to 
the executive branch’s decision to limit the enforcement of certain legislation, Congress 
would be ill equipped to understand if action is required to circumvent the executive 
branch’s efforts.  A tangible example of phenomena of this type is President George W. 
Bush’s decision (along with many recent past presidents) to alter the enforcement of laws 
using line item vetoes.  Without a free press to report such behavior publicly, Congress 
would be unable to take action in response.  In this way, a free press provides a safeguard 
against abuses of power by allowing governmental branches to place checks upon one 
another.  
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The second way in which a free press can offer protection to citizens comes via its 
role as a safeguard against the tyranny of the majority.  In a democratic society, the 
majority of citizens could wield despotic power over the minority.  With regard to this 
fear, Kakabadse, et.al. comment that one of the reasons behind the insistence that 
governmental power be divided with a system of checks and balances, was so that “the 
rights of minority groups who might be oppressed from an overbearing majority” 
(Kakabadse, et.al., 2010, p. 281) could be secured.  While this fear may hold greater 
strength in direct democracies since citizens have more control over policy initiatives and 
laws enacted within such states, this fear remains in representative democracies as well, 
because the legislative branch could create initiatives according to the will of 
mischievous factions.  As James Madison argued in Federalist Paper No. 10, factions 
(whether such groups are comprised of the majority or minority) can, at times, amass a 
considerable amount of power that affords them the ability to override the general interest 
or rights of citizens outside their ranks.  On factions, Madison claims: 
[b]y a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some 
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other 
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community 
(Madison, 2008, p. 49). 
 
Put another way, a faction is a group of citizens with common projects and interests not 
shared with either one or more subsets of citizens, where such projects and interests are 
oppositional and contrary to those outside the faction.  This represents a serious problem 
for democracy.  In order to protect one or more subsets of citizens against factions whose 
concerns might pose hazardous opposition, a free press can publicly examine such 
concerns, exposing them to public scrutiny and castigation (if need be the case).  For 
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instance, since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the American press has 
repeatedly investigated the projects and interests of factions dedicated to white racial 
supremacy, as well as expose the hostile nature of such groups’ activities.  With regard to 
gay rights, journalists’ coverage of the killing of Matthew Shepard helped spark public 
outrage against homophobic violence that has led to the passage of laws against hate 
crimes.  A free press operating as an investigative body of the destructive projects and 
pernicious interests of factions enables citizens to take action against factions whose 
activities might seek to cause undue harm to others. 
 It is worth considering whether informed citizens are more likely to factionalize 
than not.  In my view, informed citizens would be less likely than uninformed ones to 
factionalize, since possessing contextually rich views would render them more likely than 
their uninformed peers to appreciate the experiences of others, as well as how their own 
projects and interests lie interconnected with those outside of their own personal 
experiential sphere.  In other words, informed citizens would be more likely than 
uninformed ones to understand the projects and interests of people outside of their socio-
economic and political spheres, and this would help foster a sense of intersubjective 
connectivity between the concerns of oneself and others. 
§1.4 Why Democracy? 
Perhaps one might argue that because citizens are ill-informed about policy 
proposals and their implications, hiring experts to solve citizens’ problems would best 
serve their interests.  To this end, a technocracy, or a state run by experts trained 
specifically to deal with societal problems, might be preferable to a democracy.  In my 
view, however, endorsing such an argument would be ill advised.  As Elizabeth Anderson 
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explains, democracy provides citizens the best opportunity to solve “problems of public 
interest, the efficient solution to which requires joint action by citizens, through the law” 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 9).  To further her argument, Anderson examines three epistemic 
accounts of democracy: the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), the Diversity Trumps Ability 
Theorem (DTAT), and John Dewey’s experimentalist model of democracy.  While she 
favors the latter over the former two models (as do I), I will discuss all three accounts, as 
doing so will buttress my above claim that democracy best enables citizens to solve 
societal problems effectively. 
There are two types of criterial success for democratic states: internal (i.e., 
procedural) and external (i.e., pragmatic) (Anderson, 2006, p. 10).  Internal criteria 
measure whether a democratic state affords citizens equal opportunity and equal voice, 
enabling them to deliberate, vote, and express feedback.  External criteria measure 
success according to instrumental criteria such as whether citizens deem the 
consequences (whether intended or unintended) of a specific policy or group of policies 
acceptable.  In other words, external criteria measure whether or not a particular solution 
(or set of solutions) works, pragmatically speaking.  Both Anderson and I share the view 
that while both types of criterial success are important, external criterial success is more 
important than internal criterial success, since our work is motivated primarily by the 
desire to discover a way (via philosophical and political theory) to increase democratic 
citizens’ success concerning the selection of effective solutions to societal problems. 
There are three concerns related to citizens’ ability to resolve social issues that are 
worth discussing before addressing the CJT, the DTAT, and Dewey’s experimental 
model of democracy.  First, diversity enhanced through voter enfranchisement and 
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inclusion helps ensure that information (that is typically distributed asymmetrically) is 
pooled together in ways that best allows citizens to discover and select successful 
solutions to problems.  Second, deliberation enhanced through diversity affords citizens 
means to influence one another’s perspectives concerning various problems and possible 
solutions, their consequences, and their costs.  Regarding citizens’ ability to influence 
one another, Helen Longino raises an interesting point about the nature of the peer review 
process within academia that has important implications for the topic of democratic 
deliberation.  As she states: 
[t]he function of peer review is not just to check that the data seem right 
and the conclusions well-reasoned but to bring to bear another point of 
view on the phenomena, whose expression might lead the original 
author(s) to revise the way they think about and present their observations 
and conclusions.  To put this another way, it is to make sure that ... the 
authors have interpreted the data in a way that is free of their subjective 
preferences (Longino, 2001, pp. 68-69). 
 
Longino’s insights are important, as they demonstrate how citizens can positively 
influence one another by providing a mechanism for motivating the revision of one’s 
views.  Exposing one’s views to the criticism of others opens the door to gaining a new 
perspective in which to understand such views.  More often than not, what citizens 
consider privately has been informed, in part, by their own epistemic commitments and 
idiosyncrasies.  It is sometimes difficult for individuals to view their own ideas free from 
their subjective preferences.  Public deliberation affords citizens the opportunity to 
discover how others interpret their views who may hold entirely different sets of 
subjective preferences.  What is most beneficial here is the idea that opening one’s views 
to others affords citizens the opportunity to revise their perspectives in light of criticisms 
that might be developed in opposition to them.  Finally, feedback allows citizens to 
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engage in further deliberation after they have selected initial solutions in case such 
solutions produced consequences deemed unacceptable. 
Describing the CJT, Anderson states that this theorem claims: 
if voters face two options, vote independently of one another, vote their 
judgment of what the right solution to the problem should be (i.e., they do 
not vote strategically), and have, on average, a greater than 50% 
probability of being right, then, as the number of voters approaches 
infinity, the probability that the majority vote will yield the right answer 
approaches 1 (Anderson, 2006, p. 12). 
 
In other words, plurality voting that involves pooling together an ever-increasing number 
of responses increases the probability that voters will select a correct5 solution to a 
particular problem.  This gives reason to claim that democracy is better suited than 
technocracy (i.e., the rule of select experts), since it bests citizens’ success rate 
concerning their ability to select effective solutions to societal problems.  The CJT, 
however, ultimately fails to be exhaustive, as it cannot account for the importance of 
ensuring epistemic diversity among voters.  Epistemic diversity is important, as 
[m]ost of the problems democracies are asked to solve are complex, and 
have asymmetrically distributed effects on individuals according to their 
geographic location, social class, occupation, education, gender, age, race, 
and so forth.  Since individuals are most familiar with the effects of 
problems and policies on themselves and those close to them, information 
about these effects is also asymmetrically distributed (Anderson, 2006, p. 
15). 
 
Discovering solutions to complex problems often requires a vast amount of information 
from a variety of different sources.  Since citizens are affected asymmetrically by societal 
problems, and typically only possess information pertaining to their own projects and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Per the CJT, it is assumed that voters are operating under conditions where a “correct” solution is present 
as well as discoverable. By “correct”, I mean “the choice which would have been made under conditions of 
full information” (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997, p. 586). Under real world conditions, there may be no one 
“correct” solution to a particular problem that is present and/or discoverable. If under conditions of full 
information, however, democracy cannot be shown to be a reliable mechanism to select successful 
solutions to societal problems, then one would have reason to claim that democracy is an inadequate 
political theory. 
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interests (as well as those of their close associates), it would be erroneous to assume that 
a set of voters possessing homogeneous views (as opposed to heterogeneous ones) could 
pool together enough information to select an effective solution to complex problems.  
For instance, imagine a group of citizens residing in West Chester, Pennsylvania 
attempting to hold a public forum for the expressed reason of improving Philadelphia 
inner city schools.  In this case, the group residing in West Chester would most likely not 
possess information about what it is like to live in an impoverished community, let along 
attend school in one.  Without the addition of information about the plight facing many 
Philadelphians residing within areas like Strawberry Mansion, Mantua, etc., this group 
would most likely fail to possess information germane to the proposed task.  To 
ameliorate this problem, group members would find it necessary to include new members 
with information less homogenous than their own, as well as pertinent to the issue under 
consideration. 
 Since the CJT fails to provide a mechanism to ensure that voters possess 
heterogeneous views, it is an unattractive model of democracy.  Moreover, while the 
theorem is true, it is only applicable to cases where there are just two options.  
Unfortunately, in real world scenarios, there are never just two options.  The world does 
not come packaged as a neat set of problems and well defined possible outcomes. The 
future is “open” in that problems are often complex and individuals seldom (if ever) are 
able to define possible outcomes to the degree assumed under conditions where the CJT 
is applicable.  Since the CJT assumes that only two voting options exist, it is inapplicable 
in the case of a complex, heterogeneous democracy.  Additionally, the theorem assumes 
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that the problems are well defined in advance.  Real world scenarios are seldom, if ever, 
well defined in advance.  In most instances, such cases are poorly defined at best. 
 Providing even more cause for concern is the fact that the CJT assumes that 
citizens vote independently of one another (Anderson, 2006, 15).  Put another way, the 
CJT supposes that citizens do not influence one another to any significant degree.  Since 
Anderson holds that 
mutual influence prior to voting are constitutive, not incidental features of 
democracy[, … w]ithout access to public fora for sharing information and 
opinions based beyond their immediate knowledge, voters are often 
uninformed and helpless (Anderson, 2006, 16). 
 
Stated simply, the CJT assumes that the people do not influence each other, but they 
clearly do.  This concern relates to Anderson’s first problem with the CJT, as she 
originally claimed that since social problems affect citizens differently, and since citizens 
know primarily about their own projects and interests exclusively, it is necessary for them 
to publicly discuss matters concerning the problems they collectively face.  Such 
deliberation is necessary so that citizens, who possess asymmetrically distributed 
information, can pool together enough information to select an effective solution to 
complex issues, as well as persuade one another to modify his or her views. 
 The Diversity Trumps Ability Model does account for the sort of heterogeneity 
that Anderson argues a healthy democracy requires.  As she explains, the DTAT 
[s]tates that if the problem is hard (no individual always gets it right), the 
problem solvers converge on a finite set of solutions, the problem solvers 
are epistemically diverse (they don’t all converge on the same local 
optimum), and there are many problem solvers who work together in 
moderate sized groups, then a randomly selected collection of problem 
solvers outperforms a collection of the best problems solvers (Anderson, 
2006, 18). 
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Put another way, in situations involving many voters assembled together in isolated 
groups who come together to solve complex problems wielding a finite list of possible 
solutions to such problems, a randomized selection of voters would select correct 
solutions at a rate higher than a group of experts.  This is an important finding, as it 
provides evidence for my claim that democracy, rather than technocracy, can best wield 
solutions to societal problems, for this theorem shows that a diverse collection of non-
experts does a better job selecting successful solutions to such problems than experts.  
While an improvement over the CJT, the DTAT fails to account for two features vital to 
the health of a democracy: universal inclusion and feedback. 
 First, the DTAT fails to stress “the noninstrumental importance of universal 
inclusion (i.e., equal opportunity and equal voice)”, as well as feedback (Anderson, 2006, 
21).  Concerning the former, Anderson claims that while the DTAT recognizes the 
instrumental value of inclusive franchisement and free speech, it fails to recognize their 
noninstrumental value (and she posits that these aspects are especially valuable features 
of democracy).  Equal opportunity and equal voice have instrumental value according to 
the DTAT because such equalities enhance voters’ ability to pool together diverse 
information from individuals affected asymmetrically by societal problems. 
 It is worth noting is that the inclusion of these equalities satisfies the internal 
criterion of democratic decision-making.  As stated above, this criterion demands 
that the decisions fairly represent everyone’s concerns, and thereby 
represent an object of public concern (Anderson, 2006, 22). 
 
The problem here is that equal opportunity and equal voice are valuable for more than 
their instrumental ability to allow citizens to gather a diversity of information before, 
during, and after voting.  Their noninstrumental value comes from their ability to ensure 
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the fair representation of citizens’ projects and interests, making them actually important 
to the public at-large, and not just one sub-section of citizens.  
In addition, these equalities make it possible for citizens to disseminate 
information into the public sphere via feedback.  Since voters are fallible, feedback about 
the effectiveness and success of selected solutions is vital to the health of democracy, for 
without such feedback, revisions to public policy initiatives would be quite difficult to 
enact.  On this point, Anderson claims that the DTAT 
does not model the epistemic functions of periodic elections and other 
feedback mechanisms designed to change the course of collective 
decisions in light of information about their consequences (Anderson, 
2006, 23). 
 
According to Anderson, John Dewey’s experimentalist model of democracy 
includes all three features noted above: deliberation, voting, and feedback.  Anderson 
explains that Dewey envisions 
[d]eliberation … [as] a kind of thought experiment, in which we rehearse 
proposed solutions to problems in imagination, trying to foresee the 
consequences of implementing them, including our favorable or 
unfavorable reactions to them.  We then put the policies we decide upon to 
an actual test by acting in accordance with them and evaluating the results.  
Unfavorable results—failures to solve the problem for which the policy 
was adopted, or solving the problem but at the cost of generating worse 
problems—should be treated in a scientific spirit as disconfirmations of 
our policies.  They give us reasons to revise our policies to make them do 
a better job solving our problems (Anderson, 2006, 24). 
 
Dewey recommends that citizens seek out enough information to reasonably understand 
problems and possible solutions, their consequences, and their costs.  After such 
information has been gathered, citizens form a hypothesis about which solution may be 
best via deliberation, which occurs through venues such as public houses, town hall 
meetings, social media platforms, etc.  Citizens must then vote upon proposed solutions, 
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and since information is asymmetrically distributed among voters, diversity is essential, 
as it enables citizens to collect as much data as possible.  Lastly, citizens must reflect 
upon the consequences from the adopted means enacted to solve a particular problem and 
provide feedback about the selected solution’s success or failure by way of polling, 
elections, protests, etc. (Anderson, 2006, 25). 
§1.5 Journalists’ Role within Democratic Societies 
Journalists, as filters and disseminators of information, enable citizens to make 
choices about policy initiatives, laws, elections, etc. after becoming informed, rather than 
leaving individuals to make such decisions while uninformed.  With regard to this role, 
the Center for Democracy and Governance’s (CDG) 1999 report on the role of media in 
democracy states that journalists’ information dissemination enables “citizens [to] make 
responsible, informed choices rather than acting out of ignorance or misinformation” 
(CDG, 1999, 3).  By disseminating contextually rich information about the causal 
foundation and future significance of events to citizens, journalists enable the latter to 
become informed, and make decisions while so informed, rather than while ignorant or 
uninformed.  In this capacity, the media offers citizens a civic forum.6  As Pippa Norris 
claims: 
in their civic forum role, the free press can strengthen the public sphere, 
by mediating between citizens and the state, facilitating debate about the 
major issues of the day, and informing the public about their leaders 
(Norris, 2006, 5). 
 
Journalists operate as filters of information and by doing so, they create a sphere of 
political interaction between citizens and their representatives that is vital for maintaining 
a healthy democracy.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 By “civic forum”, I do not intend “deliberative forum” alla Daniel Fouke. 
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In keeping with their tradition as filters, it is important to note that information 
flows in two directions.  Journalists pass down information from governmental 
representatives to citizens, as well as pass up information from citizens to their elected 
officials.  In this way, journalists provide “information about urgent social problems … 
thereby channeling citizens’ concerns to decision-makers in government” (Norris, 2006, 
6).  Without this second directionality of information flow, it is unlikely that 
representatives will focus their time and efforts to adequately address those affairs about 
which the public is most concerned. 
Journalists also render citizens aware of actions taken by their representatives, 
enabling citizens to become informed about such actions, thus enhancing citizens’ ability 
to protest political moves they deem unacceptable.  In addition, in multiparty 
democracies like the United States, citizens can hold their representatives accountable by 
choosing to vote members of opposing parties into office during elections.  As Norris 
states: 
[i]n competitive multiparty democracies, voters can use information 
provided by the media to hold parties and leaders to account by ‘kicking 
the rascals out’ (Norris, 2006, 4). 
 
Providing further commentary, the CDG claims: 
information serves a “checking function” by ensuring that elected 
representatives uphold their oaths of office and carry out the wishes of 
those who elected them (CDG, 1999, 3). 
 
Journalists, then, play a watchdog role.  This role requires them to report the 
developments of social issues as they unfold, as well as accounts of governmental actions 
to ameliorate such problems.  As Norris claims: 
[i]n their ‘watchdog’ role, the channels of the news media can function to 
promote government transparency, accountability, and public scrutiny of 
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decision-makers in power, by highlighting policy failures, 
maladministration by public officials, corruption in the judiciary, and 
scandals in the corporate sector (Norris, 2006, 4). 
 
By informing citizens of the actions of their representatives, as well as their fellow 
citizens, journalists provide individuals the best chance of making full use of the equal 
opportunity and equal voice they enjoy.  Rather than taking away these equalities when 
citizens act while uninformed, journalists must provide individuals as much information 
as possible to best ensure that they are informed whenever they participate civically.  As 
Thomas Jefferson claims: 
I know no safe depositary of the ultimate powers of the society but the 
people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to 
exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to 
take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education.  This is the 
true corrective of abuses of constitutional power (Thomas Jefferson to 
William C. Jarvis, 1820, ME 15:278). 
 
Put another way, democracy is best served by expending more effort to educate citizens 
in hope that they become informed and make good decisions based upon that 
information.  On occasion, citizens will err when participating civically.  Since human 
beings are fallible, this is a very real possibility.  Concerning the above claims, Jefferson 
states: 
I am persuaded that the good sense of the people will always be found to 
be the best army.  They may be led astray for a moment, but will soon 
correct themselves.  The people are the only censors of their governors, 
and even their errors will tend to keep these to the true principles of their 
institution.  To punish these errors too severely would be to suppress the 
only safeguard of the public liberty.  The way to prevent these irregular 
interpositions of the people is to give them full information of their affairs 
through the channel of the public papers, and to contrive that those papers 
should penetrate the whole mass of the people (Thomas Jefferson to 
Edward Carrington, 1787, ME 6:58). 
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Informed public opinion is democracy’s best asset.  Public censor of governmental 
representatives allows for changes that need not come as the result of bloodshed, for 
democratic citizens have the power to provoke change peacefully, without recourse to 
rebellion.  As Jefferson notes: 
[t]his formidable censor of the public functionaries, by arraigning them at 
the tribunal of public opinion, produces reform peaceably, which must 
otherwise be done by revolution (Thomas Jefferson to A. Coray, 1823, 
ME 15:489). 
 
 For citizens to wield information effectively (e.g., holding representatives 
accountable for their actions via elections), they need full disclosure (or close to it – 
barring information that would lead to national security concerns) about their 
representatives’ actions, as well as the actions undertaken by other citizens.  The best 
means to avoid despotic tyrannical regimes, or citizen majorities, from seizing control is 
to disseminate as much information as can be presented, thus allowing the greatest 
number of citizens as possible to become informed.  As Jefferson states: 
[t]he most effectual means of preventing [the perversion of power into 
tyranny is] to illuminate, as far as practicable, the minds of the people at 
large, and more especially to give them knowledge of those facts which 
history exhibits, that possessed thereby of the experience of other ages and 
countries, they may be enabled to know ambition under all its shapes, and 
prompt to exert their natural powers to defeat its purposes (Thomas 
Jefferson: Diffusion of Knowledge Bill, 1779, FE 2:221, Papers 2:526). 
 
Limiting press freedom runs the risk of citizens losing their freedom entirely, as they 
cannot provoke change in government effectively if they do not have the necessary 
information to make decisions under informed conditions.  If they cannot perform the 
latter, then they cannot peacefully fight against the rule of despotic, tyrannical 
governments. 
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§1.6 The Cost of Becoming Informed 
 That said, one could argue that becoming informed can sometimes cause citizens 
to incur unacceptable opportunity costs, making individuals’ efforts to make decisions 
under informed conditions too burdensome.  An opportunity cost is “the value of the 
next-best alternative that must be forgone in order to undertake the activity” (Frank & 
Bernanke, 2004, 6).  Perhaps one might claim that becoming informed by frequently 
consuming hybrid accounts is not worth the expected payout that one might receive from 
policy initiatives created by representatives endorsed by a majority of citizens that 
comprise the voting public.  This is known as the Downs paradox.  As Anthony Downs 
states: 
[Any one citizen's vote] is not decisive: it is lost in a sea of other votes.  
Hence, whether [one] is well-informed has no perceptible impact on the 
benefits [one] gets.  If all others express their true views, [one] gets the 
benefits of a well-informed electorate no matter how well-informed [one] 
is; if [one] is badly informed, [one] cannot produce these benefits 
[oneself].  ...  Since all [citizens] do this, the election does not reflect the 
true consent of the governed" (Downs, 1957, 246). 
 
Since any one citizen’s vote will most likely not be decisive, the time and effort that it 
might take to become informed and motivated will outweigh the gain that one will 
receive no matter if they become so or not.  There is little incentive to become informed 
and motivated when one can seemingly rest assured that the majority of voters will be, so 
whether one has taken the time to do so personally is rendered of little accord.  One thing 
worth noting is that Downs assumes that “all others” are informed and vote accordingly.  
I find this assumption problematic.  Why should one assume “all others” to be informed 
and motivated when one is not so inclined oneself?  If this were the case, and “all others” 
are just as rational as oneself, it might be possible that everyone including oneself and 
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“all others” has rested on their laurels, expecting everyone else to become informed and 
motivated and vote accordingly.  If that were so, then perhaps no one would put forth the 
effort to become informed and motivated and vote accordingly.  Perhaps it would be best 
if everyone assumed that no one else would put forth any effort, as doing so would ensure 
that everyone has done so. 
 While I am willing to concede Downs’s point to some degree, I am convinced that 
there are tangible benefits of becoming informed and motivated that remain even after the 
Downs paradox taken into account.  To show why such benefits remain in the face of 
Downs’s free rider concern, James Fishkin asserts: 
I can be a "free rider" and save the costs of doing my share but still reap 
the benefits. …  Why should I invest in acquiring political information to 
produce the benefits of a better public decision when those benefits, in all 
reasonable probability, will be provided–or not–regardless of my actions?  
But citizens in a civic community, one with high social capital, have many 
reasons to participate in politics together and to stay informed.  They are 
part of a dense network of civic associations, both political and 
nonpolitical, which provides them lots of reasons to read newspapers, to 
stay informed, to participate in community activities.  They internalize 
norms that motivate them to participate and to join with others–norms that 
give them satisfaction regardless of any calculation about the effects of 
their individual actions.  And, as Tocqueville noted, these habits of 
association, the widespread acceptance of working together, make it far 
easier for each individual to participate, to combine with others for some 
cause of mutual interest (Fishkin, 1995, 148-149). 
 
In other words, citizens who become informed and motivated within a public sphere can 
cooperate and participate civically to achieve resolution to societal problems.  Without 
doing so, their efforts to discover solutions to the problems they face will prove difficult 
(perhaps extremely so).  Those who take the time to become informed and motivated 
inculcate social habits that enable them to further socialize and participate civically for 
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their cooperative benefit.  For these individuals, developing such habits makes working 
toward the attainment of mutual satisfaction easier. 
Fishkin’s assertions provide support for another problem facing Downs’s claims.  
Downs theorized that citizens merely have a voice, and cannot influence one another.  As 
Downs claims, one’s vote “is lost in a sea of other votes” (Downs, 1957, 246).  This 
claim is wrongheaded.  One’s vote is not lost in a sea of other votes, but one’s 
contribution toward deliberation, as well as one’s participation in feedback that occurs 
prior to yet another subsequent vote influences how others may come to understand 
problems and possible solutions, their consequences, and their costs.  Deliberation prior 
to voting would have no import if Downs’s assumption were found correct, for it would 
mean that citizens have no influence over the content of their views nor the selection of 
their votes.  Diversity concerning the views of citizens would not hold much import 
either, because the significance of encouraging increased heterogeneity among views lies 
in the fact that by pooling together diverse information sets, the public would be better 
able to select successful solutions to problems as they would have more information to 
draw upon than they would have if every citizen held homogenous views.  Put another 
way, pooling together diverse information sets is important since the more information 
citizens can gather about a problem, as well as the consequences of the means and ends in 
view, the higher the likelihood of successfully selecting an effective solution. 
§1.7 Avenues of Civic Participation 
 One might also question my claim that in a representative democracy citizens are 
able to achieve resolution to societal problems via civic participation.  One offering this 
criticism could note that at the national level in a representative democracy, citizens do 
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not have the power to provoke changes by direct popular vote or referendum.  In my 
view, this claim is mistaken because citizens have the ability to influence government via 
“letters, phone calls, campaign donations, petitions, rallies, [etc.]” (Carpini and Keeter, 
1996, 58).  In addition, citizen participation and public opinion serve as both a litmus test 
as well as a catalyst of political pressure that various governmental estates rely upon 
whenever different branches seek to collaborate with one another.  As 
Michael Carpini and Scott Keeter claim: 
[t]he battle between branches of government is increasingly fought 
through the mobilization of public pressure.  Presidents use the media to 
rally public opinion and to put direct and indirect pressure on Congress.  
Presidential favorability ratings serve as indicators to Congress as to 
whether [the president] should be followed.  Agendas are revised and 
policies succeed or fail depending on the ability to rally public support 
(Carpini and Keeter, 1996, 58). 
 
The executive branch uses the force of public opinion to place political pressure upon 
legislative representatives whenever a president needs certain measures debated on the 
congressional floor, bills created, oversight committee action initiated, etc.  At the same 
time, congressional leaders use public opinion as a litmus test to determine whether to 
follow a course of action a president seeks to put into motion. 
 Even after policy initiatives have been passed and enacted into law, public 
cooperation is necessary, and for such cooperation to be possible, citizens must become 
informed about the content, scope, and nature of such initiatives and motivated to 
participate civically (Carpini and Keeter, 1996, 58).  With regard to the former, Carpini 
and Keeter claim that citizens must possess 
at least a modicum of public understanding of such matters as the relation 
between oil consumption and geopolitical conflict, between taxes and 
spending, between education and productivity, and between crime rates 
and the economy.  A policy based on informed civic input is more likely 
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to reflect the public interest.  ...  A citizen who understands the context 
surrounding a particular issue may be more likely to think in public, rather 
than purely private, terms.  As a result, a citizen who participates in, or 
who simply follows, the development of national policy and who 
understands the logic of that policy is better able and, when appropriate, 
more willing to support the policy's implementation (Carpini and Keeter, 
1996, 58). 
 
Without informed citizens providing input via civic participation, policy initiatives are 
less likely to represent their interests, or serve as effective solutions to societal problems.  
Developing a comprehension of the causal foundation of events and their future 
significance will best enable citizens to think in a broad way (i.e., beyond the scope of 
their own private interests).  Becoming informed about the policies set in place by their 
representatives will best encourage citizens to better understand the need for such policies 
and how to best promote their implementation. 
 At the local governmental level, citizens enjoy greater control.  At public 
meetings (e.g., school board meetings, chamber of commerce meetings, local town hall 
meetings, etc.), citizens wield the ability to influence the creation and enactment of policy 
initiatives concerning “the public schools, zoning laws, and property taxes” (Carpini and 
Keeter, 1996, 59).  While such direct involvement is not possible (or is at least 
impractical) at the national level, that does not mean that both citizens and representatives 
alike should underestimate the degree of influence that informed citizens can wield when 
they are motivated to do so. 
§1.8 The Consequences of Uninformed Civic Participation 
 
 When uninformed citizens participate civically two particularly pernicious results 
may occur.  One, uninformed citizens may vote differently than they would if they had 
become informed beforehand.  Since uninformed citizens have trouble determining which 
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policy measure and candidate might best serve their best interests, they have difficulty 
participating civically effectively.  Because of this, citizens may fail to vote “correctly,” 
that is, they may fail to make “the choice which would have been made under conditions 
of full information” (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997, 586)7.  In other words, if citizens remain 
uninformed about a particular candidate or issue about which they are called upon to cast 
a ballot, voters may fail to select the candidate or resolution that would best represent 
their own personal projects and interests.  As Carpini argues, uniformed voters have 
difficulty discerning which candidates hold particular policy preferences.  As he claims: 
when [citizens] participate — either directly through the vote or indirectly 
through opinion polls — low … levels of information lower the likelihood 
that this participation will accurately reflect the individual, group, and 
collective interests of the public (Carpini, 1999, 36). 
 
Without citizens becoming informed about their representatives, the policy initiatives 
those representatives favor, and the motivations behind creating and implementing such 
initiatives, citizens’ ability to select representatives that would best serve their interests is 
limited.  In voting scenarios, citizens must possess (at the very least) broad-context 
perspectives about 
their own interests, with the articulated stands of the candidates and 
parties, and with their actual performance when in office (Carpini and 
Keeter, 1996, 55). 
 
To select representatives that will best serve their interests via the policy initiatives they 
create, citizens must become informed before voting.  To place this idea in a real world 
context, Carpini and Keeter rely upon the following example.  They offer that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 As noted above, the Condorcet Jury Theorem shows that if under ideal conditions of full information you 
have voters faced with two options that vote “correctly” greater than 50% of the time (independently of one 
another and not strategically), then increasing the number of voters in the set increases the chance (as a set) 
that the group will select the “correct” solution (Anderson, 2006, p. 12). 
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the more [a] citizen knows about [a] school bond issue, the clearer she will 
be on what her interests are ... and the more likely she will be to cast a 
vote consistent with those interests.  ...  [In addition, since] politics is an 
ongoing process, and new or more accurate information allows citizens to 
continually refine their political opinions and behaviors so that they better 
match their real interests (Carpini and Keeter, 1996, pp. 14-15). 
 
No matter if a scenario concerns school bond issues or votes on sales tax increases, the 
more information a citizen knows about an issue, the better they are to make choices that 
best represent their concerns. 
 Becoming informed is important, as those citizens who are only able to 
recapitulate a sketchy version of events and political candidates that primarily features 
exciting and dramatic imagery of scenes on the campaign trail will have difficulty 
choosing the representative and policy measure that best serves their projects and 
interests.  As Carpini and Keeter claim: 
how well citizens are able to discern and articulate their interests depends 
not only on the immediate information environment in which any issue is 
debated, but also on their ability to put this new information into a broader 
personal and political perspective (Carpini and Keeter, 1996, p. x). 
 
While citizens seek contextual information about their concerns, doing so in some 
absolute sense is impossible.8 Discussing this reality, William Connolly claims: 
[what we] aspire to, but do not expect to attain completely, is a choice 
between alternative experiences that is fully informed about the factors 
entering into those experiences and helping to make each what it is.  ...  
One who chooses in the light of such self-awareness does not necessarily 
give [all of the bits of information received] full reign: He simply chooses 
after confronting these facts about himself and his setting.  Since it is 
inevitable that no choice will ever be fully informed in this way, we must 
say that the most informed choice available to one in a particular context 
constitutes a judgment in serious pursuit of one's real interests (Connolly, 
1983, pp. 68-69). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 I address this problem at length in chapter two of this dissertation. 
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I agree with Connolly that attaining full information9 is not possible.  This realization, 
however, does not permit one license to forgo the process of becoming as informed as 
one can, keeping in mind that time constraints and opportunity costs must always be 
considered when determining how much effort can be expended upon becoming 
informed.  The point here is that more information10 results in a higher chance that one’s 
choices will best represent one’s projects and interests. 
 Another negative implication that results when uninformed citizens participate 
civically is that they will be at a disadvantage whenever their interests clash with the 
interests of informed political elites.  As Carpini and Keeter claim: 
if more knowledgeable citizens are better equipped to articulate their 
interests and better able to reward and punish political leaders for their 
actions, then when interests clash, less informed citizens are at a decided 
disadvantage (Carpini and Keeter, 1996, p. 218). 
 
Since informed citizens are better able to formulate and articulate their own projects and 
interests, they are better able to select representatives who will create and enact policy 
initiatives that would best serve their concerns.  Since informed citizens can develop and 
express their concerns better than their uninformed counterparts, it is more likely that the 
former will have their projects and interests served at a significantly higher rate than the 
latter via civic participation. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 I discuss what I consider having full information is at length in chapter two by examining Phillip 
Kitcher’s treatment of the impossibility of attaining objective theories of everything, or put simply, 
conceptual schemas that include all of the true facts that could be possibly known about an event, idea, 
concept, etc. 
10 I recognize that information is complex notion.  I will take up some of the issues complicating this 
concept at length in chapter three.  For instance, for something to qualify as information, it needs to be 
relevant to and interpretable by the person needing information.  As I will discuss later, journalists provide 
the relevance filter and make the evidence interpretable. 
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§1.9 Concluding Remarks 
 In this chapter, I argued that citizens in a democracy ideally enjoy equal 
opportunity under the law to deliberate, vote, and express feedback, as well as equal 
voice enabling them to participate civically in order to further their concerns.  To take 
advantage of these equalities, journalists must present citizens hybrid accounts of events 
consisting of narrow- and broad-context information.  In doing so, journalism can serve 
as an effective mechanism to ensure that citizens are best able to deliberate, vote, and 
express feedback effectively.  Since many news stories feature personal and dramatic 
elements of events exclusively, they fail to encourage citizens to develop anything more 
than “narrow-context” views.  Developing mere narrow-context views fails to render 
citizens informed and motivated, since the satisfying these conditions requires that 
citizens develop broad-context views as well. 
 In the next chapter, I will examine the notion of journalistic objectivity, 
questioning its status as an ideal journalists should strive to attain when constructing 
news narratives.  Ultimately, I will argue that journalistic objectivity should be 
abandoned since, as I will demonstrate, constructing an objective, value-free account of 
an event is impossible, since framing requires the use of value-laden appraisals.  This 
discussion will ground my aim in chapter three to investigate the journalistic practice of 
framing and the way different types of framing (e.g., episodic vs. thematic) affect 
citizens’ information processing capabilities.  In examining these effects, I will discuss 
several psychological theories of perception and learning to show how episodic framing 
inhibits citizens’ ability to form contextually rich views of events, buttressing my claim 
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that journalists should avoid framing stories episodically, and instead frame accounts that 
present hybrid narrow- and broad-context information. 
 In chapter four, I will investigate the psychological ground of emotional arousal 
to show how hybrid narratives can encourage citizens to become informed and motivated 
to resolve societal problems.  In particular, a noncognitive, process-centered view of 
emotional response grounded upon appraisal theory will be examined as doing so will 
show why both narrow- and broad-context information must be included within 
narratives, and why mere narrow-context nor mere broad-context information can satisfy 
four conditions11 that render one informed and motivated.  This examination will buttress 
my discussion about citizens’ disinterest in consuming hybrid accounts in chapter five.  
As I will argue, citizens deem hybrid accounts uninteresting due to audience members’ 
apathetic outlook toward social problems that is grounded upon a fatalistic attitude 
toward the manifestation of events.  Lastly, I will show that citizens’ interest in 
consuming hybrid accounts will rise if journalists present information to citizens that 
encourages them to become informed and motivated, as doing so will enable them to 
participate civically to further individuals’ projects and interests.  Upon feeling 
empowered by information presented via hybrid narratives, citizens will readily seek 
them out. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Elizabeth Anderson suggested these four conditions in: Anderson, E. (2007). Fair opportunity in 
education: A democratic equality perspective. Ethics, 117(4), 595-622.  They are as follows: (1) an 
awareness of societal problems; (2) a disposition to resolve social issues; (3) technical knowledge needed to 
resolve social issues; and (4) socio-cultural capital enabling citizens to cooperatively and respectfully 
interact with individuals across sectoral lines. 
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Chapter Two 
Objectivity: Abandoning an Ideal 
§2.1 Introduction 
Journalists employ the term ‘objectivity’ quite loosely, using it to express ideas 
ranging from constraints on journalistic practice to emotive expression.  In this chapter, I 
will argue that journalists should abandon objectivity as an ideal because it is not 
metaphysically possible to attain a context-independent perspective free from value-laden 
appraisals that inform our perspectives about our experiential environment.  To show this, 
I will examine Phillip Kitcher’s work in the philosophy of science because examining 
this view will allow me to argue that attempts to present hybrid narratives must not aim at 
encouraging citizens to attain some objective understanding via a single, unified 
framework, since such a framework can never be attained.  Further, since the creation of 
narratives (in general) necessarily involves emphasizing certain bits of information and 
deemphasizing others, it is impossible for journalists to avoid the inclusion of framing 
bias, since framing requires the use of value-laden appraisals.  In other words, narratives 
cannot exist as value-neutral, objective accounts entirely free from bias.  Because of this, 
journalists should abandon objectivity as an ideal. 
§2.2 The Origin and Rise of Journalistic Objectivity 
 Three major factors contributed to the emergence and rise of modern journalism’s 
adherence to objectivity as an ideal: advances in communication technology, economic 
development, and social change.  Journalistic objectivity’s origins can be traced to mid-
1800s “economic and social conditions surrounding the rise of mass-market news” 
(Bennett, 2006, p. 185).  Modern journalistic practices now considered as promoting 
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objectivity originated before journalists used the term ‘objectivity’ to describe such 
practices.  In other words, “what began as a technique became a value” (Cannon, 1977, p. 
35).  Each of the practices described below arose often independently of one another, and 
by the end of the 1800s, the foundations for all modern journalistic practices had become 
entrenched within the profession. 
The label ‘objective journalism’ serves two functions.  First, journalists use it as 
an ennobling claim to encourage citizens (as well as themselves) to view their occupation 
as a profession worthy of high esteem.  Second, journalists evoke the phrase ‘objective 
journalism’ as a rhetorical appeal offered to an increasingly educated middle-class whose 
population began to value professionalism around the dawn of the 20th century. 
The emergence of practices aimed toward the promotion of objectivity signified a 
marked shift in ideology from the early days of American journalism.  The early 
American press (late-1700s – mid-1800s) presented coverage that was markedly 
politically biased, churning out content that was largely geared toward particular political 
parties and ideologies.  As Robert McChesney claims: 
[d]uring the first two or three generations of the Republic [journalistic 
objectivity] for the press would have been nonsensical, even unthinkable.  
The point of journalism was to persuade as well as inform, and the press 
tended to be highly partisan" (McChesney, 2003, p. 300). 
 
During this period, “reporting”, meant providing a political analysis of events.  Citizens 
habitually consumed news that projected the political slant that they favored the most.  
Many journalists and intellectuals alike believed at the time that encouraging citizens to 
consume information fueled by opposing political biases would enable them to debate 
differing viewpoints, which was deemed good for democracy.  In fact, Jefferson favored 
this practice especially.  So much in fact, that he collaborated with James Madison to 
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found one such newspaper: The National Gazette.  Their aim was to counter the federalist 
sentiment furthered by a rival paper: The Gazette of the United States, which served as a 
mouthpiece for pro-Federalist ideology and hub for the writings of Alexander Hamilton 
and John Adams.  Construing reporting as providing a political analysis of events, 
however, faded away from journalistic practice during the 1830s.  As a result, political 
parties, who once took full advantage of small run newspapers eager to publish the party 
line, stopped funding such entities.  This transition was in part motivated by strict reforms 
in campaigning practices that greatly limited politicians’ ability to campaign publicly.  
Since most small run newspapers could no longer compete with large mass media news 
organizations once political parties rescinded their offers to subsidize funding, most small 
news outlets went under. 
Significant changes in both the population and territorial size of the United States 
in the late 1800s sparked an economic transformation of the news industry.  For instance, 
a large percentage of citizens moved to cities as industrialization emerged.  Newly 
created residential sectors featured dense populations.  This migration sparked the 
emergence of mass audience markets.  The expansion of U.S. territory created a need for 
fast and large-scale news distribution.  Recognizing this need, journalists took advantage 
of new technological advances in communication tools, enabling them to distribute news 
widely and quickly.  For example, the telegraph allowed for the speedy transfer of 
information over vast distances.  The transmittal of information by telegraph made stories 
shorter and simpler; thus, the simplified story format (i.e., documentary style reporting) 
was born.  Documentary style reporting requires that the lead must contain information 
about the five following elements (the five Ws): who the subjects are; what the story is 
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about; when the event(s) occurred; where it occurred; and why it occurred.  Another 
technique, the inverted pyramid style of reporting (loosely related to documentary style 
reporting), that requires that journalists place what they deem to be the most important 
facts involved with an event first, followed by those they believe are less important, 
originated in communiqués about the Civil War written by War Secretary Edwin Stanton 
(Bennett, 2006, p. 185).  Including information about the five Ws at the beginning of a 
story allowed journalists to write compact stories that conveyed information in a concise, 
economical manner.  Readers of such stories received what journalists considered the 
most important facts up front, with details assessed as being less important coming later. 
Standardization, as a journalistic practice, emerged in 1848 via the formation of 
the Associated Press (AP).  The AP began the practice of pooling together reporters, 
which allowed them to sell the same stories to thousands of subscribers.  This enabled 
news media outlets to dramatically increase their audience and marketability, thus 
allowing news distribution to become quite profitable for the first time.  The broad 
marketability of news content demanded that journalists remove political bias.  In 
addition, during this period journalists adopted the story form, as the increased demand 
for information, alongside the employment of a multitude of journalists with little to no 
training, created an environment where news reports must be produced with minimal 
effort.  As William Sloan and Lisa Parcell claim: 
[t]he story form was ... used to tell simple stories without significant 
comment.  News from the police courts was a mainstay of penny papers 
and cases were frequently written in story form.  The stories usually 
contained some dialogue and the writing style included a liberal use of 
metaphors.  Brief stories were also told to amuse readers—for example, a 
story might end with, "The spree has excited considerable merriment.”  
(Sloan & Parcell, 2002, p. 299). 
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In other words, the story form capitalized on two extant realities: many journalists were 
unable to offer much insight about an event’s broad-context perspective, and citizens 
wanted to be entertained by the news they consumed.  Penny papers (i.e., the yellow 
press) provided avenues for publishers to exploit both of these realities.  Since both the 
readers of penny papers and the journalists who wrote them had been privy to receiving 
at most, a minimal education, journalists were encouraged to be generalists, rather than 
specialists.  It was cheaper for news outlets to not invest in extensive training required for 
journalists to become experts in a field when little to none of their audience desired to 
read in depth analyses of events.  Typically, penny papers were tabloid-style newspapers 
that featured dramatic accounts of crimes and highly sensationalized gossip.  Penny 
papers cost around a penny, thus making them affordable to the general public.  
Traditional newspapers generally cost quite a bit more and the majority of working class 
citizens deemed them an unaffordable luxury.  Due to the association of penny papers 
with the lower class, many upper class citizens demanded that their news (which came 
via traditional media outlets) “not soil the breakfast cloth”.  In fact, The New York Times 
(NYT) adopted this slogan in its fight against yellow journalism.  Another slogan the 
NYT made popular was: “all the news that’s fit to print”.  The NYT adopted these 
slogans because upper class citizens (and rising middle class citizens) demanded that 
traditional newspapers uphold standards of good taste by not publishing material deemed 
obscene or inappropriate by members of high society.  Further periods of economic 
prosperity brought many new faces to the ranks of the middle class.  With this upward 
economic trend came the insistence that journalism continue to be conducted with the 
aforementioned aspects of professionalism in mind, trends that were mostly found within 
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the journalistic practices of traditional news outlets.  The rise of the middle class 
essentially destroyed any foothold that news outlets publishing penny papers had 
established and most went under. 
As a result of the efforts to make news reporting more objective, editorial review 
boards were established at major news outlets to oversee journalistic practice.  
Throughout the years, editorial review boards have come to play an integral role by 
enforcing journalistic objectivity in the newsroom.  Their primary role is to ensure that 
journalists adopt the role of a politically neutral adversary; observe prevailing standards 
of taste; adhere to documentary reporting practices; utilize a standardized format for 
reporting (e.g., the story form); and are trained as generalists and not specialists (for the 
most part). 
It was after this period of standardization that journalists began searching for a 
defining value that could describe how one should ideally practice their profession.  In 
the late 1800s, realism came to serve as the professional journalist’s mantra.  As Bill 
Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel note: 
[realism] was the idea that if reporters simply dug out the facts and 
ordered them together, the truth would reveal itself rather naturally.  
Realism emerged at a time when journalism was separating from political 
parties and becoming more accurate.  It coincided with the invention of 
what journalists call the inverted pyramid, in which a journalist lines the 
facts up from most important to least important, thinking it helps 
audiences understand things naturally, (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001, p. 
82). 
 
By the 1920s, however, many journalists considered realism to be an exercise in sheer 
naïveté.  It was during this period that Walter Lippmann argued that objectivity should 
replace realism as journalism’s standard-bearer.  Lippmann insisted that journalists 
should adhere to rigorous methodological standards.  In other words, Lippmann desired 
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to transform journalism into a science.  Just as the peer review process in academia 
requires that reviewers evaluate work anonymously, Lippmann insisted that journalists 
must gather facts and present information in ways that protect against any biases that they 
may hold.  According to Lippmann, journalists must not impregnate stories with their 
own irrational and heavily biased subjectivity so that what flows from their efforts is the 
dissemination of disinterested facts.  While Lippmann did not assume that by laying out 
and ordering facts that truth would mysteriously present itself, he did believe that 
removing one’s subjectivity so that one is left with disinterested facts bests one chances 
to relay objective narratives to the audience.  As Lippmann claims in response to an 
article that appeared in the New York Times covering the Russian revolution of 1917 
(i.e., the Bolshevik revolution): 
[journalists must] remain clear and free of his irrational, his unexamined, 
his unacknowledged prejudgments in observing, understanding and 
presenting the news (Lippmann, 1919, as cited by Kovach & Rosenstiel, 
2001, p. 73). 
 
Lippmann’s concern was that the journalists who covered the story did not employ 
methods of gathering and presenting data that avoided bias.  As he claims: 
the news about Russia is a case of seeing not what was, but what men 
wished to see" (Lippmann, 1920, p. 3). 
 
His hope was that objectivity, as an ideal that captured the spirit of methodological 
unification, as well as an adherence to rigorous standards of observation found within the 
scientific community, would enable journalists to practice their craft with more 
discipline.  I share Lippmann’s desire for journalists to adhere to rigorous methodological 
standards to ensure that they do not frame stories in ways that present false or even partial 
truths to citizens.  I do not, however, believe that striving to remain objective is any less 
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naïve than attempting to adhere to realism, since I do not find it possible for journalists to 
present context-independent accounts of events (or of anything for that matter).  To 
demonstrate this, I will now examine Phillip Kitcher’s account of context dependency 
and his claim that attempts to attain objective understanding via a single, unified 
framework are misguided. 
§2.3 Context-dependency 
In the context of discussing scientific claims, Kitcher argues that it is impossible 
to develop a context-independent view about our world that is free from value-laden 
appraisals.  Since there is often a gap between theory and evidence, scientists are forced 
to rely upon value-laden appraisals when adopting views describing experiential 
phenomena.  Asserting that scientists are sometimes forced to make such assessments, he 
claims: 
[a]ccording to the global underdetermination thesis, there is a way of 
developing the rejected rival(s) to obtain a theory (theories) that would be 
just as well supported by the new evidence—the evidence that allegedly puts 
an end to debate—as the doctrine that is actually accepted.  Scientists thus 
make choices when there is no evidential basis for doing so (Kitcher, 2001, 
p. 31). 
 
Further, he discusses the implications that come to bear concerning the global 
underdetermination thesis by asserting that it 
claims there are alternative theories which are not simply equally well 
supported by any evidence we have but which would continue to be 
equally well supported given any amount of evidence we could ever 
collect[.] …  [F]or any further results that might be garnered (i.e., 
theoretical developments), there is always a way to extend each of the 
rivals to obtain theories which continue to be equally well supported 
(Kitcher, 2001, p. 35). 
 
Put simply, it is problematic that in every case where one attempts to describe an event or 
series of phenomena, one can develop a rival theory that has equal explanatory power as 
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any other because it is possible to augment each theory in different ways that give rise to 
different and contradictory theories, where each theory has just as much explanatory 
power as any other.  In these cases, how do theorists decide which conception is best?  
Kitcher posits that theorists invoke the use of value-laden judgments.  Concerning this 
point, he asks: 
[h]ow do they break the ties?  …  Since there are no objective standards 
for judging the victorious hypothesis to be superior, the decision in its 
favor must be based on values: scientists (tacitly or explicitly) arrive at 
their verdict by considering what fits best with their view of the good or 
the beautiful or what will bring them happiness (Kitcher, 2001, p. 35). 
 
Whenever faced with no evidence that points one way or the other, theorists will favor 
the view that best serves their purposes, brings them the most utility, or is the most 
aesthetically pleasing to them. 
 Kitcher’s findings are useful for my discussion of journalism because it helps me 
argue that news reports can be seen as offering competing theories about the causes of the 
events that are being covered.  Because it is possible for different journalists to construct 
competing accounts of the same event, with each narrative having the same explanatory 
power as the other, journalists must make value-laden judgments to decide which account 
to present. For instance, since most journalists seek to present stories that news 
consumers will find interesting, when faced with the choice between two accounts with 
equal explanatory power, it follows from Kitcher’s view that journalists will select the 
narrative that is the most intriguing or provocative. 
 Examining this phenomenon, Helen Longino discusses the case of context 
attribution surrounding the discovery of stone tools uncovered in various locales around 
the globe.  Providing equally compelling theories of context attribution to the primitive 
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implements are two gender specific views: the gynecentric (woman-the-gatherer) and 
androcentric (man-the-hunter) models.  Both models attribute the source of the tools in 
different, gender specific contexts.  As she states: 
[m]an-the-hunter theorists ... describe the role of the chipped stones in the 
killing and preparation of other animals, using as their model the behavior 
of contemporary hunting peoples.  Woman-the-gatherer theorists ... 
describe their role in the preparation of edible vegetation obtained while 
gathering, relying, for their part, on the model of gathering behavior 
among hunter/gatherers (Longino, 1990, p. 109). 
 
Since theorists consider both views equally compelling, there is no prima facie way to 
determine which theory best provides context attribution for the primitive tools.  Longino 
asserts that 
[n]one of the admissible data, thus, provides any sort of decisive or even 
unequivocal evidence for or against either of the two accounts.  How the 
data are read depends on whether one is working within the framework of 
man-the-hunter or woman-the-gatherer (Longino, 1990, p. 109). 
 
How can our social environment be transformed so that the possibility of reaching 
objectivity obtains?  Concerning a prescription for motivating such a move, she claims: 
four criteria [are] necessary for achieving the transformative dimension of 
critical discourse: (1) there must be recognized avenues for the criticism of 
evidence, of methods, and of assumptions and reasoning; (2) there must be 
shared standards that critics can invoke; (3) the community as a whole 
must be responsive to such criticism; (4) intellectual authority must be 
shared equally among qualified practitioners (Longino, 1990, p. 76). 
 
Longino’s approach is to save objectivity by abandoning the view that it provides an 
absolute theory of everything.  Rather, she posits objectivity as involving a series of 
procedures that make it possible that value-laden assessments are rendered transparent 
and exposed to scrutiny issued by other members of the scientific community.  Longino’s 
procedural objectivity is best viewed as a process wherein ideas are exposed to 
intersubjective criticism in hope that they can be revised by way of screening out the 
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newly uncovered subjective preferences (i.e., value-laden assessments) in which they are 
grounded.  Describing her view of objectivity, she claims: 
objectivity has to do with modes of inquiry.  In this sense to attribute 
objectivity to science is to claim that the view provided by science is one 
achieved by reliance upon nonarbitrary and nonsubjective criteria for 
developing, accepting, and rejecting the hypotheses and theories that make 
up the view (Longino, 1990, p. 62). 
 
Here Longino is claiming that if ideas are evaluated using intersubjectively agreed upon 
(and thereby nonsubjective) standards, then what would result are views that no longer 
bear the mark of subjectivity, as the worry that they are grounded upon nothing more than 
value-laden, subjective preferences holds little bite. 
 I agree with Longino’s first three criteria (though not the fourth), as well as her 
overall aim to create a schema designed to expose the value-laden assessments that 
inform one’s views via public scrutiny12.  That said, I am not sympathetic toward her 
refusal to abandon objectivity, even if the type she entertains seems more like 
intersubjectivity than objectivity with a capital “O” (i.e., a theory from nowhere).  As will 
be discussed below, objectivity is a particularly troublesome notion in journalism and 
much of the problems addressed in this dissertation have arisen out of journalists’ 
attempts to adhere to it as a guiding ideal.  For reasons I will express in the latter part of 
this chapter, I believe it would be best for journalism to abandon objectivity altogether. 
 Revisiting the fourth criterion she offers as a way of making objective appraisals 
at the communal level possible will help expose further problems with Longino’s view.  
As she claims: “(4) intellectual authority must be shared equally among qualified 
practitioners” (Longino, 1990, p. 76).  While she is only speaking about ensuring that 
segments of society are not denied equal opportunity and equal voice, the worry that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I discuss this point later in this chapter when considering deliberation’s role within democracy. 
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some participants are not well-suited for such a responsibility remains.  Within society at-
large, ensuring that all participants are equally qualified, or equally able to deliberate, 
vote, and express feedback effectively, seems implausible.  If we assumed that all citizens 
meet such a criterion, two problems would emerge.  One, we would be wrong in 
assuming that civic participants possess equal intellectual ability, training, and 
motivation13.  Clearly, they do not.  Many citizens do not exhibit these qualities.  Two, if 
we were to attempt to ensure that all civic participants express such traits, we might be 
tempted to ascribe civic agency only to those individuals deemed qualified to participate 
in civic life.  Both of these assumptions are misguided and the latter would prove harmful 
since a large number of individuals would be excluded and not afforded equal 
opportunity and equal voice. 
If journalists are to abandon objectivity as an ideal, Kitcher’s view can serve as a 
viable replacement.  He advocates that individuals should seek a piecemeal view of our 
world that involves the continual addition of bits of interconnected experience.  The types 
of information that accumulate depend upon the sorts of projects and interests we hold.  It 
is the particular concerns that are unique to each group of people that determine which 
pieces of information individuals deem epistemically significant. 
Even though Kitcher’s view features context-dependency, it also involves 
unification.  Such unification, however, is context-dependent as it involves locally unified 
pieces of information that individuals hold as epistemically significant to practical 
interests instead of the universe-at-large.  It is the particular projects and interests that are 
unique to each group of people that determine which pieces of information individuals 
deem epistemically significant.  As Kitcher states: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 I will address the problem of motivation at length in chapter four. 
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[t]he most we can expect from a theory of explanation is some 
understanding of how these questions and interests shift our inquiries, and 
the complex environments in which they occur, evolve (Kitcher, 2001, p. 
76). 
 
Put simply, since the theories of explanation that are offered always involve locally 
unified pieces of information about citizens’ concerns, we should not expect such 
theories to encompass the experiential environment of every being in the universe and 
their metaphysical commitments. 
§2.4 Models of Journalistic Objectivity 
Even though there are good reasons to abandon objectivity as an ideal, many 
journalists refuse to do so.  Discussing how journalists interpret this ideal will further 
elucidate its unattractiveness.  According to Robert Mindich, journalists believe that 
objectivity demands that they should remain value-neutral and detached from the facts 
presented within the stories (Mindich, 2000, p. 8).  In other words, journalists should not 
insert their own opinions about the facts they are presenting and how those facts may 
interrelate.  This means that journalists must allow facts to portray reality as it exists in 
itself, and not rely upon value-laden appraisals while expressing a view of this reality 
(Mindich, 2000, p. 8).  Describing this belief, Stephen Ward claims that those who favor 
this version of journalistic objectivity hold that 
[there exists] a hard, clear line between news and opinion in the 
newspaper. …  For objectivists, news [does] not differ from opinion by 
having less interpretation or comment—it [has] no interpretation or 
opinion ... only statements of facts.  ...  Interpretations [contain] value 
judgments—one person’s subjective "opinion" (Ward, 2005, p. 217). 
 
Michael Schudson labels journalists who construe objectivity in the above manner: 
“naïve empiricists”, and by this he intends that they "believe ... that facts are not human 
statements about the world but aspects of the world itself" (Schudson, 1978, p. 6).  Put 
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another way, these journalists believe that facts about the world lie independent of our 
subjective beliefs.  In this way, facts are mind independent externalities.  As Schudson 
states: 
the belief in objectivity is just this: the belief that one can separate facts 
from values.  Facts, in this view, are assertions about the world open to 
independent validation.  They stand beyond the distorting influences of 
any individual's personal preferences.  Values, in this view, are an 
individual's conscious or unconscious preferences for what the world 
should be; they are seen as ultimately subjective and so without legitimate 
claim on other people.  The belief in objectivity is a faith in "facts," a 
distrust of "values," and a commitment to their segregation (Schudson, 
1978, pp. 5-6). 
 
A commitment to journalistic objectivity amounts to the wholesale segregation of facts 
and values.  Objective reporting involves the presentation of facts about the world, 
devoid of any values held by journalists.  Without journalists’ values intruding upon 
facts, audience members and journalists alike believe that narratives present value-free 
perspectives or views from nowhere.  In a 2010 survey asking whether citizens prefer 
news with no particular point of view, a majority of respondents answered affirmatively.  
As researchers from the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press claim: 
[a]bout six-in-ten (62%) say they prefer getting political news from 
sources that do not have a particular point of view (Americans Spending 
More Time, 2010, p. 47). 
 
The claim made by proponents of this construal of objectivity, that journalists 
should remain value-neutral and detached from the facts presented within news stories, is 
misguided, as the call for detachment is mysterious, impossible to achieve, and can prove 
harmful.  What sort of detachment is required of journalists?  This is quite mysterious 
indeed.  Perhaps, journalists should select which facts to include in a story at random.  If 
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they did so, the accounts created would mostly be incoherent and not useful for citizens 
hoping to become informed and motivated by consuming them. 
Furthermore, seeking detachment by segregating facts from values is impossible 
to achieve due to framing bias, which is the inevitable reliance upon normative, value-
laden assessments to select out certain features pertaining to an event, while allowing 
those features to solely represent the case under description.  Picking out significant 
features of an event to present inevitably introduces bias because value-laden assessments 
ground the selection of certain features and the suppression of others.  Depending upon 
the ideological commitments one holds, the features deemed the most salient change. 
For instance, if a person without any knowledge of the Virginia Tech shooting 
asks me to describe the incident, I may provide the following account.  “On April 16, 
2007, a mentally disturbed student with a documented history of displaying questionable 
behavior, who had managed to legally procure firearms due to restrictions in the state of 
Virginia’s healthcare privacy laws, engaged in a killing spree on the campus of a rural 
Virginia state university that left 33 dead and another 23 injured”.  Surely there are other 
elements that someone else may deem important that I chose not to feature in the account 
I offered.  Perhaps another person may deem it salient to note that the killer believed 
himself to be righting the wrongs of an unjust society.  The point here is that whenever 
one attempts to describe an event, one must select out certain elements as more salient 
than others to provide an account of the incident being described.  To accomplish this, 
one must rely upon value-laden appraisals during the act of description.  My decision to 
frame the account as a mental health issue, rather than a revenge plot, demonstrates that I 
assessed the killer’s mental state as having more causal significance for the event than the 
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issue of revenge.  I grounded my decision upon a normative, value-laden assessment of 
the causal significance of the phenomena described.  In particular, I value citizens’ ability 
to become informed and motivated by developing contextually rich views of events.  To 
that end, I framed the above account in a way that stressed the interconnection between 
the 2007 shooting and mental health, state legislation, and gun ownership.  I deemed it 
necessary for citizens to understand that each of these topics is important to the story, and 
more so, that these topics are interrelated in various ways, making this is highly complex 
issue. 
If biases are detectable and owned up to, they are not pernicious.  Framing bias is 
detrimental when it is hidden because hidden framing bias inhibits the audience’s ability 
to understand what ideologies may be motivating journalists to frame stories in particular 
ways.  If journalists are forthright about their ideological commitments and those values 
that might have influenced the framing of the narrative they are presenting, then citizens 
can reflect upon how the account was organized and attempt to uncover such values and 
understand how they helped shape the narrative.  Moreover, citizens consuming news 
stories framed by different journalists can compare and contrast accounts presenting 
coverage of the same events, affording individuals the ability to come to appreciate these 
events from a variety of angles, which broadens the scope of citizens’ views.  Journalists 
who claim that they are able to segregate facts from values and that the stories they 
produce contain “just the facts”, assume that they are presenting citizens eyewitness 
accounts where the only bias is the viewer’s own.  In reality, however, journalists are 
introducing a second perspective or bias: their own. 
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In some instances, framing bias proves harmful.  In cases where journalists frame 
mere narrow-context information as salient and ignore broad-context information, 
audience members find it difficult to appreciate what led to the event and how it may 
influence future events.  If I had framed my narrative to include information pertaining 
merely to the victims’ suffering, the killer’s blood lust, or the parents’ terror in my 
description of the shooting, one would be hard pressed to figure out what caused this 
incident and how its occurrence may influence future events because of two problems.  
One, hidden framing bias disguised by a “just the facts” style causes citizens to ignore 
contextually rich information as evidenced in this example by its omission.  Two, the 
framing in this case is shallow as no broad-context to put the event into perspective is 
provided.  Only by discovering the event’s interconnection with notions like healthcare 
privacy legislation, gun laws, early warning signs of mental illness, etc. can one 
understand what led to the shooting and how citizens could work toward preventing 
future incidents of this type. 
In addition, if journalists provide more salience to broad-context information than 
narrow-context data, citizens would have the ability to make use of the former to help 
them judge for themselves whether journalists have provided the right information.  With 
this judgment in hand, individuals could speak out whenever they believe that journalists 
are failing to present accounts that best enhance citizens’ ability to hold deliberation, 
vote, and express feedback.  Without journalists providing contextually rich information, 
citizens most likely would not even be aware that important elements were missing. 
By providing information in a “just the facts” news style, journalists demonstrate 
that they assume that they are presenting facts without any normative, value-laden 
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assessment of which facts are more important than others, while allowing those facts to 
solely represent the case under description.  This is not the case, as framing bias is 
inevitable, and at times harmful.  Without broad-context information, citizens are unable 
to appreciate why journalists provided particular facts more salience than others.  When 
journalists attempt to provide nothing but the facts, many times they resort to presenting 
narrow-context accounts packaged in short, isolated blips (whether video clips, sound 
bites, tag lines, etc.).  In other words, journalists are often afraid that providing broad-
context accounts would require them to provide a story with contextual richness that 
necessitates that they adopt a backdrop of partiality.  To many journalists, providing 
contextual richness would require them to “fill in the gaps”, which, many journalists 
believe would impose bias upon those facts.  As David Hildebrand claims: 
one effect of neutrality is the minimization of context in news stories and 
thus the reduction of public understanding (Hildebrand, 2011, p. 6). 
 
Put another way, the call for neutrality causes journalists to provide stories minimal 
context and this inhibits citizens from forming broad-context perspectives about events. 
 The call for journalistic detachment proves harmful in yet another way.  Say a 
journalist is aware that citizens expect her to remain impartial when presenting a series of 
statements.  It would be possible for her to take measures, by using slogans like “Fair & 
Balanced”, to persuade citizens to believe that she is remaining impartial when presenting 
a view of events.  Would she be required to remain impartial in actuality?  No.  I suspect 
that, in many cases, when citizens claim that journalists are disingenuous, peddlers of 
misinformation, this is the type of behavior they have in mind.  Concerning this problem, 
Tom Rosenstiel and Bill Kovach state: 
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this neutral voice, without a discipline of verification, creates a veneer 
covering something hollow.  Journalists who select sources to express 
what is really their own point of view ... [and who] use the neutral voice to 
make it seem objective, are engaged in a form of deception.  This damages 
the credibility of the whole profession by making it seem unprincipled, 
dishonest, and biased ... [at a time] when the standards of the press are so 
in doubt (Rosenstiel & Kovach, 2007, p. 83). 
 
So without a way to verify claims made by journalists, there is no way to discern whether 
they are impartially presenting information or not.  This lack of verification leads citizens 
to often doubt the press.  This is a disturbing reality, as citizens require information 
suitable for enhancing their ability to deliberate, vote, and express feedback.  If citizens 
frequently doubt journalists’ ability to present such information, then citizens may turn a 
blind eye to the press, refusing to consume information they consider erroneous at best 
and purposely presented disingenuously at worst. 
 Moreover, the slogan “Fair & Balanced” indicates a second strategy for achieving 
objectivity, namely by presenting a “balanced” view consisting of more than one side of a 
story.  This is usually achieved by presenting two sides of a story via a “he said/she said” 
approach.  This is problematic because there are always more than two sides to a story.  
Pretending that presenting two sides of a story exhausts all possibilities is naïve, and also 
dangerous because it makes societal problems appear less complex than they actually are.  
Perhaps instead, offering a “balanced” view entails that some journalists frame narratives 
using ideological commitments that run counter to what is perceived as the norm in 
mainstream media.  For instance, journalists on Fox News often argue that since most 
news outlets present information laden with liberal political bias, their news, which is 
driven with a conservative political bias, balances the scales, so to speak.  Theoretically, I 
do not find this problematic.  Citizens share a responsibility to seek information from a 
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variety of news outlets.  This is not controversial considering Dewey’s recommendation 
(as noted in §1.4) that citizens seek out enough information to reasonably understand 
problems and the possible solutions, their consequences, and their costs.  In this case, 
seeking out information requires that citizens consume news crafted by journalists 
espousing a variety of political ideologies. 
 Related to the above concern is the worry that citizens will self-select which 
stories they consume based upon the ideological perspectives individuals hold.  For 
instance, a conservative-minded citizen might choose to rely upon Fox News or the Wall 
Street Journal exclusively to receive information about social issues and events.  This 
happens frequently.  Since citizens self-select which narratives they consume, individuals 
may fail to develop contextually rich views of societal problems framed from a variety of 
ideological perspectives.  In response, I argue that to effectively solve problems via civic 
participation, citizens must seek out numerous sources of information from a diverse 
variety of ideological perspectives if individuals hope to reasonably understand problems.  
Failing to seek out numerous sources of information from a diverse variety of ideological 
perspectives will lessen the chance that citizens become informed and motivated to 
resolve social issues. 
 As I noted in chapter one, without a rich context in which to place the facts they 
receive, citizens are often unable to become informed and motivated.  Meaningful context 
and background information concerning how the facts that journalists disseminate 
connect with citizens’ projects and interests is the most important information presented 
by journalists.  Providing such context requires that journalists present accounts that 
feature broad-context information because without this, it is improbable that citizens will 
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become informed.  Also important is information conveying the personal and dramatic 
elements of the subjective experiences of others.  Without the latter, it is unlikely that 
audience members will become motivated to resolve societal problems14.  In the next 
section, I will examine narrow- and broad-context accounts themselves, taking care to 
demonstrate how both types can be integrated to form hybrid narratives. 
§2.5 Narrow- and Broad-Context Accounts 
 Limiting citizens’ ability to participate civically are certain unreliable methods 
journalists use to present information to audience members.  One such unreliable method 
involves the presentation of narrow-context accounts.  As explained in §1.1, narratives that 
provide mere awareness of the personal and dramatic elements of events are narrow-
context accounts.  This method is problematic, since disseminating stories that present 
information through narrow-context accounts fails to encourage citizens to become 
informed and motivated.  Informed and motivated citizens necessarily possess knowledge 
about the socio-economic and political causal foundation and significance of events, that 
is, they hold “broad-context” views. 
 Presenting information in ways that encourage citizens to develop mere narrow-
context views inhibits their efforts to make full use of discover effective solutions to the 
problems they face, as their understanding of such problems is extremely limited in 
scope, and solving complex problems often requires citizens to develop more 
theoretically and contextually sophisticated perspectives. 
 Take the following two examples as tokens of narratives that feature narrow- and 
broad-context accounts, respectively.  Concerning a narrative presenting a narrow-
context account, take the case of a story published on CNN.com about the shooting that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 I discuss the importance of including narrow-context information at length in chapter four. 
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took place in April 2007 on the campus of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute in 
Blacksburg, Virginia (Students Describe Panic, CNN.com)15. 
Students describe panic and confusion after shooting 
 
POSTED: 8:29 p.m. EDT, April 16, 2007 
 
(CNN)  -- A gunman shot and killed himself after opening fire in a dorm 
and classroom at Virginia Tech on Monday, killing at least 32 others in the 
deadliest shooting spree in U.S. history. 
 
Students in Blacksburg, Virginia, described a chaotic scene as word of the 
shootings spread by e-mail, word-of-mouth and the school's emergency 
loudspeakers: 
  
Tiffany Otey, Virginia Tech student: "At first we really weren't sure what 
was going on.  It sounded like construction.  There's a lot of construction 
going on always during our classes at that time.  Then it was like a 
continuous gunfire going off like every second or so there would be 
another shot.  There was approximately probably 50 shots total.  ...  At one 
point we did hear screaming because people were running out of the 
building and at this point, we were all kind of frightened as to wonder, 
what happens to us?  We're like sitting there, too, like, who knows if the 
shooter was going to come up the next floor.  
   
Maybe 10 minutes later we were in the room.  The police came up.  They 
all had bulletproof vests on, machine guns.  They were telling us to put our 
hands above our head and if we didn't cooperate and put our hands above 
our heads they would shoot.  I guess they were afraid, like us, like the 
shooter was going to be among one of us.  So we were told to keep our 
hands above our head and run out of the building.  At one point, somebody 
didn't have their hands above their head and one of the cops stated, you 
know, put your hands above your head, like we're going to have to shoot” 
(Students Describe Shooting). 
 
 Much of the data presented in this narrative comes via an eyewitness account that 
gives the audience access to the subjective experiences of the victims.  The story begins 
by providing minimal contextually rich information by stating that the incident was “the 
deadliest shooting spree in U.S. history” (Students Describe Panic, CNN.com), and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 CNN. (2007, April 16). Students describe panic and confusion after shooting. CNN.com - Breaking 
News, U.S., World, Weather, Entertainment & Video News. Retrieved November 17, 2010, from 
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remainder of the piece offers a personal and dramatic account of the shooting.  This 
narrative fails to present the audience with anything more than a shallow awareness of the 
incident and its immediate aftermath.  Consuming this story leaves the audience unable to 
assemble anything more than an anecdotal account of the gunshots, screams, and 
confusion surrounding what transpired.  Given this framing16, it would be difficult for 
citizens to assemble a view including any other events, or societal problems that could 
have served as catalysts for the shooting.  Further, citizens would be hard pressed to 
understand how it may influence future events.  Because of this, the shooting’s contextual 
significance may escape readers and instead, any intersubjective appreciation of it may be 
limited to (a misconception about) how dangerous college campuses appear to be at 
present. 
 As an example of a narrative presenting a broad-context account of events, take 
the following story presented on the day of the shooting at Virginia Tech.  On April 16, 
the BBC News aired a report that presented contextually rich information about the 
shooting (BBC News).  Similar to other stories aired that day, the opening scenes portray 
police officers hiding behind trees holding machine guns, as well as footage of 
emergency vehicles taking various positions around the campus.  What is significant 
about this report is that the commentary supplied by the journalists who produced this 
segment did not attempt to merely play into the trauma of the event.  The segment’s 
producers chose to include a brief description of the time-line of events and to then 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 I will discuss framing at length in chapter three.  Broadly construed, framing denotes the act of “choosing 
a broad organizing theme for selecting, emphasizing, and linking the elements of a story” (Bennett, 2008, p. 
37).  Frames provide meaning to stories and convey information to citizens by connecting news content 
together thematically (Bennett, 2008, pp. 37-38).  In some cases, journalists use framing to provide stories 
with personal and dramatic elements, while at other times journalists use it to describe an event’s 
contextual surroundings. 
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engage the audience with a substantive discussion about school shootings and gun 
control.  Journalist Matt Fry, who provided the majority of information during the 
segment, discussed various school shootings that have occurred at American schools in 
recent years.  He addressed the frequency of occurrence of such events, as well as their 
magnitude.  In addition, Fry discussed the relation between school shootings and the 
debate about gun control in America by including a brief description of a summit that 
took place after a shooting at an Amish school in Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania in 2006.  
He noted that no gun control measures that could affect the availability of guns were 
created as a result of the discussions that took place during the summit.  Most 
importantly, he noted that it seems as though nothing is substantively accomplished in the 
aftermath of school shootings.  Generally, he claimed, all that manifests is another wave 
of public outcry.  As this example shows, it is possible to afford citizens an opportunity to 
develop a comprehension of events deeper than what journalists offer through stories 
featuring mere narrow-context information. 
 In addition to becoming informed, citizens must become motivated to resolve 
societal problems17.  Just because an individual holds a contextually rich understanding 
of gun violence on college campuses, that does not mean that she will be motivated to 
take action aimed at resolving this issue.  Because of this, narrow-context information 
that can entice citizens to become emotionally engaged with stories and feel connected to 
the victims under description should be presented alongside broad-context information.  
To be clear, to best enable citizens to become informed and motivated to select successful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The focus of chapter four will consist of an exploration of this claim.  In particular, examining a 
noncognitive, process-centered view of emotional arousal that is grounded upon appraisal theory will show 
why personal and dramatic elements must be included alongside broad-context information to encourage 
citizens to become informed and motivated. 
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solutions to societal problems through deliberation, voting, and feedback, journalists 
must present hybrid accounts featuring narrow- and broad-context information.  This is 
so for the following reasons.  One, citizens must be presented information that is personal 
and dramatic so that it encourages them to become aware of, and disposed to act 
responsively toward the projects and interests of others, as well as to attain the ability to 
cooperate with one another successfully (Anderson, 2007, p. 596).  Two, attaining 
contextually rich knowledge of societal problems requires abstract, impersonal 
information about the causal foundation and future significance of events (Anderson, 
2007, p. 596). 
 The following excerpt from a story featured at Reuters.com demonstrates how 
journalists can present information to citizens in ways that encourage individuals to 
become informed, as well as disposed to resolve societal problems. 
English major blamed for Virginia Tech shooting 
 
BLACKSBURG, Virginia (Reuters) - The gunman who massacred 32 
people at Virginia Tech University was identified on Tuesday as a student 
from South Korea and a troubled loner whose behavior had sometimes 
alarmed those around him.  As students and teachers grieved at a tearful 
memorial service led by President George W. Bush, police said Cho 
Seung-Hui, 23, acted alone on Monday in carrying out the deadliest 
shooting rampage in modern U.S. history.  ... 
 
The shooting spree on a sprawling rural campus in southwestern Virginia 
renewed heated debate over gun control in the United States.  It prompted 
foreign critics to rail against a "gun culture" protected by the Western 
world's most lenient gun-control laws. … 
 
Cho, who immigrated to the United States 15 years ago and was raised in 
suburban Washington, D.C., killed himself after opening fire in 
classrooms where he apparently chained doors to prevent escape before 
cutting down his victims one by one.  He used two guns and stopped only 
to reload. … 
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Lucinda Roy, an English professor, told CNN she became concerned after 
Cho's creative writing instructor came to her about disturbing passages he 
had written. 
 
She said she took his writings to university officials, who said nothing 
could be done, and referred him to the university's counseling services. 
 
Neighbors and roommates described Cho as quiet and withdrawn, but one 
former classmate said he was not surprised when he found out the 
shooter's identity. 
 
"Looking back, he fit the exact stereotype of what one would typically 
think of as a 'school shooter' -- a loner, obsessed with violence, and serious 
personal problems," former classmate Ian MacFarlane wrote on an AOL 
blog site. 
 
Cho who was studying English literature, wrote profanity-laced plays and 
had characters talk of pedophilia and attack each other with chainsaws, 
said MacFarlane, now an AOL employee. … 
 
The campus, where there are more than 25,000 full-time students, reeled 
with shock and grief. 
 
For Tuesday's memorial ceremony, an overflow crowd of several thousand 
filled most of the field in the neighboring football arena on a sunny spring 
day. 
 
Many students said they felt exhausted and numb.  Some shook with sobs 
as the hymn "Amazing Grace" played. 
 
"We're just trying to cope with everything," said Jack Nicholson, 21, of 
Leonardtown, Maryland.  "It's just been crazy." … 
 
White House spokeswoman Dana Perino acknowledged that "there is 
going to be and there has been an ongoing national discussion and debate 
about gun control policy," but said the focus for now was on grieving 
families and the school. 
 
More than 30,000 people die from gunshot wounds every year in the 
United States and there are more guns in private hands than in any other 
country.  A powerful gun lobby and grass-roots support for gun ownership 
rights have largely thwarted attempts to tighten controls18 (English major 
blamed, Reuters.com). 
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 The story above provides broad-context information alongside narrow-context 
data.  Such testimony opens readers to the subjective experiences of others, while at the 
same time it provides information about the causal foundation and future significance of 
the shooting.  Concerning the latter, the narrative features information that provides 
citizens knowledge about the severity of the attack in comparison to other school 
shootings; the debate over gun control in the United States; warning signs exhibited by 
troubled students; rates of incidence of gun deaths; gun ownership per capita in 
comparison to other countries; as well as failures to enact stricter gun controls 
domestically.  This story serves as an example of how journalists can present information 
to citizens in ways that encourage them to develop an awareness of the problem at hand, 
a disposition to become responsive, a contextually rich understanding of how such a 
problem may be resolved, and the ability to successfully interact and cooperate with 
others.  Put another way, it demonstrates the form stories should take if journalists hope 
to best facilitate citizens’ efforts to deliberate, vote, and express feedback as such 
accounts best enable citizens to become informed about, and motivated toward resolving, 
societal problems.  Luckily, as noted above, Kitcher’s work provides a model that 
journalists could use to construct hybrid accounts, and he terms these models: 
significance graphs. 
§2.6 Significance Graphs 
 
Remember that when constructing accounts, Kitcher suggests that theorists 
abandon the hope of uncovering some context-independent view from nowhere, and 
instead focus upon evaluating relations of significance between interconnected items.  
Such items are an assortment of “questions, answers, hypotheses, apparatus, methods, 
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and so forth” (Kitcher, 2001, p. 78).  These items can be viewed in two specific ways and 
presented in significance graphs (Kitcher, 2001, p. 78).  One way that we can view items 
on a significance graph is by taking an item-centered perspective.  This approach 
involves the observation of a particular item’s significance.  In item-centered significance 
graphs, the event in question is featured at the center of the graph and then one maps out 
elements connected to that event.  Construing the aggregation of knowledge as a context-
dependent activity rather than a search for the ideal atlas motivates intellectual work to 
accord with human practical interests.  An ideal atlas is an objective, context-independent 
view from nowhere that is not dependent upon a particular perspective with specific 
projects and interests to help determine its shape.  The specific features a map contains 
depend upon constantly evolving sets of conventions that are contextually dependent 
upon such projects and interests.  Describing Kitcher’s use of “ideal atlas”, Antonio 
Diéguez claims that it denotes an: “ideal classification … of the world, or context-
independent objective explanation” (Diéguez, 2012, p. 16).  Concerning the possibility of 
formulating an ideal atlas, Kitcher claims: 
[l]ike maps, scientific theories—or, better, significance graphs—reflect the 
concerns of the age.  There is no ideal atlas, no compendium of laws or 
"objective explanations" at which inquiry aims.  Further, the challenges of 
the present, theoretical and practical, and even the world to be mapped or 
understood, are shaped by the decisions made in the past (Kitcher, 2001, p. 
82). 
 
Via significance graphs, we can plot out our current concerns through our understanding 
of their interrelation to past concerns, though not in a contextually independent manner.  
Our past concerns have influenced what present concerns we have now, as well as what 
concerns will have in the future (in addition to our present concerns’ influence on these 
future concerns as well).  In Kitcher’s view (with which I agree), it is not conceivable to 
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believe that we can construct an objective, idealistic “Theory of Everything” (Kitcher, 
2001, p. 61) when so much of that “everything” depends upon the continual evolution of 
our projects and interests. 
Concerning journalistic practice, we can say that instead of embarking on a quest 
hoping to obtain an objective, context-independent understanding of our world, 
journalists' efforts should be spent mapping out past, present, and possible future events, 
taking care to show how those events are interconnected via relations of significance.  
Significance graphs can serve as models with which journalists can frame narratives that 
offer citizens hybrid accounts19 of events.  By utilizing an item-centered approach, 
journalists can elucidate events’ casual foundation and future significance, as well as the 
subjective experiences of individuals’ closely associated with such events.  Considering 
the aggregation of knowledge as a context-dependent activity rather than a search for the 
ideal atlas would motivate journalists to construct news stories in ways that accord with 
citizens’ projects and interests. 
Public journalism20 suggests that citizens’ projects and interests should motivate 
how journalists present information.  Rather than attempting to capture an unattainable 
level of journalistic objectivity, public journalism requires that journalists focus their 
efforts upon mapping out events’ contextual surroundings in lieu of what projects and 
interests citizens hold.  Since significance graphs enable individuals to plot the vast array 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 I purposely evoked the phrase ‘hybrid accounts’ here rather than ‘broad-context accounts’ to stress that I 
see no theoretical reason why the same graphs that chart out lines of broad-context significance between 
items and events cannot be used to do the same to plot out connections between personal and dramatic 
elements as well. 
20 Public journalism advocates that journalists should present information to audience members in light of a 
commitment to enhancing individuals’ ability to engage in civic participation.  I will discuss public 
journalism and the prescriptions it offers journalists at length in chapter five. 
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of interconnection between items (i.e., events), it is possible to utilize such graphs to plot 
out hybrid accounts of events dependent upon citizens’ concerns. 
For instance, concerning the Virginia Tech shooting that occurred in 2007, 
journalists could use significance graphs to plot out the interconnection between the 
shooter’s clinically documented mental state, the state of Virginia’s privacy laws 
concerning mental health confidentiality at the time of the incident, and his ability to 
legally purchase handguns.  Before the shooting occurred, the state of Virginia did not 
have a system in place that enabled arms dealers to check mental health records to see if 
prospective buyers had ever been clinically diagnosed with disorders that might give 
sellers pause when considering to whom they should sell their weapons.  A significance 
graph that plotted out such points of connectivity could be useful for journalists wishing 
to provide broad-context information concerning how the shooter was able to legally 
purchase firearms before the incident. 
While maps must be accurate, it would be incorrect to assume that we could 
construct maps in ways that would display our world in an ideal or absolute fashion.  This 
lesson holds for journalists constructing news stories as well.  This is important as it 
shows that when speaking about broad-context views, I do not consider such views as 
ideal or objective.  In my view, broad-context views should be accurate, but it would be 
erroneous to assume that one could formulate a perspective of an event that features 
every bit of experience associated with it.  In like turn, it would be misguided for 
journalists to seek out context-independent frameworks when considering what 
information to include within news stories.  As stated above, the approach Kitcher 
advocates that one follow is piecemeal.  In other words, one must continually add 
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information to her cache as she performs various actions that are motivated by her 
context-dependent concerns (or in the case of journalists working under the public 
journalism model, citizens’ context-dependent concerns).  As Kitcher claims, “[i]instead 
of a single system within which all “objective” explanations are subsumed, we proceed 
piecemeal” (Kitcher, 2001, p. 72).  Journalists, too, should follow his advice.  Under 
Kitcher’s view, scientists should seek to provide explanations for the causal processes at 
work for phenomena that present themselves as candidates in need of explanation 
(Kitcher, 2001, p. 72).  What presents itself as in need of explanation is dependent upon 
the projects and interests that scientists hold.  In other words, the phenomena of interest 
are contingent and contextually dependent, so a view explaining the causal processes at 
work behind such phenomena is necessarily context-dependent as well.  Because of this, 
such a view would not be an objective, context-independent one.  Similarly, the 
phenomena that journalists must provide causal explication of are contextually dependent 
upon the projects and interests of citizens that manifest the events featured in news 
narratives.  Therefore, journalists, like scientists, would be ill advised to seek causal 
explanations of the phenomena that comprise events according to some absolute, 
objective perspective because it is impossible to construct (let alone present) context-
independent accounts. 
§2.7 Journalists as Cartographers 
Constructing news stories is like the process of map making.  When constructing 
maps, cartographers organize information according to two concerns: the cartographer’s 
own projects and interests, as well as those of the potential users of the maps under 
construction.  As Kitcher claims: 
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maps [are] designed for different purposes [and] pick out different entities 
within a region or depict those entities rather differently. …  What counts 
as an omission or an inaccurate spatial representation depends on the 
conventions associated with the kinds of maps, and, in their turn, those 
conventions are in place because of the needs of the potential users 
(Kitcher, 2001, p. 56). 
 
Revisiting a claim discussed earlier, it is in part21, the projects and interests of the 
potential users of maps that dictate not only what features each map will contain, but also 
what type of map it is.  For instance, an oil prospector needs an entirely different sort of 
map than a police officer.  The features belonging to both maps might differ entirely.  
Similarly, when considering how to construct news stories, journalists should consider 
the projects and interests of citizens.  For instance, a democratic citizen seeking 
information about an upcoming election would be concerned with consuming stories that 
explicate the political platforms of the candidates running for office.  That same citizen 
might not, however, be concerned with consuming stories that feature the White House 
dinner menu from the previous week.  While it is important to note that the elements that 
comprise maps and news stories are chosen because of the concerns of their designers 
and those that they are designed for, it will be helpful to say more about why certain 
concerns hold bearing.  As Kitcher explains: 
the full story of why one set of conventions is chosen must include the 
past choices of mapmakers and the projects their maps made possible, for 
those maps and projects influence the desires of later map-users, the 
resources available to them, and even the character of the terrain that they 
will explore (Kitcher, 2001, p. 61). 
 
The selection of a set of conventions for one particular map (e.g., map 3) depends upon 
one or more sets of conventions selected for, and featured on, past maps (e.g., maps 1 and 
2), as well as the projects and interests that such past maps helped evolve or create during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 I say in part, because as I stated above, the cartographer’s own projects and interests also motivate what 
items are featured on maps. 
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the lapse of history between the creation of maps 1 and 3.  It is now easier to see why 
forming an ideal atlas is an impossible endeavor, since much of what cartographers 
feature on a map (and the type of map in general) depends upon ever-evolving sets of 
conventions that are contextually dependent upon the projects and interests of citizens. 
Reformulating Kitcher’s directly preceding statement to fit within my discussion 
of journalistic practice, one might say that the reason that certain features of news stories 
are selected during framing is due to journalists’ editorial decisions, which were 
influenced by their own projects and interests, as well as the concerns of citizens.  
Journalists’ selection of particular information presented within past stories influenced 
citizens’ past concerns, which affected past decisions made.  These past decisions and 
concerns have affected the formation of citizens’ (and journalists’) current concerns, 
which will in turn affect their future projects, interests, and decisions. 
Another interesting point contained in the last excerpt offered by Kitcher is the 
idea that cartographers’ choices partly determine map users’ experiential environment.  
There is a lesson here for journalists, as their decisions to include certain bits of 
information in stories (as well as acts of omission) affect the way citizens interact with 
their environment.  Put simply, past and present narratives serve catalysts for future 
events; whereby, those future events serve as catalysts for news stories yet to be framed. 
While the following story was most likely not framed using a significance graph, 
it does serve as an example of what a story produced by utilizing such a method looks 
like.  The story begins by describing the scenario that residents of Dara Adam Khel (a 
Pakistani town) face daily: increasing socio-political restraints, threats of bodily harm 
(including death), and feelings of despair and terror.  The piece opens with a statement 
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from a local weapons dealer explicating his fear about Taliban execution: “[b]efore they 
kill you, they sharpen the knife in front of you.  They are worse than butchers” (Gardi, 
2007, p. 1).  While eyewitness statements like these indicate the presence of narrow-
context information, the rest of the narrative provides enough broad-context information 
that the socio-economic and political context of these accounts is elucidated.  For 
instance, throughout the narrative, the following elements are described: how many U.S. 
and NATO troops are stationed throughout the region; why these troops are stationed 
there and why not elsewhere.  In addition, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s role in 
U.S. led measures to neutralize the Taliban in the region was discussed, and in particular, 
doubt cast upon his effectiveness and allegiance.  The narrative also addresses the 
political crisis facing Musharraf concerning his suspension of Pakistan’s Supreme Court 
Chief Justice.  As explained, Musharraf’s political turmoil came to a head when he 
ordered Pakistani police officers to raid a television station providing coverage of the 
protests held outside Pakistan’s Supreme Court building.  Further, the story provides 
information about Musharraf’s political power base, noting that since he has lost so much 
support with moderates, he might be forced to rely upon fundamentalists Taliban-
supporting fundamentalists to further his political aspirations.  The article also notes that 
if protests against the president continue, he might be tempted to crack down even less on 
Taliban extremists and their actions.  These conjectures are important, as it demonstrates 
that the journalist who framed this story is attempting to present the interconnection 
between past and present events to future occurrences.  Continuing this theme of linking 
past events with present incidents, the piece begins to discuss distant events that led to the 
present socio-economic and political climate.  For instance, the author claims: 
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the territory at the heart of Talibanistan ... has never fully submitted to the 
rule of any country.  The colonial British were unable to conquer the 
region's Pashtun tribes and allowed them to run their own affairs 
according to local custom.  In exchange, the tribesmen protected the 
subcontinental empire from northern invaders.  Following independence in 
1947, Pakistan continued the arrangement (Gardi, 2007, p. 1). 
 
The remainder of the story provides narrow- and broad-context information by presenting 
eyewitness accounts interlaced with information about the socio-political pressures facing 
both the residents of Talibanistan, local and national political leaders, as well as the 
former head of the Pakistani intelligence agency: Inter-Services Intelligence.  For 
example, the story explains that 
[t]ribal leaders interviewed by TIME say they do not support the aims of 
the jihadists.  But the Taliban's campaign of fear has worn down local 
resistance.  Malik Sher Muhammad Khan, a tribal elder from Wana, says, 
"The Taliban walk through the streets shouting that children shouldn't go 
to school because they are learning modern subjects like math and science.  
But we want to be modern.  It's not just the girls.  In my village, not a 
single person can even sign his name.”  Khan estimates that only 5% of 
the inhabitants of Waziristan actively support the militants.  Others benefit 
financially by providing services and renting land for training camps.  The 
rest, he says, acquiesce out of fear.  A few months ago, militants stormed 
his compound in retaliation for his outspoken criticism of their presence in 
the area.  During the melee, a grenade killed his wife.  "If I had weapons, 
maybe I could have saved her," he says.  "We have no way to make them 
leave" (Gardi, 2007, p. 2). 
 
What results from this particular presentation of information is an awareness of the 
events described that is both riveting and informative.  It contains a good balance of 
personal and dramatic elements as well as contextually rich information woven together 
so that readers are enticed to read further, becoming more informed and motivated as 
they do so. 
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§2.8 An Information Threshold 
Perhaps one might claim that there is a threshold concerning how much 
information it is advisable to seek when attempting to become informed and motivated.  
Because of this concern, it might not be advisable for citizens to continually consume as 
much news as possible.  This claim holds merit, and the amount of information it is 
advisable to seek varies depending upon the type of decision or problem one faces.  There 
is a point where seeking more information becomes disadvantageous for citizens, as they 
would incur unbearable opportunity costs.  For instance, it would be possible for one to 
devote one hundred hours per week for fifteen years to study the effects of a city 
ordinance that banned the use of riding lawnmowers in the town in which she resides.  
While she might find this exercise fascinating, it would not be prudent for her to spend so 
much time and energy investigating the issue.  Doing so would cause her to be less able 
to participate civically regarding issues not related to the particular city ordinance she has 
been studying because if she were consuming nothing but narratives associated with such 
a ban, she would mostly likely not know much about current candidates running for 
office (whether local, state, or national), the evolution of the debate over social issues 
(e.g., same sex marriage), or international affairs (e.g., tensions between North and South 
Korea).  A lack of such information would leave her ill equipped to deliberate with her 
peers about these topics, cast an informed vote, or provide feedback via protest.  Perhaps 
examining the matter for a short time, and then moving on to other, more pressing issues 
would be a better use of her time.  The lesson here is that citizens should attempt to 
gather as much information as they can up until the point where gathering more 
information would cause them to incur opportunity costs too great to bear. 
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Perhaps her over-zealous efforts to become informed as possible about her city’s 
ban on the use of riding lawnmowers were motivated by her desire to discover an optimal 
solution to this problem.  Instead of searching for an optimal solution, however, she 
should have sought a satisficing solution.  In "Rational Choice and the Structure of the 
Environment", Herbert Simon explains that within environments that are open-ended, 
agents would do better to gather as much information as one needs to develop a good 
enough, or “satisficing,” solution to a problem at hand, rather than attempt (needlessly) to 
discover an optimal solution.  As Simon claims: 
[b]ecause real-world optimization ... is impossible, the real economic actor 
is in fact a satisficer, a person who accepts "good enough" alternatives, not 
because less is preferred to more, but because there is no choice (Simon, 
1996, pp. 28-29). 
 
Because we cannot construct an ideal atlas that would allow us to have enough 
information to develop an optimal solution to particular problems, we select actions that 
bring about outcomes with which we are satisfied.  Simon argues that the human 
condition is epistemologically constrained in such a way that we can never discover an 
idealized understanding of a problem that contains all possible bits of information 
pertinent to achieving optimal resolution.  There usually is, however, enough information 
available to allow agents to achieve satisfactory resolution, even if that information is not 
complete.  As he states: 
[s]ince the organism … has neither the senses nor the wits to discover an 
"optimal" path … we are concerned only with finding a choice mechanism 
that will lead it to pursue a "satisficing" path, a path that will permit 
satisfaction at some specified level of all of its needs (Simon, 1956, p. 
136). 
 
Since we cannot formulate an objective conception of a problem in our environment, at 
some point we must decide to act using the information we have available with the hope 
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that as incomplete as our information set is, it is sufficient to accomplish our goal, 
leading us to satisfactory results.  In this case, what counts as sufficient would be relative 
to the context within which our goal lies. 
 One might object by claiming that satisficing is epistemically inadequate because 
that there is no guarantee that we will ever reach satisficing solutions to the problems we 
face.  While I admit that this concern is genuine, as I explained in chapter one, diversity 
enhances citizens’ efforts to select successful solutions to societal problems in two ways.  
First, via the enfranchisement and inclusion of as many voters as possible, information 
(that is typically distributed asymmetrically) can be gathered in ways that provide a high 
degree of probability that enough data is collected so that a satisficing solution is 
discovered.  Second, deliberation occurring before and after voting is enhanced through 
diversity, and this can enable citizens to influence one another’s perspectives concerning 
problems and possible solutions, their consequences, and their costs.  This second manner 
of influence further increases the probability of a successful solution’s selection, as it 
enhances the cooperative efforts of citizens.  The point here is that while it might be true 
to say that certainty concerning citizens’ ability to discover a satisficing solution to a 
problem is never guaranteed, diversity fueled by providing citizens equal opportunity and 
equal voice greatly increases the chances that satisfactory resolution is achieved. 
A second worry related to time and opportunity costs concerns the possibility of a 
problematic regress that occurs when one considers how much information one needs to 
reach optimality.  If one attempts to develop her information set optimally, she would 
need to know the cost of gathering each bit of new information.  To do this, she would 
need to know the value of the information that she might attempt to acquire.  To know 
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this, she would need to know the optimal amount of information needed to calculate the 
cost of acquiring the new information.  A continuation of this pattern leads to a regress, 
and ultimately, indecision.  Therefore, in order to avoid incurring unbearable opportunity 
costs, one should seek information to the level of satisficing, instead of optimality.  There 
is no way to establish how much information one would need to reach a satisficing 
solution before a decision has been made.  Only after individuals have made a decision 
and implemented a plan can citizens identify whether the information level reached was 
satisficing.  Chapter one included talk of three democratic functions that comprise civic 
participation: deliberation, voting, and feedback.  As my discussion noted, feedback 
allows citizens to present disfavor whenever a solution they have ratified and 
implemented fails to resolve the particular social problem for which they selected it.  
Feedback allows citizens, upon gathering new information about the effects of the 
solution chosen to fix the problem, to deliberate further in hope that they can vote upon 
and implement a new solution if the first brings about unacceptable consequences. 
§2.9 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I first argued that journalists must not aim at encouraging citizens 
to attain some objective understanding via a single, unified framework.  Arguing for this, 
I made use of Phillip Kitcher’s claim that it is impossible to develop a context-
independent view of our world that is free from value-laden appraisals that inform our 
perspectives about our experiential environment.  I also argued that since the creation of 
narratives (in general) necessarily involves emphasizing certain bits of information and 
deemphasizing others, it is impossible for journalists to avoid the inclusion of framing 
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bias, as framing requires the use of value-laden appraisals.  Since narratives will always 
come laden with framing bias, journalists should abandon objectivity as an ideal. 
In the next chapter, I will take an in depth look at framing and show how framing 
information in different ways affects news consumers’ information processing.  In 
addition, I will examine how economic pressures influence journalists to present stories 
that feature mere dramatic depictions of the personal experiences of individuals instead of 
contextually rich information about the causal foundation and future significance of 
events.  Because of this, such narratives make events appear episodic and isolated from 
their contextual environment.  Lastly, I will discuss a framing method (i.e., the public 
health model) devised to overcome the weaknesses of episodic framing.  The public 
health model features thematic framing, which requires journalists to present contextually 
rich information such as rates of incidence, prevention tips, patterns of incidence, etc.  As 
will be shown, thematic framing avoids invoking the problematic effects upon citizens’ 
information processing that episodic framing causes. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Constructing Narratives: Framing and Its Effects 
 
§3.1 Introduction 
 
 How news consumers interpret events depends upon what bits of information are 
given salience, the theme or interpretative script chosen to connect those elements that 
have been provided salience, as well as what aspects are deemphasized or ignored 
entirely.  Because of this, framing serves two functions.  On the one hand, journalists 
frame narratives to elucidate points of interconnection between experiential elements in 
order to introduce a general theme or interpretive script.  On the other, journalists’ 
framing decisions cause bits of information deemed impertinent to the general theme or 
interpretive script they are constructing to be deemphasized (or ignored entirely).  A 
discussion of the psychological underpinnings grounding the connection between framing 
and information processing will elucidate how certain types of framing (e.g., episodic and 
thematic framing) affect such processing. 
 Further, through the process of selective attention, we focus our perceptual 
awareness upon certain experiential elements while ignoring others.  Since framing is a 
process that inevitably results in certain bits of experience being disregarded in favor of 
others deemed more important, I will argue that it mimics selective attention.  This means 
that information contained within news stories is shaped via a double filtration process.  
First, selective attention filters out elements outside of journalists and news consumers’ 
respective centers of attention, and second, framing filters out even more bits of 
information as well.  Journalists and news consumers alike should keep an awareness of 
this fact ready at hand, as this implies that framing doubles the chance that information 
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about their environment will be fragmented and difficult to assemble into a coherent 
structure upon reflection.  This is problematic, as citizens hoping to gain a contextually 
rich understanding of events from news stories will inevitably have difficultly doing so. 
 Exercising selective attention causes humans to remain unaware of elements of 
experience outside of our focal point of attention.  Such unawareness is not problematic 
in and of itself, though it can become problematic if the aspects we fail to become aware 
of prove valuable to our attempts to deliberate, vote, and express feedback, since making 
full use of these capacities requires that citizens be informed, as well as motivated to 
resolve social issues. 
§3.2 Framing 
Deliberating, voting, and expressing feedback as a means of furthering citizens’ 
projects and interests requires that they become informed and motivated about social 
issues in ways that enable them to reasonably understand problems and possible 
solutions, their consequences, and their costs, as well as disposed to resolve such 
problems.  Since unreliable framing methods cause citizens to make false inferences from 
the inevitably partial presentation of information, journalists must understand how 
framing negatively affects citizens’ information processing capabilities. 
Framing requires that journalists first determine which bits of information are 
most important for citizens to consume.  After selecting particular elements and ranking 
them in terms of most important to least, journalists proceed to organize that information 
in various ways and present it to citizens via narratives.  Fortunately, journalists can use 
citizens’ projects and interests to guide their efforts to frame stories in ways that 
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emphasize the most significant bits of information relative to such concerns.  As Matthew 
J. Brown states: 
most truth is banal and insignificant … [therefore,] we need to understand 
how our questions and interests, both practical and theoretical, work to 
pick out certain things as significant (Brown, 2010, p. 9). 
 
What journalists must uncover is the importance information holds to the projects and 
interests of citizens. 
The mere identification of salience, however, is only half of the story.  Next, 
journalists must organize information into narratives consumable by citizens.  
Information disseminated through news stories is organized via framing (Bennett, 2008; 
Coleman & Thorson, 2002; Entman, 1993; Iyengar, 1994).  In general, framing is the act 
of “choosing a broad organizing theme for selecting, emphasizing, and linking the 
elements of a story” (Bennett, 2008, p. 37).  Frames provide meaning to stories and 
convey information to citizens by connecting news content together thematically 
(Bennett, 2008, pp. 37-38).  In some cases, journalists use framing to provide stories with 
personal and dramatic elements, while at other times they use framing to describe an 
event’s contextual surroundings.  Robert Entman claims that 
[f]raming essentially involves selection and salience.  To frame is to select 
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described [emphasis in original] (Entman, 
1993, p. 52). 
 
To accomplish this, journalists frame narratives in ways that make the significance of 
experiential elements that comprise events, perspicuous.  Mirroring Entman’s view, W. 
Lance Bennett claims that through framing, journalists communicate the significance of 
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events, as they perceive it, to the audience (Entman, 1993; Bennett, 2008).  Entman 
continues, claiming that framing provides salience by 
making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable 
to audiences … by highlight[ing] some bits of information about an item 
… thereby elevating them in salience (Entman, 1993, p. 53). 
 
 How news consumers interpret events depends upon what bits of information are 
given salience, the theme or interpretative script chosen to connect those elements that 
have been provided salience, as well as what aspects are deemphasized or ignored 
entirely.  Because of this, framing serves two functions.  One the one hand, framing is 
used to identify experiential elements journalists consider salient as well as elucidate 
points of interconnection between such elements so that a general theme or interpretive 
script is introduced.  On the other, framing causes experiential elements and 
interconnections between such elements not deemed pertinent to the general theme or 
interpretive script being constructed to be deemphasized (or ignored entirely).  A 
discussion of the psychological underpinnings grounding the connection between framing 
and information processing will elucidate how certain types of framing affect such 
processing. 
§3.3 Framing and Selective Attention 
William James claims that our senses, based upon delineations of space and time, 
combine, separate, emphasize, and ignore certain aspects of experience (James, 1967, pp. 
21-74).  He posits that 
[t]he phenomen[on] of selective attention [is an] … example … of this 
choosing activity … Accentuation and Emphasis are present in every 
perception we have[,] … [b]ut we do far more than emphasize things, and 
unite some, and keep others apart.  We actually ignore most of the things 
before us [italics and capitalization in original] (James, 1967, p. 70). 
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Through the process of selective attention, we focus our perceptual awareness upon 
certain elements while ignoring others.  Until the point of selection, our world appears as 
“an indistinguishable, swarming continuum, devoid of distinction or emphasis” [italics in 
original] (James, 1967, p. 70).  Even though selective attention is a naturally occurring 
phenomenon, there is no guarantee that we will utilize this capacity effectively.  Humans 
(journalists included) have the tendency to fail to emphasize elements of experience that 
should not be ignored.  Quite frequently, individuals concentrate upon certain elements so 
exclusively that they fail to acknowledge other aspects of experience that may also prove 
valuable to furthering their projects and interests. 
Like all observers, journalists must sort through information and organize it on a 
continual basis and this requires them to prioritize some elements while ignoring others.  
Since framing is a process that involves the organization of information by way of 
placing emphasis upon certain elements while disregarding others, I argue that it mimics 
selective attention22.  Journalists operate within the same pluralistic universe that James 
describes.  To develop narratives out of a world comprised of a vast entanglement of 
elements, journalists must select a very limited number of those elements, which they 
organize in a manner they deem digestible by citizens. 
Since framing, like selective attention, acts as a filter whereby certain elements of 
experience are emphasized at the expense of others, information contained within news 
stories is shaped via a double filtration process.  Journalists should keep an awareness of 
this fact ready-at-hand, as this implies that framing doubles the chance that information 
about our environment will be fragmented and difficult to assemble into a coherent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Selective attention concerns internally situated processing that is automatic and unconscious.  Framing 
concerns externally situated processing that involves the conscious choosing of information and emphasis 
performed by journalists.  Due to this difference, selective attention and framing are not identical. 
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structure upon reflection.  This is problematic, as citizens hoping to gain a contextually 
rich understanding of events from news stories are often inhibited from doing so when 
such narratives are episodically framed. 
§3.4 Inattentional Unawareness 
Exercising selective attention causes humans to remain unaware of elements of 
experience outside of our focal point of attention.  On selective attention’s role in the 
creation of inattentional unawareness, James states:  
attention … out of all the sensations [in our perceptual space] … picks out 
certain ones worthy of its notice and suppresses all the rest (James, 1967, 
p. 70). 
 
As Arien Mack and Irvin Rock acknowledge, Aristotle was the first to provide 
explication concerning inattentional unawareness (Mack and Rock, 2000, p. 250).  On 
inattentional unawareness, Aristotle states:  
[a]ssuming, as is natural, that of two movements the stronger always tends 
to exclude the weaker, is it possible or not that one should be able to 
perceive two objects simultaneously in the same individual time?  The 
above assumption explains why persons do not perceive what is brought 
before their eyes, if they are at the time in deep thought, or in a fright, or 
listening to some loud noise (Aristotle, 447a11-14). 
 
Which elements enter and which exit our attentional locus varies in different instances.  
However, at any one time, there are always bits of experience lying outside of our center 
of attention.  Inattentional unawareness is not problematic in and of itself, though it can 
become problematic if the aspects we fail to become aware of prove valuable to our 
attempts to deliberate, vote, and express feedback, since making full use of these 
capacities requires that citizens be informed, as well as motivated to resolve social issues. 
 For instance, a newsreader may pay very little attention to the fact that the local 
newspaper she had been reading presented information about an escaped convict last seen 
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in her neighborhood.  Because she became engrossed in a conversation with her 
coworkers, she stopped reading the paper, failing to recognize this information.  The 
woman may seriously consider securing her doors and windows upon returning home if 
she had perceived information about an escaped convict on the run near her residence.  
Humans (thereby journalists as well) have the tendency to fail to emphasize 
elements of experience that should not be ignored.  Quite frequently, individuals 
concentrate upon certain experiential elements so exclusively that they fail to 
acknowledge other aspects of experience that may also hold significance to their projects 
and interests.  It is important to remember that framing also structures bits of information 
together in ways that provide themes or interpretive scripts to the collection of data 
available about events.  A discussion of schema theory that examines how humans learn 
new schemas, as well as modify currently existing ones, will elucidate yet another way 
that framing affects information processing. 
§3.5 Schemas 
 
 Concerning the above case, since the woman never perceived information about 
the escaped convict, after work she would most likely go through her normal nightly 
routine, which would probably not involve ensuring that there were no escaped convicts 
hiding on her property.  This is because the schema23 that she was using on this occasion 
did not include information about escaped convicts on the run near her home.  Richard 
Anderson theorizes that individuals rely upon schemas that enable them to make sense of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 As stated here, schema is an intentionally broad term and in what follows I will introduce and explicate 
the notion of schema-subtypes. Jean Piaget first introduced the concept of schemas in: Piaget, J. 
(1926). The language and thought of the child. London: Routledge.  In psychological learning theory, 
schemas represent information frameworks that aid individuals’ information processing capabilities.  My 
discussion of schemas and schema modification is intended to show how framing affects citizens’ ability to 
process information. 
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their experiential environment (Anderson, 1977).  People develop schemas that help them 
make sense of external stimuli entering their perceptual faculties (e.g., sight, hearing, 
taste, etc.).  In addition, schemas enable individuals to make predictions about what 
external stimuli they might encounter depending upon the particular schema they are 
operating within at any given moment (Widmayer, 2004, p. 1).  Richard Harris claims 
that the term 
schema refers to knowledge structures or frameworks that organize an 
individual's memory for people and events.  A schema is a general mental 
construct or model about some knowledge domain.  A person holds mental 
schemas based on past experiences; for example, our schemas about 
Latinos, schizophrenics, or the Iraq War (Harris, 2009, p. 40). 
 
For instance, when a person consumes a news story she has a particular schema (i.e., a 
news consuming schema) that helps her make sense of her experience.  For example, 
when watching a local TV news segment, she might expect to be offered a description of 
a particular event that occurred in her local community.  Individuals develop schemas 
through interactions with external stimuli in their experiential environment.  Schemas 
serve as frameworks within their environment that enable them to organize information 
streaming in through their sense organs, increasing their fluidity concerning their 
interaction with both inanimate objects and other actors in their environment. 
 Since schemas help individuals interpret information as it streams into their 
perceptual faculties, information that does not fit the particular schema currently in use 
might not be understood properly or be ignored entirely via selective attention.  As 
Widmayer claims: “[i]nformation that does not fit into these schema may not be 
comprehended, or may not be comprehended correctly” (Widmayer, 2004, p. 1).  
Revisiting the example of watching a local TV news segment, if a journalist suddenly 
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informs a viewer that aliens have invaded and taken over city hall, the viewer might ask a 
person watching the segment with her whether she had heard the journalist correctly, as 
surely he could not have made such an outlandish claim.  In other cases, she might ignore 
information entirely, or become quite bewildered and not know how to interpret data she 
was presented.  Imagine another case involving a doctor visit where a patient seeks 
treatment for a laceration on her finger only to have the doctor tell her that he believes 
that instead of a wounded finger, he surmises that she has testicular cancer.  This example 
is absurd, for as a biological female, she does not have the right bodily configuration to 
suffer from such a disease.  This type of diagnosis, being nonsensical in this case, would 
lie outside of the woman’s schema for the types of information that her doctor might 
present to her during a medical exam.  As a result, she would most likely not be able to 
fully comprehend what the doctor was telling her.  Widmayer continues by claiming: 
readers have a difficult time comprehending a text on a subject they are 
not familiar with even if the person comprehends the meaning of the 
individual words in the passage (Widmayer, 2004, p. 1). 
 
Even though the woman would have the ability to comprehend what having this type of 
cancer entails, she lacks the affected body parts vulnerable to this disease, so she would 
most likely not be able to understand how to interpret the diagnosis. 
 Individuals have many context-specific schemas through which they operate.  For 
instance, a person operating a motor vehicle employs a “driving schema”.  Upon arriving 
at her intended destination: a store, she utilizes a “shopping schema”.  After visiting the 
store, she might need to attend a night class at a local community college.  While in class, 
she relies upon a “class schema”.  Afterward, she might need to study at a library, so she 
uses a “library schema”.  Each schema allows her to adapt to new information presented 
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within whichever contextual environment she finds herself immersed.  Along with the 
ability to efficiently process and interpret information, she also encounters particular 
expectations about her behavior within each environment.  For instance, while operating 
according to her “class schema”, she would know that singing along to her radio would 
not be acceptable behavior, though in her “driving schema” this would be perfectly fine.  
At times, schemas overlap.  For example, texting is unacceptable behavior in both her 
“driving schema” and her “class schema”, though perhaps not, in her “shopping schema”.  
The point here is that schemas should not be considered objective, context-independent 
scripts, but instead, should be considered contextual frameworks that serve as 
mechanisms that guide individuals within their experiential environment. 
§3.6 Schema Modification 
 Individuals continuously develop currently existing schemas, as well as learn new 
ones through the introduction of new information streaming in through their perceptual 
faculties.  Widmayer asserts that: “the learner in schema theory actively builds schema 
and revises them in light of new information” (Widmayer, 2004, p. 1).  Revisiting the 
local TV news segment example, the first time that the woman watches local TV news, 
she actively builds a schema for all future viewings.  The more she views such segments, 
the more complete her scripts become, and the better she is at predicting what might take 
place.  For instance, upon repeated viewings of local TV news segments, one might form 
a schema that tells her that early on in the broadcast, a meteorologist will present a short 
segment containing information about the weather for the next few days, promising a 
more detailed analysis later on in the broadcast. 
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There are three specific ways that individuals process new information while 
already in possession of schematic frameworks regarding scenarios within which they are 
embedded.  Since individuals are constantly paying close attention to new information 
that they might be able to use to modify their current context-specific schemas, schema 
modification is a continual process (Goffman, 1974 as cited by Coleman & Thorson, 
2002, p. 405).  The first type of modification is accretation.  Accretation involves 
receiving new information and assimilating it within one’s current schema (Widmayer, 
2004, p. 2).  The second type: tuning, involves the process of changing existing schema 
to fit newly acquired information because this information has exposed an inadequacy 
with that schema (Widmayer, 2004, p. 2).  The last type: restructuring, involves the 
process of developing an entirely new schema by way of comparing an old schema with 
the newly created one, being sure to attend to the discrepancies between newly acquired 
information and her now defunct prior schema (Widmayer, 2004, p. 2).  Schema 
modification via accretation, tuning, and restructuring occurs unintentionally, without 
agentially controlled activation.  What experiential elements we perceive dictates how 
existing schemas will be created, as well as modified.  If we fail to perceive bits of 
information germane to our ever-evolving projects and interests, then we may discover 
that our existing schemas related to such concerns are in need of modification. 
§3.7 The Relationship between Schema Modification and Framing 
 Explicating the relationship between schemas and framing will demonstrate that 
the way journalists frame information influences how (and whether) citizens learn new 
schemas or modify currently existing ones.  Journalists use framing to disseminate 
information to citizens that resonates with their context-specific schemas (Scheufele & 
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Tewksbury, 2007, p. 12).  Once citizens perceive information, they experience 
accretation, tuning, or restructuring in response, which occurs as internally situated 
processing that is automatic and unconscious. 
 Schema modification involves three specific schema subtypes: memory objects, 
cognitive fields, and mental models.  Memory objects pertain to preconceptions 
individuals use to interpret phenomena detected within their experiential environment 
(Derry, 1996, p. 169).  Concerning their source, Sharon Derry claims: 
various types of representations (e.g., pictorial, declarative, procedural, 
auditory, emotional, etc.) can be combined to form a single memory object 
(Derry, 1996, p. 167). 
 
Derry continues by claiming that memory objects can be 
associated with ... the kinds of social situations [individuals] experience 
(e.g., attending weddings, dining in restaurants (Derry, 1996, p. 167). 
 
So, for example, our local TV news viewer might form memory objects concerning 
graphics used to depict weather patterns, the anchor’s tie, sounds indicating breaking 
action news, etc.  In addition, people form memory objects about the types of practices 
they engage in.  For instance, a police officer might form memory objects based upon the 
specific duties she must perform (e.g., traffic stops, subduing assailants, etc.) (Derry, 
1996, p. 167). 
 Cognitive fields refer to preconceptions that will be activated whenever 
individuals are engaged in mental modeling (Derry, 1996, p. 169).  Specifically, 
cognitive fields are 
distributed pattern[s] of memory activation that occur in response to a 
particular event (such as a problem posed, a classroom demonstration, a 
discussion, etc.) that makes certain memory objects more available for use 
than others (Derry, 1996, p. 168). 
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Cognitive fields prepare memory objects for activation during the process of mental 
modeling.  Different cognitive fields are triggered depending upon the type of event one 
is experiencing and in turn, different memory objects are activated for retrieval.  
Depending upon the cognitive field triggered, one would be disposed to acknowledge 
certain experiential elements as relevant, and others, irrelevant.  For instance, if a 
cognitive field related to driving were triggered, then a red light within one’s field of 
vision would most likely grab one’s attention immediately, whereas if a cognitive field 
related to visiting an arcade were triggered, the same red light might not register as 
salient. 
 The last schema subtype: mental modeling, involves the process of forming points 
of connection between memory objects so that an individual can interpret a specific event 
or phenomenon.  As Derry claims: 
[m]ental modeling can be viewed as a process of constructing, testing, and 
adjusting a mental representation of a complex problem or situation.  The 
goal of mental modeling is to construct an understanding of a phenomenon 
(Derry, 1996, p. 168). 
 
Mental modeling is responsible for accretation, tuning, and restructuring, which enable 
schema modification.  Much like narratives, it would be incorrect to consider mental 
models as context-independent, objective views.  They are context-dependent, as all 
schemas are.  Concerning this point, Derry observes: 
mental models represent situational understandings that are context 
dependent and do not exist outside the situation being modeled (Derry, 
1996, p. 168). 
 
 Framing and mental modeling function similarly, since both processes involve the 
organization and structuring of information to provide meaning to narratives (in the case 
of framing) or schemas (in the case of mental modeling) by connecting information 
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together thematically.  Framing and mental modeling should not be considered as 
synonymous, as the latter involves internal processing, while the former involves external 
processing.  In other words, mental modeling occurs within one’s own brain and is 
directed inward, while framing involves other-directed information dissemination. 
 This difference is not disconcerting, as the idea that framing concerns a two-level 
process: both internal and external, is commonly accepted.  Political communication 
theorists typically refer to mental models (i.e., schemas) as individual frames, while news 
stories are termed media frames.  Reflecting upon comments made by Pamela Shoemaker 
and Stephen Reese in Mediating the Message (1996), Scheufele and Tewksbury claim: 
[as an externally directed construct]  ‘‘framing’’ refers to modes of 
presentation that journalists and other communicators use to present 
information in a way that resonates with existing underlying schemas 
among their audience. …  [And as an internally-directed construct] 
framing describes how people use information and presentation features 
regarding issues as they form impressions (2007, p. 12). 
 
Media frames are information packages that journalists present to citizens and journalists 
develop them by organizing information in ways that offer a particular interpretation or 
perspective.  William Gamson and Andre Modigliani consider a media frame to be 
a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an 
unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them.  The [media] 
frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue 
(Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). 
 
When most who are familiar with the term speak about framing, they are referring to 
media frames. 
Individual frames, however, are not the same as media frames.  Individual frames 
are mental models that help individuals interpret information within their experiential 
environment.  Entman recognizes individual frames as: "schemata ... [that] connote 
	  
	  
85 
mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information" 
(Entman, 1993, p. 53).  Drawing out the difference between individual frames and media 
frames, Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders state: 
frames lead a double life: they are internal structures of the mind that help 
individuals to order and give meaning to the dizzying parade of events 
they witness as political history unfolds; they are also devices embedded 
in political discourse (Kinder & Sanders, 1990, p. 74). 
 
The operational similarity between media frames and individual frames is important 
because examining this similarity allows theorists to better understand how types of 
framing (e.g., episodic vs. thematic frames) influence citizens’ individual framing, by 
examining the outcome of media frames upon individual frames.  Describing episodic 
framing, Shanto Iyengar suggests: 
episodic news fram[ing] takes the form of a case study or event-oriented 
report and depicts public issues in terms of concrete instances (for 
example, the plight of a homeless person or a teenage drug user, the 
bombing of an airline, or an attempted murder) (Iyengar, 1994, p. 14). 
 
Episodic news frames make events appear as isolated incidents, occurring at random, and 
since episodic framing does not provide the audience with any broad-context information, 
citizens have difficulty understanding how the phenomena presented lies connected with 
other issues or events.  Commenting on the content and frequency of episodic framing, 
Renita Coleman and David Perlmutter claim: 
[r]esearch on the content and style of mass media suggest an overall bias 
toward individual or atomistic coverage: the focus is on the car crash or 
the body under the tarpaulin rather than greater contexts or social policy 
debates (Coleman & Perlmutter, 2005, p. 27). 
 
Focusing on individual cases and discussing them particularistically by failing to include 
information about their socio-economic and political context makes it difficult for 
citizens to understand what, besides the individual agents featured, might be at fault for 
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the existence of the phenomena under description.  Commenting on the particularistic 
focus of episodic frames, Kimberly Gross states: 
[e]pisodic frames present an issue by offering a specific example, case 
study, or event oriented report (e.g., covering unemployment by 
presenting a story on the plight of a particular unemployed person) (Gross, 
2008, p. 171). 
 
For instance, an episodically framed narrative may provide an eyewitness account of a 
gang-related murder, and fail to provide more contextually rich information such as: 
current crime trends within the neighborhood in which the event occurred, or any citizen 
or governmental action plans to curb violence.  The problem with episodic framing in 
cases like this would be that community residents may come to believe that the incident 
in question was an isolated event and would most likely not influence future events.  
Iyengar recognizes this problem and refers to episodic framing as disseminating 
information “morsels” or bits of data that are often viewed as random happenings 
(Iyengar, 1994, p. 136).  Commenting further on this idea, Gross states: 
[c]itizens exposed to a steady stream of episodic frames fail to see the 
connections between problems such as poverty, racial discrimination, and 
crime when they are presented as discrete and unconnected (Gross, 2008, 
p. 171). 
 
This is unfortunate, as such problems are often interconnected, and achieving resolution 
concerning one problem requires an understanding of other issues. 
In addition, as I addressed in chapter two, since episodic framing features a “just 
the facts” news style, citizens are led to assume that the journalist responsible for the 
story did not have an opportunity to introduce bias into the narrative.  This assumption is 
false and also problematic because it leaves citizens unwittingly exposed to the negative 
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effects of framing bias.  Framing bias is inevitable, and its presence makes it impossible 
for journalists to offer value-neutral accounts of events. 
Another concern related to episodic framing is the fact that upon consuming 
narratives framed episodically, citizens often encounter problems concerning blame 
attribution.  Commenting on how framing can influence citizens’ claims of blame 
attribution, Renita Coleman and Esther Thorson assert: “how a message is framed can 
have an effect on how people attribute responsibility or place blame” (Coleman & 
Thorson, 2002, p. 406).  Shanto Iyengar has conducted numerous studies concerning the 
effects of framing to deduce the following.  Does citizens’ attribution of blame change 
depending upon the type of media frame journalists present them?  His work suggests a 
resounding “yes” and shows that episodic framing directs claims of blame attribution 
toward individuals instead of complex social issues, governmental institutions, and 
policies (Iyengar, 1994).  Further compounding this problem is Iyengar’s 
acknowledgment that 
people typically exaggerate the role of individuals' motives and intentions 
and simultaneously discount the role of contextual factors when attributing 
responsibility for individuals' actions (Iyengar, 1994, pp. 32-33). 
 
Perhaps citizens do this because they typically lack knowledge about many of the 
contextual, societal factors that are often at work behind individuals’ actions, while 
people are already familiar with common, less complex reasons for why people act the 
way they do. 
 In his research, Iyengar found that when confronted with information focused 
solely upon the subjective experiences of a small number of individuals, citizens are more 
likely to blame individuals featured in the story, rather than attribute responsibility to 
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much more complex issues like: unemployment, lack of healthcare, poorly managed 
governmental assistance programs, etc. (Iyengar, 1994).  Presenting news stories with an 
unswerving focus on specific episodes, individual perpetrators, victims, or 
other actors at the expense of more general, thematic information inhibits 
the attribution of political responsibility to societal factors (Iyengar, 1994, 
p. 5). 
 
He also notes that 
 
following exposure to episodic framing, Americans describe chronic 
problems such as poverty and crime not in terms of deep-seated social or 
economic conditions, but as mere idiosyncratic outcomes (Iyengar, 1994, 
p. 137). 
 
Iyengar’s findings are troubling when citizens’ ability to deliberate, vote, and 
express feedback is considered, since these functions are geared toward addressing 
problems at the societal level, rather than the individual one.  It would be naïve, for 
instance, to posit that violence is simply an individualistic phenomenon, with no bearing 
on society at all (Andrews & Bonta, 2010).  One ramification concerning the shift in 
blame attribution is that audience members call the wrong entities into question and this 
means that citizens’ deliberation, voting, and feedback would involve the wrong targets.  
For instance, if it is true that the most significant factor motivating violence is collective 
in nature and not individualistic, then to have citizens deliberating, voting upon, and 
expressing feedback about a cause that is not to blame (or at least not so much) is 
counterproductive.  Consider further the recent growth in both NRA membership and gun 
ownership.  It is plausible to suggest that many who have joined the ranks of these groups 
have done so in the spirit of libertarianism.  If so, this might indicate that these persons 
have adopted an individualistic attitude toward social issues.  Concerning this 
phenomenon, Coleman and Thorson claim: 
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[a]n emphasis on collective solutions runs counter to Western society’s 
basic liberal values as well as to journalists’ conventions … [and] people 
in Western cultures typically exaggerate the role of individuals’ motives 
and intentions while downplaying the role of contextual or societal factors 
(Coleman & Thorson, 2002, pp. 405-406). 
 
Citing Edward Jones, Coleman and Thorson note that the tendency to believe that 
individuals’ motives play a larger role than societal factors in motivating action is known 
as the fundamental attribution error (Coleman & Thorson, 2002, p. 406; Jones, 1979).  
This is no surprise considering what Iyengar’s work demonstrates.  Episodic framing 
causes consumers to lose sight of ways collective efforts can effectively solve societal 
problems since “who citizens hold accountable for social problems can determine the 
kinds of solutions they choose” (Coleman & Thorson, 2002, p. 406).  It is no wonder that 
many of these same consumers come to believe that solving such problems can only be 
accomplished individualistically, which drives them toward means that can literally put 
power in their own hands (i.e., guns).  The problem remains, however, that more often 
than not the most effective solutions to societal problems comes through community-
based or governmental initiatives and programs.  For citizens to compartmentalize 
societal problems into individualistic issues demonstrates a real concern, as successful 
solutions will most likely be frequently be overlooked. 
§3.8 Information Bias 
 Earlier I argued that many journalists believe that relying upon presenting news 
via a “just the facts” style serves as a way they can remain value-neutral (since 
objectivity demands it) and that believing this causes journalists to frame news 
episodically.  Due to economic pressures motivating news production, when adopting a 
“just the facts” style, journalists choose to report elements of experience best able to 
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attract the attention of potential audience members, as well as captivate current news 
consumers, thereby increasing the rate of news consumption.  Market forces and a 
concern for profit, above all else, dominate today’s newsrooms.  No longer do corporate 
executives treat news divisions as separate entities within corporate structures as they did 
in the past, and now news divisions are held as fiscally accountable as all other media 
divisions.  On this phenomenon Bennett states: 
[t]oday, the news must perform like the entertainment divisions, with 
profit pressures cutting away at staff and other resources (Bennett, 2008, 
p. 77). 
 
Commenting on the primary motivations that influence journalistic decisions, David 
Levy claims: 
[w]hile journalism operates as a business in many western countries its 
wider significance resides fundamentally in its relationship with 
democracy.  This is not to suggest that concerns for democracy motivate 
most news organisations most of the time.  Far from it.  Most are 
motivated by a mix of the search for profit sometimes combined with, 
sometimes offset by a search for less tangible reputational benefits.  For 
the journalists, the latter tend to be focused on their peers elsewhere in the 
profession, through the perceived quality of their work or their popularity 
among readers.  For some proprietors commercial success is all (Levy, 
2010, p. 4). 
 
This phenomenon has led other theorists like Gerald Baldasty to claim: 
[w]hen commercial considerations dictate the general news process, the 
press will serve democracy only when such service is financially 
profitable” (Baldasty, 1992, p. 9). 
 
When economic concerns dictate how journalists operate, democracy will only be aided 
by such operation indirectly, and as a byproduct of journalists’ efforts to enhance 
profitability.  Commenting further, Bennett asserts: 
[t]he signs increasingly point to the influence of profit motives and market 
forces. …  Today’s byword is freedom of the market, which means profits 
over social responsibility” [emphasis in original] (Bennett, 2008, p. 83). 
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This is unfortunate, as journalists will resort to organizing and presenting information in 
ways that will attract future audience members (and retain current ones), thereby boosting 
their program’s ratings and market share in an effort to increase the profitability of their 
product.  Commenting on this trend, Bennett observes that journalists frame narratives 
increasingly with costs, efficiency, and viewer or reader reactions in 
mind” (Bennett, 2008, p. 101). 
 
In fact, media executives encourage such behavior.  As Iver Peterson claims in relation to 
print media: 
[p]ublishers are showing a growing unanimity about marketing … 
campaigns aimed at getting their reporters and editors to accept the 
[economic] realities of the newspaper business these days (Peterson, 1997, 
NYT). 
 
Economic pressures prove problematic when journalists prioritize their economic role 
over their democratic responsibility, as this causes them to frame stories in ways that 
exclusively feature personal and dramatic elements (i.e., narrow-context information).  
By doing so, journalists fail to provide audiences with narratives that encourage citizens 
to be informed and motivated to act collectively. 
 Bennett addresses three tendencies that journalists rely upon when providing 
framing to stories.  These tendencies, known as information biases, interfere with the 
audience’s ability to develop broad-context views of events.  Bennett argues that 
journalists rely on information biases when they act upon the tendency to organize 
information contained within stories in ways that encourage the audience to develop only 
narrow-context views of events.  In addition, he notes that journalists are less apt to 
present broad-context accounts of events since stories laden with information biases 
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comport easily to the economic demands influencing journalists’ framing decisions 
(Bennett, 2008, p. 38). 
Personalization bias is the tendency to organize information contained within 
news stories in a manner that focuses attention upon the subjective experiences of 
specific individuals involved with an event (Bennett, 2008, pp. 40-41; pp. 48-52).  This 
bias neglects the 
social, economic, or political picture in favor of the human trials, 
tragedies, and triumphs that sit at the surface of events (Bennett, 2008, p. 
40). 
 
Ann Kaplan claims that news stories often focus upon the specific individuals of an event 
and fail to deliver any information about the event’s social significance (Kaplan, 2005, p. 
99).  In Trauma Culture, she posits:  
[As a result of news coverage focused upon delivering a personal account 
of events, we are] encouraged to identify with specific people, to enter into 
their experiences rather than to think about what we are looking at, or to 
engage on any larger intellectual or analytical level (Kaplan, 2005, p. 99). 
 
A news story framed while relying upon personalization bias may emphasize a perilous 
situation that a particular individual faces while ignoring the event’s broad-context 
significance.  
Dramatization bias denotes the tendency to organize information contained within 
a story in a manner that emphasizes those aspects of experience that invoke the greatest 
degree of excitement in the audience (Bennett, 2008, pp. 41-42).  As demonstrated in the 
excerpt from CNN.com about the 2007 shooting at Virginia Tech, the organization 
provided to the information disseminated focuses upon the presentation of the victims’ 
terror and confusion.  The story presents imagery of police holding machine guns and 
donning bulletproof vests in an attempt to provide an account of the fear and chaotic 
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uncertainty of the event.  Through careful and purposeful framing, journalists attempted 
to invoke a strong emotional response in the audience. 
Of the three information biases, fragmentation bias is the most obstructive to the 
audience’s ability to develop a broad-context view of events.  Fragmentation bias is the 
tendency to organize information contained within a story in a manner that isolates events 
from one another and their broad-context environment (Bennett, 2008, p. 42).  As a 
result, “information in the news becomes fragmented and hard to assemble” (Bennett, 
2008, p. 42).  Fragmented news is characterized by short, episodic segments of 
information that appear disconnected from other aspects of experience, or as Bennett 
claims, fragmented news serves to “turn events into self-contained, isolated happenings” 
(Bennett, 2008, p. 42).  Stories become fragmented when journalists frame stories in 
ways that emphasize mere personal and dramatic elements (Bennett, 2008, p. 47).  Stories 
laden with fragmentation bias cause media frames to be episodic, in that fragmentation 
bias makes events appear as isolated, random occurrences. 
Bennett argues that while the audience often acknowledges the presence of 
personalization and dramatization bias, most news consumers do not recognize the 
connection between those biases and the consequent manifestation of fragmentation bias 
(Bennett, 2008, pp. 36-73).  On this causal relationship between personalization bias, 
dramatization bias, and fragmentation bias, Bennett states that 
[t]he very elements that [make] for a great personalized and dramatic news 
story, however, also [contribute] to its fragmentation (Bennett, 2008, p. 
47). 
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In other words, news stories produced by journalists who rely upon personalization and 
dramatization bias during the news production process frequently contain information 
that appears fragmentary to the audience.  On this phenomenon, Bennett states that 
news generally comes to us in sketchy, dramatic capsules that make it 
difficult to see the causes of problems, their historical significance, or their 
connections across issues (Bennett, 2008, p. 43). 
 
 To be clear, journalists adopt a “just the facts” style in an attempt to remain 
objective and value-neutral.  Since journalists are pressured by media executives to 
present the most riveting information they have available as a means of attracting and 
retaining news consumers, when adopting a “just the facts” style, journalists present 
narratives laden with personalization and dramatization biases.  Doing so causes stories 
to be laden with fragmentation bias, which manifests episodic framing.  For reasons 
addressed earlier, episodic framing inhibits citizens’ efforts to develop an understanding 
of the causal foundation of events and their future significance.  Because of this, citizens 
are ill equipped to participate civically in order to further their projects and interests.  
Deliberation requires that citizens conceptualize some end that they hope to bring about, 
as well as some possible means to that end.  Discourse without such information amounts 
to the exchange of a lot of hot air.  Further, such deliberation requires that citizens 
theorize about the potential consequences of possible means and end(s).  Without 
discovering the origin and significance of events, one is ill equipped to understand the 
consequences of such means and end(s).  As a remedy, episodic framing should be 
avoided in favor of thematic framing, as the latter enables journalists to frame narratives 
in ways that include contextually rich interpretive scripts citizens can use to better 
understand the causal foundation and future significance of events. 
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§3.9 Thematic Framing 
 Thematic framing draws upon perceived connections between issues and events 
and attempts to provide the audience with broad-context information such as: rates of 
incidence, standing public policy, proposed public policy, current governmental 
initiatives, etc.  Commenting on thematic framing, Iyengar claims: 
thematic fram[ing] … depicts political issues more broadly and abstractly 
[than episodic framing] by placing [events] in some appropriate context-
historical, geographical, or otherwise.  A thematic report on poverty might 
present information about recent trends in the rate of poverty and the areas 
with the greatest concentration of poor people (Iyengar, 1996, p. 62). 
 
There are different ways to thematically frame information.  One such way is the public 
health model proposed by Lori Dorfman, Katie Wodruf, Vivian Chavez, Lawrence 
Wallack, and Jane Stevens (Dorfman, et al., 1997; Stevens, 1994, 1998).  The researchers 
hold the assumption that journalists 
have an obligation to their readers and the communities they serve to 
present information in a way that can be used by community members to 
solve a problem such as violence (Dorfman, et al., 2001, p. 416). 
 
The public health model proposes that journalists frame narratives thematically in the 
hope that citizens will be encouraged to gain an understanding of the many societal 
factors behind incidents of violence within communities.  As these theorists claim: 
[c]rime news framed from a public health perspective would include 
information that connected incidents of violence to the larger social and 
environmental context, exposed its risk factors, and included information 
about prevention (Dorfman, et al., 2001, p. 405). 
 
Providing further explication of the public health model of framing, the theorists offer 
three conditions that news must meet to follow this model’s framework 
approaching violence as a public health issue emphasizes (1) preventing 
violence before it occurs, (2) using science and surveillance to identify 
effective policies and programs, and (3) drawing on the efforts of diverse 
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disciplines and communities in a collaborative approach (Dorfman, et al., 
1997, p. 1311). 
 
All three aspects of the public heath model encourage the journalistic exploration of 
broad-context perspectives related to the various incidents about which they report.  For 
instance, to satisfy condition (1), journalists could discuss warning signs pertaining to 
specific types of violence (e.g., gang-related, domestic, etc.).  To satisfy condition (2), 
journalists could examine public policies and community-based action programs 
designed to assuage violence and report whether such initiatives are proving effective.  
Last, concerning condition (3), journalists could advertise the specific collaborative 
efforts currently under way in various communities and inform citizens how they could 
participate in such endeavors. 
The results of the researchers’ study demonstrated that journalists present most 
news about violence episodically, rather than thematically.  As the authors claim: 
television news rarely includes contributing factors in stories on violence.  
In 84% of the stories examined, the context in which violence occurred 
was ignored or deemphasized. …  [and]  Violence was rarely depicted as a 
public health issue (Dorfman, et al., 1997, pp. 1314-1315). 
 
Depicting violence as a public health issue requires the type of broad-context information 
indicative of thematic framing.  In order to increase the incidence of news reports 
featuring a public health frame, the authors offer the following recommendations.  One, 
journalists must provide data about rates of incidence of violence in order to 
contextualize narratives (Dorfman, et al., 1997, p. 1315).  The type of data pertinent here 
might relate to the following: how many perpetrators are under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol and whether victims typically know their assailants24 (Dorfman, et al., 1997, p. 
1315).  Two, journalists must present violence risk factors must also be presented to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 I recognize that other factors might be pertinent as well depending upon the situation and social issue. 
	  
	  
97 
better educate the public about violence prevention (Dorfman, et al., 1997, p. 1315).  For 
instance, journalists could present information about whether alcohol or other drugs had a 
connection to the victims and alleged suspects; whether the individuals had a pattern of 
violence; and what measures (whether by the victim or community officials) had been 
implemented to prevent this violence from occurring (Dorfman, et al., 1997, p. 1315). 
§3.10 Thematic Framing Implementation 
 
Since the publication of their 1997 study, Dorfman, Thorson, and Stevens worked 
together in a collaborate effort to encourage journalists to adopt a public health model of 
framing.  Their project included the publication of a handbook journalists could rely upon 
when framing stories on violence, as well as conducting workshops where journalists 
could receive training and issue feedback to the researchers.  The researchers stressed the 
fact that journalists often fail to report about incidence trends or other broad-context 
information necessary to publish stories using the public health framing model.  To 
ameliorate this concern, the researchers disseminated 
information about national data sets available to the paper through the 
National Institute for Computer-Assisted Reporting (NICAR), the FBI, the 
CDC, and other local, state, and national sources (Dorfman, et al., 2001, p. 
412). 
 
Further, they entertained the possibility that this information was not available to 
journalists in some cases.  As they state: 
journalists report “what’s available”: if facts about risk factors are not 
available—whether the victim or perpetrator was under the influence of 
alcohol, for example—then that information is not reported (Dorfman, et 
al., 2001, p. 411). 
 
While it may be true that journalists often do not have this information at the ready, in 
many cases they can acquire such information via external sources (e.g., police officials, 
	  
	  
98 
medical researchers, etc.).  As part of their educational initiative, the researchers 
contacted external sources and arranged for them to meet with journalists so that both 
groups could develop a working relationship that journalists could utilize while framing 
future stories.  It was made apparent, however, that in some cases, particularly 
concerning local police and health departments, that rates of incidence were quite 
difficult to ascertain, as some organizations simply did not have enough personnel to 
enable them to keep such records.  As the researchers claim: 
[l]ocal data are the most important to reporters and the most difficult to 
obtain.  This can be a barrier as sources of data—health departments and 
law enforcement—are often reluctant to give data to reporters, especially 
on tight deadlines (Dorfman, et al., 2001, pp. 414-415). 
 
Their research suggests that daily reporters at small-run, local news outlets may have 
difficulty ascertaining such data, though the negative impact stemming from this problem 
could be lessened by presenting thematic news segments on a weekly or monthly basis 
that include such information.  In addition, this type of information is suitable for 
distribution on news outlets’ websites where journalists could add information as soon as 
it is available.  Based upon their investigation concerning the availability of data, the 
researchers claim that in moderate to large communities, journalists should not have a 
particularly difficult time gathering broad-context information.  In smaller communities, 
the problem might remain.  This does not imply, however, that journalists in such 
environments should not start demanding access to such data.  As they state: 
[i]n cities where health departments have adequate surveillance on 
intentional injury and violence, newspapers should be given access to data, 
with identifiers purged, so they can begin to build their own databases for 
future stories and to add context to breaking news.  In those locales with 
inadequate data sources, we hope newspapers will take the lead in 
demanding better data collection and appropriate access (Dorfman, et al., 
2001, pp. 414-417). 
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§3.11 Concluding Remarks 
 In this chapter, I argued that news consumers interpret events differently 
depending upon what experiential elements are given salience and which are ignored 
during framing.  I also argued that framing serves functions.  On the one hand, journalists 
use framing to elucidate points of interconnection between experiential elements in order 
to introduce a general theme or interpretive script.  On the other, framing causes some 
elements to be deemphasized or ignored entirely.  Due to selective attention, individuals 
inevitably select out experiential elements and ignore others.  This results in individuals 
remaining attentionally unaware of some aspects of experience.  Since framing also 
involves selection and de-emphasis, it mimics selective attention.  Because of this, 
information featured in narratives passes through a double filtration process where 
journalists’ and individuals’ selective attention first filter out some bits of information 
while highlighting others.  Afterward, framing filters out even more aspects of 
experience.  As a result, the risk of narratives being difficult to understand contextually is 
greatly increased.  This is problematic, since to best be able to participate civically, 
citizens must attain a contextually rich understanding of events from news stories. 
 In the next chapter, I will discuss the psychological ground of emotional arousal 
to show emotional arousal is necessary for becoming motivated.  I will argue that since 
mere broad-context accounts fail to emotionally arouse citizens, they cannot encourage 
citizens to become motivated.  Because of this, I will argue that accounts must include 
narrow-context information, as such information encourages audience members to 
undergo emotional arousal, thereby opening the door to becoming motivated.   
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Chapter Four 
Emotional Arousal: Affect’s Role in Becoming Motivated 
§ 4.1 Introduction 
Investigating the psychological ground of emotional arousal will show how 
hybrid narratives featuring narrow- and broad-context information can encourage citizens 
to become informed and motivated to resolve societal problems.  In particular, I will 
examine a noncognitive, process-centered view of emotional response grounded upon 
appraisal theory.  Investigating this view will show that Elizabeth Anderson is right to 
claim that narratives must include first- and second-person knowledge25 about the 
subjective experiences of others and the normative claims they issue since audience 
members are not likely to become motivated without gaining such knowledge.  As I will 
also argue, Anderson is wrong to assume that impersonal, third-person knowledge26 is not 
necessary for becoming both informed and motivated. 
To be clear, I will argue that since becoming motivated requires that citizens 
experience emotional arousal, and because emotional arousal is grounded upon affective 
appraisals, the most effective way to encourage citizens to become motivated would be 
for journalists to construct stories that encourage audience members to undergo affective 
appraisal processing.  Further, I will argue that stories that feature personal and dramatic 
elements that convey the subjective experiences of others are well suited for encouraging 
citizens to undergo affective appraisal processing.  As I will also argue, since reason’s 
role in emotional arousal (while important) comes only after one has undergone affective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Since first- and second-person knowledge is comprised of information merely concerning the subjective 
experiences of others and the normative claims they issue, both types are narrow-context in scope. 
26 Since third-person knowledge is comprised of impersonal, abstract, contextual information, it is broad-
context in scope. 
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appraisal processing, news stories that fail to include personal and dramatic elements do 
little to encourage citizens to become motivated to resolve societal problems. 
§4.2 Anderson’s Case against Mere Broad-context Accounts 
 
 In “Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective”, Elizabeth 
Anderson argues that democratic elites must exhibit “responsiveness to and effective 
service of the interests of people from all sectors of society” (Anderson, 2007, p. 596).  
Responsiveness requires that elites gain awareness of the problems of the disadvantaged, 
as well as a disposition to ameliorate such concerns (Anderson, 2007, p. 596).  Effective 
service requires that elites attain technical knowledge about the disadvantaged’s problems 
and the ability to interact respectfully with people from all sectors in a cooperative 
manner (Anderson, 2007, p. 596).  Becoming informed about problems requires that 
citizens become aware of such problems, become able to appreciate them in a 
contextually rich way, as well as attain knowledge that enables one to respectfully 
interact with others in a cooperative manner (i.e., socio-cultural capital).  I consider 
Anderson’s awareness condition, technical knowledge condition, and social-capital 
condition as three components comprising what it means to be informed.  Further, I deem 
developing a disposition to be responsive (i.e., the disposition condition) as what it means 
to be motivated. 
 In order to educate democratic elites so that they become informed and motivated, 
Anderson argues that their training should primarily feature first- and second-person 
knowledge, and only secondarily feature third-person knowledge as a means to attain 
technical knowledge required for becoming informed27.  In her view, third-person 
knowledge is insufficient to educate elites adequately as it cannot help them overcome 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The terms first-, second-, and third-person knowledge are Elizabeth Anderson’s. 
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cognitive deficiencies that arise via stereotypes.  Instead, first- and second-person 
knowledge is better suited than third-person knowledge to help elites overcome cognitive 
deficiencies that limit their ability to become informed, as well as motivated to seek 
resolution of the disadvantaged's problems (Anderson, 2007, p. 610). 
In cases where first-hand first- and second-person knowledge is unavailable, 
Anderson claims that an abundance of second-hand first- and second-person knowledge 
disseminated via mediators (e.g., educators) could encourage citizens to become 
informed and motivated.  I, however, believe that it would be a mistake to assume that 
accounts comprised of mere first- and second-person knowledge, no matter if they are 
first- or second-hand, could inform and motivate citizens.  This is so due to the problems 
I addressed in chapter three concerning episodic framing and the fact that accounts 
comprised of mere first- and second-person knowledge are by definition, episodically 
framed.  Such accounts fail to include contextually rich information about the causal 
foundation and future significance of events since they are comprised of mere eyewitness 
accounts often featuring normative claims issued by the individuals featured.  As a result, 
accounts comprised of mere first- and second-person knowledge cause events to appear 
isolated, without connection to larger social issues or concerns; hence, such accounts 
appear episodic. 
I agree with Anderson’s claim that first- and second-person knowledge about the 
subjective experiences of others can encourage citizens to become informed and 
motivated.  I take issue, however, with her failure to acknowledge that such information 
cannot be transmitted via accounts comprised of mere first- and second-person 
knowledge (either from personal contact—first-hand, or via a mediator—second-hand) 
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without subjecting elites to problems associated with episodic framing.  A further 
concern I have with Anderson’s view is that even though she concedes that third-person 
knowledge is required to satisfy the technical knowledge condition, she fails to 
acknowledge that third-person knowledge is required to also satisfy the socio-cultural 
capital and disposition conditions.  This is unfortunate since, in my view, the only 
condition that accounts comprised of mere first- and second-person knowledge can 
sufficiently satisfy is the awareness condition.  All three remaining conditions require 
third-person knowledge. 
Anderson’s case against the presentation of mere third-person knowledge is as 
follows.  Narratives comprised of mere third-person knowledge sufficiently satisfy the 
technical knowledge and awareness conditions, though she notes that first- and second-
person knowledge better satisfies the awareness condition than third-person knowledge 
(Anderson, 2007, pp. 606-607).  In her view, accounts comprised of mere third-person 
knowledge do not sufficiently satisfy the disposition and socio-cultural capital conditions, 
nor are they necessary to do so.  Rather, according to Anderson, accounts comprised of 
mere first- and second-person knowledge sufficiently satisfy the disposition and social 
and cultural-capital conditions and are necessary to do so. 
Discussing a noncognitive, process-centered view of emotional response will 
show that Anderson is correct in claiming that presenting mere third-person knowledge 
fails to sufficiently satisfy the disposition condition.  This is because presenting abstract, 
impersonal information about social issues is unlikely to invoke emotional arousal in 
citizens that could ground a disposition to provide aid in cases where one is unlikely to 
have had personal experience with said issues or those affected by them.  Anderson notes 
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this fact, but fails to provide a complete account concerning why this is the case.  Such an 
account can be developed via an understanding of emotional response at its most basic 
level, which will come in §4.8-4.10.  In addition, examining this particular view of 
emotional arousal will show why hybrid accounts comprised of first-, second-, and third-
person knowledge sufficiently satisfy all four conditions required for becoming informed 
and motivated and are necessary to do so. 
§4.3 Democratic Elites 
 
According to Anderson, democratic elites are powerful individuals 
who occupy positions of responsibility and leadership in society [such as:] 
managers, consultants, professionals, politicians, and policy makers 
(Anderson, 2007, p. 596). 
 
As noted in §4.2, Anderson holds that democratic elites must become informed and 
motivated so that they can help resolve societal problems and effectively serve “the 
interests of people from all sectors of society” (Anderson, 2007, p. 596).  Ideally, elites 
would become motivated only after becoming informed.  This, however, is often not the 
case.  While elites become motivated, they often do so while remaining merely aware of 
societal problems without possessing technical knowledge of them.  When this occurs, 
elites can be said to hold narrow-context views of events comprised of a mere awareness 
of social problems and affected parties, without possessing any contextually rich 
information about the causal foundation or future significance of events.  Because of this, 
elites’ ameliorative efforts often end in failure.  For instance, say a group of elites 
attempts to improve the conditions of a failing school district in Detroit.  While the elites 
in this case are impassioned about the cause they are fighting for, they fail to understand 
the complexity of the issue, and do not have much experience with the type of problems 
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facing this school district in question.  By taking action, the elites do little to solve the 
problem at hand, and in the end, make matters worse for the students and teachers 
affected.  Anderson also recognizes this concern and notes that many elites display 
incompetence about how to address the problems of the disadvantaged (Anderson, 2007, 
p. 596). 
Since, in this dissertation, I am concerned with demonstrating how journalists can 
encourage every citizen to become informed and motivated, I find it unhelpful to 
dichotomize elites and the disadvantaged as Anderson does. Anderson’s view creates the 
worry that elites will be become less motivated than they might if they begin to view all 
citizens as responsible for the amelioration of societal issues.  This follows, since if elites 
were to assume that they alone are responsible to fix societal problems, many may begin 
to feel that they are being unfairly treated. I see no reason why, however, Anderson’s 
model (with certain modifications) for educating democratic elites cannot serve as a 
guide for journalists in their role of informing and motivating all citizens.  I consider our 
underlying aim to be the same: inform and motivate voters.  Perhaps, though, we disagree 
on the scope of voters that should be informed and motivated, as well as the type of 
information necessary to satisfy the conditions for becoming motivated and informed. 
While the nature of the problems that elites and the disadvantaged face may differ 
in some cases, both groups share a common set of societal concerns (e.g., economic 
recession and depression, elections, legislative and judicial issues, foreign policy, etc.).  
How these issues affect citizens across sectoral lines may differ, but the disadvantaged 
and elites are in many ways interconnected through the problems they share.  To best 
resolve social issues, all citizens must recognize the interconnectivity between people 
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from all sectors and should strive to become informed and motivated.  Anderson’s work 
can help all citizens conceptualize how to accomplish this.  For these reasons, in what 
follows, I will ignore the dichotomy between elites and the disadvantaged. 
§4.4 Knowledge 
According to Anderson, third-person knowledge is academic knowledge and is 
“conscious, articulate, impersonal propositional knowledge” (Anderson, 2007, pp. 606-
607).  According to Anderson, mere third-person knowledge is insufficient to encourage 
citizens to become informed and motivated.  As she states: 
[i[n terms of the four qualifications needed by an elite in a democratic 
society— awareness, responsiveness, technical knowledge, and 
competence in respectful intergroup interaction[28]—academic knowledge 
covers only technical knowledge and, to a lesser extent, awareness of the 
problems and circumstances of people from different walks of life 
(Anderson, 2007, pp. 606-607). 
Anderson believes that presenting mere third-person knowledge is insufficient for several 
reasons.  First, in many cases, mere third-person knowledge does not contain information 
about the subjective experiences of individuals closely associated with particular events 
(i.e., first-person knowledge)29.  She posits that without assistance, citizens are unable to 
understand what it is like to live like individuals across sectoral lines (Anderson, 2007, 
pp. 608-614).  Abstract, impersonal information does not sufficiently encourage citizens 
to understand the concerns of others operating within different socio-economic and 
political sectors.  Second, since mere third-person knowledge does not contain data about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 In this dissertation I refer to this condition the socio-cultural capital condition. 
29 She finds this to be so in cases “when the knowledge needed concerns individuals’ interpretations of and 
responses to what they see as the meanings of different actions and events” (Anderson, 2007, pp. 609-610). 
In such instances, she claims: “there is no substitute for taking up the first-person point of view” 
(Anderson, 2007, p. 610). 
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normative claims issued in response to events (i.e., second-person knowledge), it fails to 
encourage citizens to reflect upon the data presented to them in a normative light.  Mere 
third-person knowledge’s failure in these two respects is problematic as developing a 
disposition toward helping others requires that individuals be emotionally aroused, and in 
her view, the presentation of subjective experiences and normative claims is required for 
emotional arousal to occur (Anderson, 2007, pp. 608-614).  Third, in cases where mere 
third-person knowledge is presented, cognitive biases manifest and it is difficult for 
citizens to become informed and motivated.  As Anderson explains, stereotypes are to 
blame for the manifestation of cognitive biases.  These biases cause incompetence in 
citizens because it causes them to hold distorted views of the behaviors and problems of 
individuals from socio-economic and political sectors different from their own 
(Anderson, 2007, p. 605).  Such incompetence makes it difficult for citizens to satisfy 
each of the four conditions necessary to becoming informed and motivated.  Explicating 
this point, she discusses how stereotypes generate incompetence in citizens and how this 
puts others at a disadvantage.  Anderson construes a stereotype as 
a schema for making inferences about the nature of a particular object 
once it has been recognized as a member of a class with an associated 
schema.  Stereotypes are crude, typically unconsciously held heuristics 
that enable people to economize on information processing and react 
quickly to situations involving the object (Anderson, 2007, p. 604). 
 
As she claims, stereotypes create cognitive biases that render citizens unable to become 
aware of the problems of others (Anderson, 2007, p. 604).  Without satisfying the 
awareness condition, satisfaction of the three remaining conditions is impossible; thus, 
citizens remain uninformed and unmotivated. 
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Anderson recognizes five cognitive biases created by stereotypes that render 
citizens incompetent.  Since three of these biases relate to my discussion of the merit of 
third-person knowledge, it is worth addressing them.  One, stereotypes distort our 
perception of new evidence “making stereotype-confirming evidence highly salient, … 
leading [us] to overlook stereotype-disconfirming evidence” (Anderson, 2007, p. 604).  
For instance, imagine a case where a bigoted individual, who believes that most Mexican 
Americans are violent criminals, views a news story depicting a Mexican American male 
as a murderer.  According to Anderson’s claim (with which I agree), this story would 
resonate with this particular viewer more strongly and for a longer period than a narrative 
depicting a Mexican American as a good samaritan.  In my view, to combat this cognitive 
bias, alongside first- and second-person knowledge, broad-context data featuring rates of 
incidence of violent crimes broken down by race might put this story into perspective and 
demonstrate that most Mexican Americans are not violent criminals.  Two, stereotypes 
exaggerate the homogeneity of members of some class while simultaneously 
exaggerating differences between members of different classes (Anderson, 2007, p. 604).  
For example, our bigoted viewer might decide after consuming the above narrative that 
since all Mexican Americans are the same, they are all violent criminals, because the 
story portrayed one Mexican American as a violent criminal.  To counter this bias, hybrid 
accounts elucidating the diversity of Mexican American citizens could demonstrate that it 
is wrong to assume that all Mexican Americans display similar behavior.  Further, such 
information could demonstrate the similarities between citizens of all ethnicities, taking 
care to highlight the shared projects and interests of all Americans.  Three, stereotypes 
bias causal explanations of behavior of members of a class.  As she claims: 
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[w]hen an object’s behavior conforms to the stereotype, those who hold 
the stereotype tend to attribute the behavior to the object’s internal 
characteristics.  When the object’s behavior contradicts or fails to conform 
to the stereotype, those who hold the stereotype tend to attribute the 
behavior to circumstances external to the object (Anderson, 2007, p. 604). 
 
For instance, upon viewing that same story, our bigoted viewer might attribute the 
subject’s alleged criminal behavior to internal characteristics rather than believe that the 
subject’s social environment influenced the choices the subject made quite considerably.  
Presenting hybrid accounts that illuminate the societal structures that influence behavior, 
rather than treating the individual’s behavior as an episodic event, can help viewers avoid 
this bias’s influence. 
Anderson fails to suggest that hybrid accounts that intertwine first- and second-
person knowledge with third-person knowledge (i.e., hybrid narrow- and broad-context 
accounts) are necessary to combat cognitive biases.  Instead, she argues that first-hand 
first- and second-person knowledge, coming directly from personal interactions between 
members across sectional lines, is required.  The problem with this suggestion is that 
direct contact between individuals across sectoral lines is not possible in many cases.  
Granted, there are some localities that could manage the task on a grand scale (e.g., 
Philadelphia, Chicago, etc.).  For others, however, mere tokenism would be possible 
(e.g., various locales in Kansas, Alaska, etc.).  Small-scale direct contact would prove 
counterintuitive, as such tokenism could result in a reinforcement of cognitive biases 
perpetuated by stereotypes; a point which Anderson recognizes (Anderson, 2007, p. 617). 
 This presents a difficulty.  How can citizens be educated in conditions where the 
only degree of contact possible would be deemed a token effort?  It is possible, and for it 
to work, journalists must present citizens information pertaining to the subjective 
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experiences of others and the normative claims they issue as well as contextually rich 
data about the causal foundation and future significance of events.  To avoid the 
distortive influence of cognitive biases, citizens must be exposed to the subjective 
experiences of others and the normative claims they make in ways that encourage news 
consumers to see what it is like to live like others across sectoral lines.  In addition, 
journalists must present citizens impersonal, broad-context information allowing them to 
appreciate others’ subjective experiences and normative claims in a contextually rich 
manner. 
 That said, Anderson, ultimately favors the presentation of first- and second-person 
accounts above all else, because such narratives 
[represent] the world from the perspective of a particular agent[;] ... what 
it is like – for that agent, as the agent sees [the world] (Anderson, 2007, p. 
607). 
 
To address the concern about tokenism that I mentioned above, she claims that when 
meaningful direct personal contact is not possible, mediators can present such narratives 
indirectly.  As she states: 
[t]he first-person point of view is immediately experienced by the agent, 
but it may also be communicated to others through testimony.  For others 
to get access to the first-person point of view of another, they typically 
need personal contact, communicative competence, and rapport with the 
other, or else they need someone else with such social and cultural capital 
to mediate between the other and oneself (Anderson, 2007, p. 607). 
 
In addition, testimony must be 
salient ... whenever it is normatively relevant to resolving the practical 
question at stake in deliberation and ... arouse, or be clothed in, some 
motivationally engaged feelings (Anderson, 2007, p. 608). 
 
To encourage citizens to become informed and motivated, knowledge must be shown to 
be relative to societal problems and invoke an emotional response in audience members 
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(Anderson, 2007, p. 608).  As noted above, in addition to first-person knowledge, 
Anderson believes that second-person knowledge is required as it provides information 
about normative demands individuals issue upon others.  As Anderson states: 
[second-person c]laims are demands for responsiveness to another’s 
interests and evaluations[.] …  They are embodied in normative judgments 
that purport to offer authoritative claims on others’ actions and feelings 
(Anderson, 2007, p. 607). 
 
Such claims are important because they can motivate citizens to develop a 
disposition to resolve social issues. 
In my view, however, even though accounts comprised of first- and second-
person knowledge can contain information salient to the amelioration of societal 
problems, by themselves, such accounts only encourage citizens to develop mere narrow-
context views.  As a result, first- and second-person accounts (whether first- or second-
hand) fail to encourage citizens to develop broad-context views because no matter if 
information about societal problems is presented through personal contact or mediators, 
without abstract, impersonal knowledge, citizens will not be able to the grasp the 
significance that such information holds for the interests of all citizens.  Attaining such 
an understanding is only possible if citizens come to comprehend the causal foundation 
and future significance of events.  Further, without developing broad-context views, 
citizens will fail to comprehend the interconnection between themselves, their peers, and 
the problems they share, and such a comprehension is necessary for them to become 
informed and motivated. 
§4.5 Accounts Comprised of Mere First- and Second-Person Knowledge 
Anderson stipulates: “adequate responsiveness requires that knowledge be 
salient” (Anderson, 2007, p. 609); a view with which I agree.  If citizens fail to 
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understand how an event is important to a particular problem, it is unlikely that they will 
discover an effective solution.  As I explained in chapter three, journalists can give the 
wrong bits of information salience in some narratives.  As a result, citizens will be 
encouraged to focus their attention on trivial aspects, rather than the larger difficulties 
they face.  While focusing their attention on the trivialities of social issues may satisfy the 
awareness condition, doing so fails to satisfy the remaining three conditions. 
As I addressed in chapters two and three, episodic framing interferes with 
citizens’ ability to develop broad-context views.  As demonstrated in the following 
excerpt about a series of storms that hit North Carolina in April 2011, the framing 
provided focuses primarily upon the victims’ subjective experiences rife with terror and 
confusion.  Because all accounts offering mere first- and second-person knowledge fail to 
present anything more than the personal experiences of individuals and the normative 
claims they issue, they are episodically framed and leave citizens ill equipped to develop 
an understanding of the interconnectivity between the narrative’s subjects, as well as their 
problems. 
Poor Who Lost All in NC Tornadoes Face Hard Future 
Kimberly Smith cried and prayed with her children as they huddled inside 
her trailer when a weekend tornado roared through eastern North Carolina. 
 
About 130 miles away and three hours earlier, Cecilia Zuvic cowered in 
the bathroom of her two-story Raleigh home, said similar prayers and shed 
similar tears as parts of her roof blew away.  The two women had similar 
losses: Smith's mobile home is in tatters and Zuvic's house is unlivable for 
now.  In the storm's aftermath, however, their experiences diverged. 
 
Zuvic was on the phone with her insurance agent within an hour of being 
pulled from her home and is set up for a rental until repairs on her house 
can be finished in several months.  Smith lost almost everything, including 
$300 in groceries bought with the disability check from her fiancé, the 
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sole breadwinner in their home.  If she can't afford repairs, she wonders if 
her family will end up living in a tent beside her wrecked home. 
 
Saturday's tornadoes in North Carolina struck one of the state's richest 
counties and a few of its poorest, leaving well-to-do professionals in the 
capital city and poor tobacco farmers down east scrambling for their lives.  
But days after the common experience, their lives again bear few 
similarities.  Those with insurance and money are ready to rebound (Poor 
Who Lost All, 2011).30 
 
While this story offers a glimpse of the interconnectivity between citizens, it is superficial 
and fails to provide enough information for audience members to develop more than 
mere narrow-context views of the problems facing the story’s victims (before and after 
their ordeal).  While citizens can gain a sense of the emotions these victims experienced, 
reading narratives framed in this way does not encourage news consumers to gain an 
understanding of the situation that could satisfy more than the awareness condition.  The 
story did briefly note that the wealthy individual had the advantage of having insurance 
while showing the disadvantage of not.  The journalist who constructed the narrative, 
however, could have encouraged citizens to develop an even greater contextual 
understanding by providing information about how to procure both rental and home 
owners insurance; steps for emergency preparedness; how to apply for aid from 
organizations like the Red Cross, etc. 
Further still, citizens may simply disregard such problems, as they feel 
psychologically detached from them.  If individuals believe themselves to be closely 
connected with victims, they may be more disposed and able to lend them aid.  
Episodically framed stories like the one above, cause citizens to feel less connected to the 
experiences of others.  This decreases the probability that they will develop a disposition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Much of the remainder of the story provided eyewitness accounts of the storms without supplying 
audience members any broad-context information such as what might be done to alleviate the victims’ 
problems. 
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toward ameliorating societal problems, or attain the socio-cultural capital necessary for 
interacting with others respectfully.  In other words, learning about the plight of others 
via accounts comprised of mere first- and second-person knowledge means that citizens 
will be presented with narratives that focus merely upon subjective experiences and 
normative claims issued by featured individuals.  Because of this, citizens may come to 
believe that their own problems are quite different and disconnected from the problems of 
others, and as a result, not become disposed to help those in need or have the socio-
cultural capital necessary to do so.  In addition, even if citizens are disposed to help and 
possess such socio-cultural capital, they still might not have the technical knowledge 
necessary to understand how to solve victims’ problems effectively. 
 To provide clarity, I offer the following assessment of the ability of accounts 
comprised of mere first- and second-person knowledge (whether first- or second-hand) to 
satisfy Anderson’s four educational conditions.  Concerning awareness, accounts 
comprised of mere first- and second-person knowledge bring citizens’ attention to 
societal problems quite well.  Further, such accounts invoke emotional arousal in citizens.  
This is important, as emotional arousal is necessary (but not sufficient) for satisfying the 
disposition condition.  In addition, accounts comprised of mere first- and second-person 
knowledge encourage citizens to become emotionally aroused and this renders audience 
members capable of sympathizing with others across sectoral lines.  This is important, as 
developing sympathetic feelings is required for attaining socio-cultural capital; thus, 
accounts comprised of mere first- and second-person knowledge are necessary to satisfy 
the socio-cultural capital condition, but do not sufficiently do so.  To sufficiently satisfy 
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both the disposition and socio-cultural capital conditions, journalists must also present 
citizens third-person knowledge about societal problems and those affected by them. 
 For instance, say a wealthy individual living in a high-income Detroit suburb 
consumes a TV news report comprised of mere first- and second-person knowledge about 
a pregnant teen living in a low-income, inner city Detroit neighborhood.  Such an account 
would contain mere narrow-context information and be episodically framed.  By 
consuming this narrative, the affluent individual might become emotionally aroused as 
well as develop sympathetic feelings toward the pregnant teen featured in the story.  
Since, in this example, no broad-context information was provided and the pregnant teen 
lives in a socio-economic sphere separate from the wealthy viewer’s, the news consumer 
might fail to have enough familiarity with individuals living in the teen’s neighborhood 
to know that teen pregnancy is on the rise in that locale and is reaching record levels.  In 
this particular case, there is a lack of sex education in the teen’s neighborhood and this is 
partly to blame for the rise in teen pregnancy.  The lack of sexual education in her 
neighborhood is due to recent budget cuts at the local governmental level that led to a 
reduction of social services programs available to the public.  As addressed in chapter 
three, due to problems associated with episodic framing, the wealthy news consumer 
would be more apt to attribute responsibility to the teen featured in the story than the 
neighborhood or local infrastructure within which the teen resides.  In this case, the 
affluent news consumer might be less apt to place political pressure upon local officials 
to improve conditions.  In addition, since citizens would direct the majority of the blame 
toward the wrong target (i.e., the teen), teen pregnancy rates would most likely not 
decrease. 
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 Further, since accounts comprised of mere first- and second-person knowledge 
necessarily present mere narrow-context information, they do not afford citizens 
contextually rich, technical knowledge of societal problems.  For instance, say citizens 
were called upon to vote whether their city should abandon efforts to relocate the city’s 
homeless shelter away from its current downtown location.  In this case, citizens would 
need to understand how the current shelter’s location impacts the downtown area, what 
its departure might do to residents and the local community, the cost of relocation, 
relocation’s effect on the newly proposed site and surrounding area, etc.  These concerns 
are complex, and a story featuring a personalized human-interest piece featuring a 
homeless resident making moral claims about what the city should do would not provide 
enough broad-context information necessary to make an informed decision about the 
proposed move. 
§4.6 Accounts Comprised of Mere Third-person Knowledge 
Accounts comprised of mere third-person knowledge, which necessarily feature 
mere broad-context information, fair no better at motivating citizens than accounts 
comprised of mere first- and second-person knowledge.  As noted earlier, becoming 
informed is only half the battle.  In addition, citizens must also become motivated to 
resolve societal issues before they can do so.  Citizens would do well to become informed 
before acting upon their motivation to resolve social issues since they would be better 
able to do so.  The following discussion will first examine how accounts comprised of 
mere third-person knowledge fare when it comes to informing citizens, and second, 
address whether such accounts can render citizens motivated. 
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Accounts comprised of mere third-person knowledge sufficiently satisfy the 
awareness and technical knowledge conditions since these accounts encourage citizens to 
develop contextually rich views of societal problems and possible solutions, their 
consequences, and their costs.  Such accounts are also necessary for satisfying these 
conditions.  For example, imagine that back in March 2003, a group of citizens was 
considering whether to express negative feedback to their political representatives about 
the U.S.’s decision to invade Iraq.  To understand the circumstances surrounding this 
event and whether they should express dissent, they would need to first become aware of 
what led to the decision to invade, as well as attain a complex understanding of U.S. 
international relations, the socio-economic and political climate in the Middle East, how 
the invasion may affect the U.S.’s standing around the globe, etc.  The presentation of 
contextually rich, third-person knowledge demonstrating the causal foundation and future 
significance of events would enable these citizens to become aware of the phenomena in 
question as well as develop a nuanced understanding of what led to the decision to invade 
Iraq and how citizens could influence governmental decisions by expressing feedback. 
Contra Anderson, third-person knowledge is necessary to satisfy the socio-
cultural capital condition, even though accounts’ comprised of mere third-person 
knowledge do not sufficiently do so.  Satisfying the socio-cultural condition requires that 
citizens appreciate the subjective experiences of others outside of their own socio-
economic and political environment and form an understanding of the contextual 
backdrop lying behind others’ experiences, where such understanding is necessary to 
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appreciate the social traditions and practices of others31.  For instance, understanding why 
certain words and ideas are stereotypically associated with certain ethnicities enables one 
to better understand why such stereotypes should be avoided.  This point is worth 
exploring. 
Earlier, I noted that Anderson believes that third-person knowledge does little to 
erase harms posed by cognitive biases created by stereotypes.  I find this notion 
problematic.  Rather, broad-context information can help alleviate this concern, as it can 
diffuse stereotypes.  For example, during the time of slavery in the United States, there 
were certain food items that became associated with African Americans.  Since this time, 
some individuals, as means of oppression, have stereotyped African Americans as being 
associated with these food items, which is reprehensible.  Some offenders might not be 
aware of the history of these particular stereotypes.  While it is true that accounts 
comprised of mere first- and second-person knowledge could effectively present the 
anger and frustration felt by African Americans whenever such stereotypes are invoked, 
these accounts fail to inform citizens about the connection between slavery and such 
stereotypes, as well as why invoking them is oppressive.  To accomplish the latter, third-
person knowledge is required. 
§4.7 Hybrid Accounts Comprised of First-, Second-, and Third-person Knowledge 
Citizens' education must come via hybrid accounts featuring first-, second-, and 
third-person knowledge (i.e., hybrid narrow- and broad-context accounts).  This is so for 
the following reasons.  One, Anderson is right to point out that accounts comprised of 
mere first- and second-person knowledge encourage citizens to understand the subjective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 As I noted earlier, to satisfy the socio-cultural capital condition, citizens must also develop sympathy 
toward others across sectoral lines, and to do so, individuals must undergo emotional arousal.  Because of 
this, first- and second-person knowledge about the subjective experiences of others is required. 
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experiences of others, which is sufficient but not necessary for gaining awareness of 
societal problems, and necessary but not sufficient for developing a disposition to be 
responsive, as well as attaining socio-cultural capital.  Two, Anderson is right to claim 
that attaining technical knowledge of societal problems requires abstract, third-person 
knowledge because doing so demands that citizens understand the causal foundation of 
events as well as their future significance.  Thus, accounts comprised of mere third-
person knowledge sufficiently satisfy the technical knowledge condition and are 
necessary to do so.  She is also right to note that mere third-person knowledge fails to 
sufficiently satisfy the disposition and socio-cultural conditions.  She is wrong, however, 
to deny that such knowledge is necessary to satisfy these conditions.  Without the ability 
to recognize the interconnection between elements of shared experience between citizens, 
individuals are unlikely to recognize that many other citizens hold similar interests and 
face like problems as well.  Recognizing this interconnection is necessary because 
without this realization, citizens will be less likely to view the problems of others as 
similar to their own, rendering individuals less apt to care about them. 
For instance, imagine a case involving an American consuming a news story 
documenting the horrific conditions that children endure while working in Indonesian 
sweatshops.  That person might wonder why those children (and their families) would not 
leave the area in which they live.  Without contextual knowledge of the socio-economic 
and political conditions in Indonesia, the news consumer would not have the technical 
knowledge necessary to understand the problem from a non-individualistic perspective, a 
phenomenon I noted in chapter three.  Because of this, they might be more apt to blame 
individual families for not removing their children from situations like this.  Such 
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proposals are naïve and far too simplistic.  Also noted in chapter three is the idea that 
adopting an individualistic perspective leaves citizens less disposed to help others, since 
audience members attribute responsibility to the individuals, rather than the greater socio-
economic and political conditions grounding the issue in question.  Because of this, 
instead of perceiving child laborers and their family as victims, our news consumer might 
view them mostly to blame for their troubles.  Impersonal, third-person knowledge could 
help our news consumer begin to view the situation from a broader social perspective 
where he could contextually appreciate the interconnection between his product 
purchasing habits and sweatshop labor.  Further, information about the normative claims 
issued by child laborers and their families could supplement this broad-context 
information to encourage him to undergo emotional arousal; thereby, our news consumer 
may begin to feel connected to the story’s featured subjects.  By feeling connected to the 
story’s subjects, he will be more likely than not to become motivated to take ameliorative 
action.  Hybrid accounts comprised of first-, second-, and third-person knowledge offer 
both insight into the subjective experiences of others and the normative claims they 
make, as well as broad-context information, which taken together, sufficiently satisfies all 
four of Anderson’s conditions required to become informed and motivated and is 
necessary to do so. 
The following excerpt from a story featured in The Washington Post demonstrates 
how journalists can present information in ways that can render citizens emotionally 
aroused, while at the same time, providing audience members enough contextual 
information that would encourage them to develop broad-context views. 
These days, 24-year-old Delonta Spriggs spends much of his time cooped 
up in his mother's one-bedroom apartment in Southwest Washington, the 
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TV blaring soap operas hour after hour, trying to stay out of the streets and 
out of trouble, held captive by the economy.  As a young black man, 
Spriggs belongs to a group that has been hit much harder than any other by 
unemployment. 
 
Joblessness for 16-to-24-year-old black men has reached Great Depression 
proportions -- 34.5 percent in October, more than three times the rate for 
the general U.S. population.  And last Friday, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reported that unemployment in the District, home to many young 
black men, rose to 11.9 percent from 11.4 percent, even as it stayed 
relatively stable in Virginia and Maryland.   
 
His work history, Spriggs says, has consisted of dead-end jobs.  About a 
year ago, he lost his job moving office furniture, and he hasn't been able to 
find steady work since.  This summer he completed a construction 
apprenticeship program, he says, seeking a career so he could avoid 
repeating the mistake of selling drugs to support his 3-year-old daughter.  
So far the most the training program has yielded was a temporary flagger 
job that lasted a few days. 
 
… 
 
Victoria Kirby, 22, has been among that number.  In the summer of 2008, 
a D.C. publishing company where Kirby was interning offered her a job 
that would start upon her graduation in May 2009 from Howard 
University.  But the company withdrew the offer in the fall of 2008 when 
the economy collapsed. 
 
Kirby said she applied for administrative jobs on Capitol Hill but was told 
she was overqualified.  She sought a teaching position in the D.C. public 
schools through the Teach for America program but said she was rejected 
because of a flood of four times the usual number of applicants. 
 
Finally, she went back to school, enrolling in a master's of public policy 
program at Howard.  "I decided to stay in school two more years and wait 
out the recession," Kirby said (Blacks Hit Hard by Economy's Punch).32 
 
Since the story above provides third-person knowledge alongside first- and second-
person knowledge, it serves as a hybrid narrow- and broad-context account of the type 
featured in earlier chapters of this dissertation.  This narrative opens citizens to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Much of the remainder of the story included contextual information pertaining to the current economic 
outlook around the country as well as efforts by the federal government to achieve resolution to the 
problems of both the disadvantaged and elites alike. 
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subjective experiences of others and the normative claims they make, while at the same 
time presenting broad-context information about the struggles of individuals across 
sectoral lines.  In other words, the story provides audience members both a personal and 
impersonal perspective about the projects and interests of citizens operating within 
various socio-economic and political conditions.  Because of this, the story encourages 
citizens to satisfy all four conditions required to becoming informed and motivated.  To 
elucidate the psychological foundation of how hybrid accounts inform and motivate 
citizens, I will now discuss the psychological underpinnings of emotional arousal by 
examining a noncognitive, process-centered appraisal theory of emotion.  Doing so will 
show why first- and second-person knowledge must be packaged alongside third-person 
knowledge in order to satisfy all four conditions required to becoming informed and 
motivated. 
§ 4.8 Appraisal Theory 
Concerning appraisals, such talk first entered the psychological literature on 
emotion via Magda Arnold’s Emotion and Personality.  In her book, she describes 
appraisals as the 
felt tendency toward anything intuitively appraised as good [for me], or 
away from anything intuitively appraised as bad for me (Arnold, 1960, p. 
171). 
 
We issue positive or negative appraisals of objects and events based upon their perceived 
potentiality to positively or negatively affect our own subjective well-being.  It is 
important to note that while Arnold generally considers appraisals as cognitive in 
character, others (Ekman 2003; Zajonc 1980, 1984) view appraisals as unreflective, 
automatic, noncognitive assessments.  As Ekman claims: 
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[t]he appraisal process … is usually automatic.  We are not conscious of 
our appraising (Ekman, 2003, p. 234). 
 
Concurring with the view that noncognitive appraisals occur automatically and 
unreflectively, Paul Ekman claims: 
[t]here must be an appraiser mechanism which selectively attends to those 
stimuli (external or internal) which are the occasion for activating the 
affect programme. …  Since the interval between stimulus and emotional 
response is sometimes extraordinarily short, the appraisal mechanism must 
be capable of operating with great speed.  Often the appraisal is not only 
quick but it happens without awareness, so I must postulate that the 
appraisal mechanism is able to operate automatically.  It must be 
constructed so that it quickly attends to some stimuli, determining not only 
that they pertain to emotion, but to which emotion, and then activating the 
appropriate part of the affect programme (Ekman, 1977, p. 58). 
 
Experiments conducted by Robert Zajonc provide evidence for Ekman’s view.  In 
“Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences”, Zajonc discusses studies he 
conducted years earlier that led him to conclude that affective reactions33 are “virtually 
inescapable” (Zajonc, 1980, p. 156).  The following excerpt from the above essay 
elucidates how affective reactions34 operate.  Zajonc claims that 
[a]ffect is the first link in the evolution of complex adaptive functions that 
eventually differentiated animals from plants.  And unlike language or 
cognition, affective responsiveness is universal among the animal species.  
A rabbit confronted by a snake has no time to consider all the perceivable 
attributes of the snake in the hope that he might be able to infer from them 
the likelihood of the snake's attack, the timing of the attack, or its 
direction.  The rabbit cannot stop to contemplate the length of the snake's 
fangs or the geometry of its markings.  If the rabbit is to escape, the action 
must be undertaken long before the completion of even a simple cognitive 
process—before, in fact, the rabbit has fully established and verified that a 
nearby movement might reveal a snake in all its coiled glory.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The label affective reaction is Zajonc’s and he intends this phrase to denote noncognitive appraisals that 
lie in contrast with cognitive appraisals, as the latter involves cognitive reflection while the former does not 
(Zajonc, 1980, p. 154). 
34 I construe noncognitive appraisals and affective reactions as the same phenomena.  While one might 
object that an appraisal is of a different category than a reaction, I believe that, in this context, such a view 
is mistaken.  Noncognitive appraisals do not involve higher order cognitive reflection that one might 
normally consider necessary for something to be considered an appraisal, since they involve mere lower 
order processing. 
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decision to run must be made on the basis of minimal cognitive 
engagement (Zajonc, 1980, p. 156). 
 
As described above, avoiding serious injury or death necessitates that rabbits hold an 
ability to react to stimuli noncognitively, free from any constraint requiring that they 
undergo cognitive processing. 
§4.9 Noncognitive Appraisal 
 In “The Emotions in Art”, Jenefer Robinson offers an account of emotion by 
claiming that an emotional response is comprised of a series of processes (Robinson, 
2004, pp. 175-178).  While her view ultimately differs from my own, I will address those 
features of her account pertinent to my argument that becoming informed and motivated 
is grounded upon noncognitive appraisals.  According to Robinson, when one perceives 
an object, one’s attention selects out some particular stimulus within her environment and 
assesses that element’s potential to influence one’s well-being (Robinson, 2004, p. 176).  
For instance, if an image of an individual holding a gun were to flash before one’s eyes, 
she would immediately undergo noncognitive appraisal, whereby her attention would 
first select out some particular stimulus (e.g., the individual holding a gun) and then 
evaluate whether that object poses a potential threat to well-being.  This appraisal is 
noncognitive because it occurs without the assistance of any cortical mechanisms related 
to cognitive reflection.  As Robinson states in Deeper than Reason: 
[noncognitive appraisals] occur without conscious deliberation or 
awareness, and that they do not involve any complex information 
processing (Robinson, 2005, p. 43). 
 
The information about stimuli garnered via one’s sense organs travels directly (and 
unconsciously) to the amygdala; bypassing the neocortex [where complex information 
processing occurs] (Robinson, 2004, p. 177). 
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 A series of experiments conducted by Zajonc tested whether individuals could use 
sense perception to detect stimuli within their experiential environment under conditions 
of mere (i.e., subliminal) exposure.  His tests confirmed that subjects could unconsciously 
garner information about stimuli within their surroundings.  Further, he discovered that 
upon unconsciously perceiving such objects, subjects appraise such data, producing 
valenced assessments about the stimuli in question.  Offering a summary of Zajonc’s 
findings, Robinson claims: 
[i]n the mere exposure experiments, subjects [were] differentially exposed 
to a variety of stimuli, such as nonsense syllables, and then asked to give a 
liking rating.  It was discovered that subjects gave a higher liking rating to 
those syllables they were exposed to more often.  In some experiments, the 
stimuli are presented too fast for recognition, and the mere exposure effect 
still obtains (Robinson, 1995, p. 60). 
 
In other words, in Zajonc’s experiments, subjects formed noncognitive, valenced 
appraisals of stimuli researchers introduced them to in windows of time too small for 
information about such stimuli to register cognitively in the subjects’ complex 
information processing centers. 
The second stage of the noncognitive appraisal process involves the assignment of 
valence markers35 to stimuli appraised as holding salience in stage one.  The label 
valence marker denotes both the positive and negative indicators one attributes to stimuli 
that elicit certain potentialities.  Stimuli assessed as having the potential to influence our 
well-being in a positive manner, we consider to have positive valence.  Thus, we feel 
attraction toward them.  Conversely, stimuli assessed as having the potential to influence 
our well-being in a negative manner, we consider to have negative valence.  Thus, we 
feel aversion to such entities (Prinz, 2004, p. 163).  For instance, take the emotion: fear.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The label valence marker was offered by Jesse Prinz in Gut Reactions (Prinz, 2004, p. 163). 
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Fear is valence-laden and furthermore, negatively charged.  Imagine a case where a 
person is walking through a wooded area.  Not paying much attention to his 
surroundings, he happens to step upon what he thought was a stick.  Take further, that 
upon stepping on the object, he discovers that what he had perceived as a stick was 
actually a poisonous snake.  Upon assessing the snake as salient to his well-being, he 
would appraise it as having negative valence and experience fear, thus rendering the 
noncognitive appraisal process complete. 
§4.10 Cognitive Reappraisal 
 As Robinson claims, it is possible for one to experience a cognitive reappraisal, or 
cognitive monitoring36, of a noncognitive appraisal (Robinson, 2004, p. 177).  Cognitive 
monitoring is important as it allows one to cognitively reflect upon noncognitive 
appraisals.  Discussing the prioritization in succession that noncognitive appraisals have 
in relation to cognitive reappraisals, Zajonc claims: 
if the most recent version of homo sapiens specifies that affective 
reactions are mediated by prior cognitive processes—as contemporary 
cognitive views would have it—then at some point in the course of 
evolution, affect must have lost its autonomy and acquired an intermediary 
in the form of cold cognition.  This scenario seems most unlikely.  When 
nature has a direct and autonomous mechanism that functions 
efficiently—and there is no reason to suppose that the affective system 
was anything else—it does not make it indirect and entirely dependent on 
a newly evolved function.  It is rather more likely that the affective system 
retained its autonomy, relinquishing its exclusive control over behavior 
slowly and grudgingly.  At most, the formerly sovereign affective system 
may have accepted an alliance with the newly evolved system to carry out 
some adaptive functions jointly.  These conjectures make a two-system 
view more plausible than one that relegates affect to a secondary role 
mediated and dominated by cognition (Zajonc, 1980, p. 170). 
 
Since noncognitive appraisal serves as an effective mechanism that allows humans to 
navigate their experiential environment, there would be no recognizable justification for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Robinson considers cognitive monitoring and cognitive reappraisals to denote the same phenomenon. 
	  
	  
127 
the claim that natural selection has reversed the order of occurrence between 
noncognitive appraisals and cognitive reappraisals. 
The cognitive reappraisal process relies upon memory retrieval activation that can 
recall both prior noncognitive appraisals and cognitive reappraisals; therefore, cognitive 
monitoring can elicit emotional responses in subjects by way of cognitive inference in 
some cases.  For example, take the case of a person who finds a box on her doorstep.  She 
has never seen the box before and has no idea who placed it there.  Upon inspection, she 
sees several green and red wires protruding from the top.  In addition, she hears a ticking 
noise emanating from inside the box.  Via cognitive inference, she begins to believe that 
the box is an explosive device, thus, she begins to feel fear.  In this case, her inference 
that the object is a bomb appears to cause her fear.  During this process, she assigns 
negative valence markers to the object, thus, causing a desire to avoid contact with the 
box.  Her emotion is intentional, in that her fear is directed toward the box, as well as 
action-directed, in that she begins to desire to flee.  For one to assume that this account is 
exhaustive, and that it is cognitive inference that grounded her elicitation of fear, one 
would be erring twice. 
 According to the account of emotional response that I am arguing for, one would 
claim that the woman has assuredly encountered prior to her current predicament, 
through either virtual or actual means (i.e., via some third-person visual or audio 
medium, or in a first-person real-time environment, respectively), the destructive nature 
of explosions.  In addition, the woman has experienced (again either virtually or actually) 
the conjunction between wires and explosives, and audible ticking sounds and explosives.  
Based upon such prior experience, the cognitive inference she undergoes involves 
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associative processing that makes what the interconnection of such experiential elements 
indicates apparent to her.  She reaches the conclusion that she has come in close contact 
with a bomb, and it poses danger.  She becomes frightened and immediately desires to 
avoid the object. 
Associative processing is important, as without it, one cannot draw cognitive 
inferences of the type described above.  In “Toward Delivering on the Promise of 
Appraisal Theory”, Craig Smith and Leslie Kirby claim: 
[a]ssociative processing is a fast, automatic, memory-based mode of 
processing (Smith & Kirby, 2001, p. 130). 
 
Revisiting the above case, upon visually perceiving the box, the wires, and the audible 
ticking, she immediately undergoes a cognitive reappraisal, whereby memory activation 
occurs, accessing a vast cache of information accumulated prior to her experience with 
the box.  Such elements may include: any experiences with the effects of explosions, 
bomb making, bomb components, the feeling of physical pain, psychological trauma, etc.  
Upon undergoing a cognitive inference, whereby she comes to identify the possible bomb 
with the potential harm that such an object may cause, she begins to experience fear 
toward the object, thereby causing her to desire to avoid it. 
 Concerning the cache of information that associative processing can access during 
cognitive inference, Smith and Kirby claim that such an array can be 
anything that can be represented in memory, ranging from concrete 
representations of physical sensations, sounds, smells, tastes, and images 
up to representations of highly abstract concepts … That is, cues that can 
activate memories and their associated appraisal meanings include not 
only concrete stimuli, such as sensations, images, and sounds, but also 
highly conceptual stimuli, such as abstract ideas or the appraisal meanings 
themselves. …  [In addition] appraisal meanings associated with prior 
experiences can be activated very quickly and automatically.  Thus[,] … 
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emotional reactions can be elicited almost instantaneously (Smith & 
Kirby, 2001, p. 131). 
 
Cognitive processing involves the associative regurgitation of various elements including 
sensations and images, as well as abstract ideas formulated via mere cognition.  In 
addition (and most importantly), associative processing allows cognitive processing to 
operate upon prior appraisals (both cognitive and noncognitive).  For some, the quickness 
with which associative processing operates seems to suggest that the woman’s fear 
manifests because of mere cognition concerning the case at hand. 
For instance, theorists holding a cognitive view of affect might claim that in the 
scenario described above, all that would be needed for fear to manifest in the woman 
would be cognitive inference concerning the following claims: 
(1) bombs are often contained inside boxes 
(2) bombs typically are built using wires 
(3) bombs typically are built using ticking clocks 
(4) bombs cause explosions 
(5) explosions can harm individuals 
(6) harm is undesirable 
 
According to cognitive theorists, if the woman cognized about these claims, she would 
undergo a fearful emotional response and be motivated to seek cover.  This picture is 
incomplete, however, because if she had no prior experience with bombs or any of the 
elements contained within the above claims, then it would be impossible for her to infer 
that bombs are something toward which one should feel fear.  In my view, for cognitive 
inference to lead her to the conclusion that she should fear the box, she would have to 
undergo a cognitive reappraisal of some prior noncognitive appraisal.  Necessarily, in this 
case, her cognitive reappraisal (involving cognitive inference) would be based upon 
contingent a posteriori evidence that wires and ticking noises indicate the presence of a 
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bomb, explosions cause pain, pain is harmful to well-being, etc.  Because of this, mere 
cognitive inference will not produce fear, as associative processing must provide linkage 
between perceptual information gained prior (as well as any attendant noncognitive 
appraisals produced from such information), and the stimuli she perceives at present for 
cognitive inference to induce a fearful response. 
 Cognitive monitoring plays a highly important role through its ability to allow us 
to rationally reflect upon prior affective appraisal processing, thus allowing us to adjust 
the strength of our felt emotional response.  As I noted earlier, according to Anderson 
(and I agree), it is necessary to undergo an emotional response to satisfy the disposition 
and socio-cultural capital conditions.  Because of cognitive monitoring’s ability to adjust 
the strength of our felt emotional response, through it we are able to also adjust the level 
of motivation we experience in relation to social issues.  This is important since 
developing too strong of a motivation to help others in cases where we can do little is 
counterproductive.  Likewise, in cases where there is much that we can do, developing 
too weak of a motivation to help others will inhibit our efforts to resolve the problem.  To 
enhance cognitive monitoring’s ability to fine-tune the strength of our motivation to fit 
the demands of the particular societal problem we are facing, narratives must include 
contextually rich, broad-context information so that we are best able to reasonably 
understand problems and possible solutions, their consequences, and their costs.  Without 
attaining such an understanding, our motivational strength may rest at a level 
inappropriate for the given situation.  
 
 
	  
	  
131 
§4.11 What Considering Emotional Arousal as Noncognitively Grounded Demonstrates 
 From the above discussion of the psychological ground of emotional arousal we 
can glean that without prior acquaintance with experiential elements related to others 
across sectoral lines and their projects and interests, consuming accounts comprised of 
mere third-person knowledge will not encourage citizens to undergo emotional arousal, 
whereby the latter is necessary for satisfying the disposition and socio-cultural capital 
conditions.  Without having formed prior noncognitive appraisals based upon experiential 
stimuli related to such individuals and concerns, cognitive monitoring alone cannot 
render one emotionally aroused in response to receiving such information.  Anderson is 
right to recognize this point and claim that to satisfy the disposition and socio-cultural 
capital conditions, first- and second-person knowledge is necessary. 
For instance, take the case of a TV news viewer who consumes a story about 
forced female excision in Ghana.  Before viewing the news story, she has never had 
experience with excision and knows nothing about the practice.  While consuming this 
narrative, she perceives a series of graphic images and videos depicting individuals 
undergoing excision and its aftermath.  In addition, she also hears testimony from 
individuals who have undergone the procedure, which includes normative claims issued 
about the practice.  Via cognitive inference, she begins to believe that excision is horrific, 
as well as feel sadness for the victims.  In this example, the TV news viewer has 
assuredly encountered prior to her current news consumption experience, the physical 
and emotional pain caused by lacerations.  In addition, the woman has experienced the 
conjunction between bloody knives, screams, tears, and suffering.  Upon visually 
perceiving such elements in conjunction with viewing an excision being performed, she 
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immediately undergoes a cognitive reappraisal, whereby memory activation occurs, 
accessing a vast cache of information accumulated prior to her news consumption 
experience.  Such elements may include: any experiences with the effects of lacerations, 
blood, the sharpness of knives, the feeling of physical pain, psychological trauma, etc.  
Upon undergoing a cognitive inference, our viewer identifies the practice of excision 
with the harm that it causes.  Because of this, she experiences sympathy toward the 
victims depicted in the news story.  In sum, she has become emotionally engaged and 
begun to form a disposition to be motivated to prevent excisions from occurring in the 
future, as well as insight about what it might be like to live in the victims’ shoes, which is 
necessary for developing socio-cultural capital. 
This is only half the battle, though, as even though she is emotionally engaged, 
without a contextually rich understanding of excision and the socio-economic and 
political conditions in which it is practiced, she will not become fully motivated to 
resolve this issue.  Further, she will not be able to attain socio-cultural capital that could 
aid her attempts to achieve such resolution.  Therefore, third-person knowledge is 
necessary to satisfy the disposition and socio-cultural capital conditions.  If the above 
narrative included mere first- and second-person knowledge, she would fail to appreciate 
contextual elements necessary to understand how she might help ameliorate the victims’ 
concerns.  Thus, her disposition to provide assistance might fail to blossom as fully as it 
may if she formed an idea of how she could take action to prevent future cases of 
excision37.  Further, if this narrative featured mere first- and second-person knowledge, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 I will discuss this problem in chapter five at length by examining how providing mere first- and second-
person knowledge (i.e., mere narrow-context information) causes news consumers to adopt a fatalistic 
attitude about their ability to influence events.  By consuming mere narrow-context information citizens fail 
to become motivated since they tend to believe that there is little they can do to resolve societal problems. 
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consuming it would inhibit her ability to attain socio-cultural capital that would enable 
her to respectfully interact with others in a cooperative manner.  The latter is important 
since individuals often view excision as entrenched in cultural tradition, and such 
tradition is foreign to our viewer, as she had no knowledge of excision’s existence before 
viewing the news story in question.  Due to these problems, third-person knowledge is 
necessary as well.  As a result of the problems discussed throughout this chapter 
associated with accounts comprised of mere first- and second-person knowledge on the 
one hand, and mere third-person knowledge on the other, hybrid accounts comprised of 
first-, second-, and third-person knowledge are necessary to satisfy all four conditions 
rendering one informed and motivated, as well as sufficiently do so. 
§4.12 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I argued that rendering citizens informed and motivated is best 
accomplished by presenting accounts comprised of first-, second-, and third-person 
knowledge (i.e., hybrid narrow- and broad-context accounts) that communicate the 
subjective experiences of others and the normative claims they issue, as well as 
contextually rich information about the causal foundation and future significance of 
events.  By consuming such accounts, citizens can gain an understanding of the socio-
economic and political origination and significance of events, as well as undergo 
emotional arousal, and gaining such an understanding and undergoing such arousal is 
necessary to becoming informed and motivated.  To demonstrate why the inclusion of 
first- and second-person knowledge on the one hand, as well as third-person knowledge 
on the other, is important, I discussed a noncognitive, process-centered view of emotional 
response grounded upon appraisal theory.  By explicating this view I demonstrated how 
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hybrid narratives consisting of both narrow- and broad-context information can 
encourage audience members to become informed and motivated about societal 
problems, thus providing further support in favor of the presentation of hybrid views.  
Lastly, explaining this particular view of emotional response allowed me to show that 
Anderson is wrong to assume that impersonal, third-person knowledge is not necessary 
for becoming informed and motivated. 
To be clear, I argued that since emotional response is grounded upon affective 
appraisals, the most effective way to encourage citizens to become motivated to resolve 
societal problems would be for journalists to construct stories that feature dramatic 
elements that convey the subjective experiences of others because those elements are best 
able to trigger our affective appraisal processing.  Undergoing emotional arousal is 
necessary for satisfying the disposition and socio-cultural capital conditions, and 
cognitive monitoring alone cannot render one emotionally aroused in response to 
receiving such information.  Via cognitive monitoring, we rationally reflect upon the 
prior affective appraisal processing that we have experienced, thus allowing us to adjust 
the strength of our felt emotional response.  Because of cognitive monitoring’s ability to 
adjust the strength of our felt emotional response, through it we are able to also adjust the 
level of motivation we experience in relation to social issues.  To help accomplish this, 
narratives must include contextually rich, broad-context information so that cognitive 
monitoring is best able to fine-tune our motivation to fit the needs of the particular 
societal problems we are facing.  Since reason’s role (while important) comes only after 
one has undergone affective appraisal, news stories that fail to include personal and 
dramatic elements do little to encourage citizens to become motivated to resolve societal 
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problems because they fail to elicit emotional arousal in audience members.  Lastly, I 
argued that without third-person knowledge (i.e., broad-context information), the 
likelihood that citizens will become informed is low since they will be unable to construct 
an understanding of the causal foundation and future significance of events, which is 
necessary for satisfying the disposition, socio-cultural capital, and technical knowledge 
conditions. 
In the next and final chapter, I will examine a problem concerning hybrid 
accounts’ ability to attract and retain news consumers.  Renita Coleman and Esther 
Thorson’s work shows that citizens gain little enjoyment by consuming hybrid accounts 
and this causes them to seek out narrow-context accounts as they enjoy consuming these 
more so.  This is problematic, because recent work completed by researchers affiliated 
with the Program on International Policy Attitudes shows that by consuming narrow-
context accounts, consumers often gain misperceptions about events and their contextual 
environment.  Further, as I will argue, news consumers fail to enjoy consuming hybrid 
accounts because they are apathetic toward learning about social issues and how they 
might be resolved because citizens assume that events occur at random and there is little 
individuals can do to influence their manifestation.  To combat this problem, I will argue 
that citizens must be encouraged to believe that they can influence government and 
society, as well as gain confidence in their ability to do so.  Journalists can accomplish 
this by presenting hybrid accounts to citizens.  Lastly, I will argue that if citizens gain 
such confidence, they will be more likely than not to become enticed (and remain so) by 
consuming hybrid accounts.  This will enable journalists to satisfy the economic 
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pressures they face demanding that they attract future news consumers as well as retain 
current ones. 
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Chapter Five 
Affective Enticement: The Remedial Effects of Hybrid Accounts  
§5.1 Introduction 
A serious issue surrounds hybrid accounts’ ability to attract and retain news 
consumers.  As discussed in chapter four, accounts comprised of mere broad-context 
information do little to entice news consumers to become motivated to resolve social 
issues (Anderson, 2007; Dorfman, et al., 1997; Stevens, 1994, 1998).  An even greater 
concern has emerged from research conducted by Renita Coleman and Esther Thorson, as 
their work suggests that even when broad-context information comes packaged with 
narrow-context data via hybrid accounts, citizens gain little enjoyment, leading audience 
members to prefer narratives that feature mere narrow-context information (Coleman & 
Thorson, 2002, pp. 414-415).  Contributing to this preference is a fatalistic attitude that 
events occur deterministically and citizens can do little to influence their rates of 
incidence (Coleman & Thorson, 2002, p. 407).  This fatalistic attitude causes citizens to 
become apathetic toward politics and societal problems, whereby citizens’ interest level 
regarding the consumption of information about social issues remains low.  To increase 
citizens’ news consumption interest, journalists must raise audience members’ 
satisfaction with news stories, and in particular, narratives’ ability to enhance citizens’ 
civic participation.  To do this, journalists must encourage citizens to consume 
contextually rich information about social issues, as this could increase citizens’ 
epistemic political efficacy, or 
confidence in one’s own ability to achieve a reasonable threshold of certainty 
about the factual aspects of politics (Pingree, 2011, p. 26). 
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Gaining confidence in their epistemic political efficacy could encourage audience 
members to experience higher levels of political efficacy, which is “a disposition towards 
politics, a feeling of effectiveness and capacity in the political sphere” (Easton & Dennis, 
1967, p. 26).  There are three types of political efficacy: epistemic, internal, and external.  
I have already addressed epistemic political efficacy above.  Internal political efficacy 
refers to one’s confidence “about one's own competence to … participate effectively in 
politics” (Niemi, et al., 1991, p. 1407), and external political efficacy denotes one’s 
confidence “about the responsiveness of governmental authorities and institutions to 
citizen demands” (Niemi, et. al., 1991, p. 1408). 
 To clarify the relation between each type of political efficacy, I offer the 
following.  Citizens gain confidence in their ability to attain a contextually rich 
understanding of politics and societal problems, which is known as their epistemic 
political efficacy (Pingree, 2011, p. 26).  Experiencing high epistemic political efficacy 
enhances individuals’ confidence in their ability to wield power effectively via civic 
participation, which is know as their internal political efficacy (Niemi, et al., 1991, p. 
1407).  Further, the more citizens believe that they are able to acquire political knowledge 
and use that knowledge to influence politics via civic participation, the more satisfaction 
they will gain from consuming news stories.  Successfully influencing politics through 
civic participation causes citizens to feel empowered by the information that enabled 
them to do so.  Because of this, citizens perceive information contained within narratives 
as useful to satisfying their concerns, thus, individuals view such stories favorably.  As a 
result, individuals gain confidence that government is responsive to their civic 
participation and that they can influence events, which is known as their external political 
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efficacy (Niemi, et. al., 1991, p. 1408).  Because citizens experience increased 
satisfaction with the process of attaining information and using it to produce change, 
individuals will be more likely than not to become enticed (and remain so) by consuming 
hybrid accounts, thus enabling journalists to attract future news consumers as well as 
retain current ones. 
Citizens’ preference for narrow-context accounts to hybrid narratives is 
problematic because consuming the former often causes audience members to hold 
misperceptions about events.  Numerous studies surveying citizens’ knowledge about 
current events as well as the sources of information they consume38 provide evidence for 
this claim.  In one such study conducted by researchers associated with the Program on 
International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), investigators found that the more citizens consume 
episodic, narrow-context accounts, the more misperceptions about societal problems they 
hold (Misperceptions, 2003, pp. 16-17).  Individuals consuming narrow-context accounts 
often fail to appreciate elements of experience necessary to forming a contextually rich 
understanding of events.  By developing mere narrow-context views, many individuals 
acquire caricaturistic perspectives of societal problems that contain misperceptions of the 
type discussed in PIPA’s research (e.g., that Iraq possessed WMDs prior to the U.S. led 
2003 invasion, that Saddam Hussein worked closely with al-Qaeda, etc.) 
(Misperceptions, 2003, p. 1).  To remedy this problem, journalists must encourage 
citizens to develop broad-context views of events.  Only then will citizens be able to 
eradicate misperceptions that inhibit their ability to become informed and motivated. 
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§5.2 The Unattractiveness of Hybrid Accounts 
 As noted above (and also in chapter four), broad-context accounts fail to 
encourage citizens to become emotionally aroused, thereby also failing to encourage 
individuals to develop a disposition to become motivated to resolve societal problems, as 
well as able to cooperate successfully with others via respectful interaction.  Because of 
this, and the failure of narrow-context accounts as above noted in §5.1, I have argued that 
hybrid accounts including both narrow- and broad-context information are best able to 
inform citizens about social issues and motivate them to resolve such problems.  A recent 
study39 suggests, however, that hybrid accounts fail to entice citizens and consuming 
these narratives causes audience members to seek out narrow-context accounts instead.  
The following discussion of Renita Coleman and Esther Thorson’s work investigating the 
effects of consuming hybrid accounts that focus on crime and violence illustrates this 
failure. 
 In “The Effects of News Stories That Put Crime and Violence into Context”, 
Coleman and Thorson examine whether readers find 
base-rate information[,] … offered along with exemplars in the public 
health stories, … more interesting, relevant, believable, important, and 
informative than [data presented via episodically framed] stories (Coleman 
& Thorson, 2002, p. 407). 
 
Base-rate information is contextually rich data about the causal foundation of events and 
their future significance, while exemplars consist of personal and dramatic elements lying 
at the surface of events (Coleman & Thorson, 2002, p. 404).  As such, accounts 
comprised of mere base-rate information are best construed as broad-context accounts, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Coleman, R., & Thorson, E. (2002). The effects of news stories that put crime and violence into context: 
Testing the public health model of reporting. Journal of Health Communication, 7(5), 401-425. doi: 
10.1080/10810730290001783. 
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while narratives comprised of mere exemplars are best viewed as episodically framed, 
narrow-context accounts.  As claimed: 
[e]xemplars are defined as case studies about individuals whose 
circumstances illustrate the phenomenon in question, involve only limited 
individual cases, and are chosen mainly for their entertaining qualities 
rather than the accuracy of their representation of the topic in the report … 
[while base-rate accounts] give details of the number or proportion of 
people or things involved in a given social issue (Coleman & Thorson, 
2002, p. 404; Brosius & Bathelt, 1994; Gibson & Zillmann, 1994, 1998). 
 
Exemplars need not be considered complete narratives, however.  In other words, it is 
possible to package base-rate information alongside exemplars.  In doing so, journalists 
create hybrid narrow- and broad-context accounts.  By testing the effect of news stories 
containing base-rate information packaged alongside exemplars, Coleman and Thorson’s 
study focused upon hybrid accounts’ ability to present information in ways that could 
encourage citizens to become informed and motivated, as well as to entice news 
consumers to elicit a desire to consume more narratives of like kind. 
 The results of their study suggest several things.  One, hybrid accounts cause 
news consumers to be more apt to attribute responsibility to societal factors rather than 
individuals featured in such accounts40.  Coleman and Thorson claim that hybrid accounts 
appear to help shift people’s attitudes so they become more critical of 
society’s role in crime and violence. … Readers of [hybrid] stories are 
more likely to lay responsibility at the feet of society … [and consuming 
such stories] decreases attribution of responsibility toward individuals 
(Coleman & Thorson, 2002, p. 410). 
 
Two, and especially interesting, was the authors’ finding that subjects who consume 
episodically framed accounts espouse a fatalistic view of events41.  As Coleman and 
Thorson claim, subjects who consume episodic accounts view 
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things as random, with no logical cause or reason … [and] see social 
change as impossible, so any attempts to better the world are futile 
(Coleman & Thorson, 2002, p. 411). 
 
For instance, concerning natural disasters, research conducted by John McClure, Michael 
Allen, and Frank Walkey shows that citizens are more likely to view damage caused by 
earthquakes as fatalistically determined and that there is nothing individuals can do to 
prevent it (McClure, et al., 2001, p. 109).  As they state: 
the fatalistic view that earthquake damage is uncontrollable implies that 
the damage is attributed to the power of the earthquake.  The damage[, 
however,] could be attributed alternatively to the design of the damaged 
structures (McClure, et al., 2001, p. 109). 
 
Put another way, citizens overlook the fact that how well individuals construct buildings 
partly determines how much damage they incur during an earthquake.  Gaining 
awareness of this fact would allow citizens to view earthquake damage as not something 
entirely out of their control, thereby increasing the likelihood that individuals will take 
proactive measures to reduce the amount of damage earthquakes cause.  McClure notes 
one problematic concern that stems from audience members’ adoption of a fatalistic 
attitude regarding earthquake damage by claiming: 
[i]f people attribute earthquake damage wholly to uncontrollable causes, 
they are less likely to prepare for earthquakes.  In contrast, if people 
attribute damage to controllable causes, such as the design of a building 
that fails to meet building regulations, their attribution implies that action 
such as strengthening the building might prevent the damage (McClure, et 
al., 2001, p. 110). 
 
With regard to matters that citizens have more control over (i.e., gun violence, teen 
pregnancy, drug addiction, etc.), audience members still have the tendency to adopt a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The fact that subjects who consume episodically framed accounts adopt a fatalistic view of events, by 
itself, might not be enough to establish a causal link between consuming such accounts and holding such an 
attitude.  It could be possible that the subjects in question held a fatalistic attitude prior to consuming 
episodically framed accounts. 
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fatalistic attitude when presented information about such social concerns (Coleman & 
Thorson, 2002).  Coleman and Thorson speculate42 that the fact that citizens exhibit a 
fatalistic attitude grounds the notion, commonly held by those advocating public 
journalism and proponents of the public health framing model alike, that episodic 
framing creates “apathetic citizenry” (Coleman & Thorson, 2002, p. 411).  Their study 
suggests that we need not be resigned to news consumers’ fatalism, but rather that such 
attitudes can be reduced through the journalistic presentation of hybrid narratives.  
Commenting on news consumers’ fatalism, Coleman and Perlmutter claim: 
[b]y giving only episodic information about [societal problems], the media 
give cues that there is nothing citizens can do, thus ignoring research to 
the contrary, increasing the public’s fear, and reinforcing the dominant 
ideology of blaming the individual with only vague references to greater 
social causes (Coleman & Perlmutter, 2005, p. 27). 
 
On the other hand, subjects consuming hybrid accounts 
tend to see … the world as structured, predictable, and explicable … [and] 
want information and are confident they can make sense out of that 
information (Coleman & Thorson, 2002, p. 411). 
 
Put another way, audience members consuming hybrid accounts are less apathetic, 
believe that events are predictable, and are confident that they can make such predictions.  
Because of this, instead of being apathetic, consumers of hybrid narratives actively seek 
out information in hope of discovering solutions to social issues. 
 A third finding important to my discussion of hybrid accounts concerns citizens’ 
expressed dissatisfaction with such narratives.  To test whether news consumers “liked” 
hybrid accounts, Coleman and Thorson employed a factor analysis to examine how 
subjects preference rank episodically framed stories in comparison to hybrid narratives.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 I agree with this speculation, though with caution.  Episodically framed news stories may indeed 
contribute to the problem of “apathetic citizenry”, though such stories may not serve as the causal ground 
of this problem. 
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To accomplish this, the researchers examined whether subjects found narratives 
indicative of each style of framing: “interesting, believable, relevant, informative, and 
important” (Coleman & Thorson, 2002, p. 414).  The authors dubbed the collective set of 
these factors: “liking”.  Their work shows that subjects favor episodically framed stories 
over hybrid accounts across the board.  As Coleman and Thorson state: 
adding base rate information to the exemplars in an attempt to add context 
actually decreases readers’ liking for the stories.  In all cases, readers of … 
[hybrid accounts] found them to be significantly less interesting and/or 
relevant, believable, informative, and important than did readers of … 
[episodically framed] stories that relied on exemplars and did not present 
base rate information. … [Hybrid] stories were evaluated more negatively 
… [and w]ithout the feature of ``liking’’ for stories, readers are obviously 
less likely to read, and lack of this most basic motivation is troubling 
(Coleman & Thorson, 2002, p. 415, p. 419). 
 
This finding is problematic, because if citizens favor consuming episodically framed 
stories over hybrid accounts, when given the choice between the two, it seems that 
audience members will choose to consume the former over the latter. 
 As discussed in chapter three, journalists often decide to present mere personal 
and dramatic elements of events as a means to entice future news consumers and retain 
current ones due to economic pressures journalists face.  To ensure economic vitality, 
journalists must produce a product that receives high ratings and captures the largest 
percentage of the market share that it can.  Coleman and Thorson’s research partly 
vindicates the journalistic practice of presenting narrow-context accounts since it seems 
that news consumers prefer these types of narratives to hybrid stories.  Since, in this 
dissertation, I am most concerned with the epistemic and political considerations 
associated with journalistic methods (rather than economic concerns), it will be important 
to examine one final problem that results when journalists succumb to economic 
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pressures and attempt to frame narratives in ways that can best entice audience members.  
In short, journalists’ efforts to entice news consumers often lead citizens to form 
misperceptions about events and societal problems.  In what follows, I offer an 
examination of this phenomenon as well as a possible remedy.   
§5.3 How Little Americans Know 
 In March 2011, the PEW Research Center for the People and the Press (PRCPP) 
released the results of a study examining the political knowledge of citizens in the United 
States.  Their findings are quite troubling.  What follows are key figures resulting from 
their investigation. 
[O]nly about four-in-ten (43%) are able to correctly identify John Boehner 
as House speaker; 19% say incorrectly that Nancy Pelosi is still speaker of 
the House … [and r]oughly three-in-ten (29%) correctly say that the 
federal government spends more on Medicare than on scientific research, 
education or on interest on the national debt.  Slightly more (36%) say that 
interest on the debt is the greater government expenditure (PEW, 2011). 
 
 Complicating the problem of how little Americans know is the fact that journalists 
present citizens an increasingly higher amount of information than ever before.  Findings 
from another study conducted by the PRCPP entitled: What Americans Know: 1989-
2007, shows that 
[s]ince the late 1980s, the emergence of 24-hour cable news as a dominant 
news source and the explosive growth of the internet have led to major 
changes in the American public’s news habits.  But a new nationwide 
survey finds that the coaxial and digital revolutions and attendant changes 
in news audience behaviors have had little impact on how much 
Americans know about national and international affairs (PEW, 2007, pp. 
1-4). 
 
Put simply, even though the news industry has experienced rapid technological 
advancements since the late 1980’s, the average American citizen’s understanding of 
domestic and foreign affairs has experienced little to no growth (What Americans Know, 
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2007, pp. 1-4).  Taken together, these studies suggest that enhancing the accessibility as 
well as increasing the quantity of information available to citizens does little to encourage 
them to become informed.  One might think that the more citizens consume news stories, 
the more knowledgeable they would become.  This, however, is not the case, as the 
average citizen’s public knowledge has remained the same in most categories, and is even 
lower in some (What Americans Know, 2007, pp. 1-4).  As the researchers claim: 
Americans didn’t do as well in 2007 compared with how similarly-
educated Americans performed in 1989.  Across the board, scores declined 
significantly among college graduates, those with some college as well as 
for those with a high school education or less. … [S]omewhat fewer 
[citizens are] able to name their governor, the vice president, and the 
president of Russia (What Americans Know, 2007, p. 8, p. 1). 
 
This finding seems strange because the availability of information via news media has 
increased dramatically during this period.  One could attribute this phenomenon to 
declining rates of news consumption.  Assuming this, however, would be incorrect.  
Additional research conducted by the PRCPP demonstrates that it is not the case that 
citizens are spending less time consuming news narratives and that 
[t]here are many more ways to get the news these days, and as a 
consequence Americans are spending more time with the news than over 
much of the past decade.  Digital platforms are playing a larger role in 
news consumption, and they seem to be more than making up for modest 
declines in the audience for traditional platforms.  As a result, the average 
time Americans spend with the news on a given day is as high as it was in 
the mid-1990s, when audiences for traditional news sources were much 
larger (Americans Spending More Time, 2010, p. 1). 
 
 Another recent study concurs with the above finding and suggests that citizens’ 
failure to accrue civic knowledge, even in an age where information is available around 
the clock from a multitude of sources, does not come from citizens’ lack of news 
consumption (Misperceptions, 2003, pp. 16-17).  The latter study demonstrates an even 
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more alarming problem.  Concerning domestic and foreign affairs, researchers found that 
the quantity of news consumption leads directly to a rise in the number of misperceptions 
held by viewers (Misperceptions, 2003, pp. 16-17).  As the researchers who conducted 
the study claim: 
a substantial portion of the public had a number of misperceptions that 
were demonstrably false, or were at odds with the dominant view in the 
intelligence community (Misperceptions, 2003, p. 1). 
 
In particular, the study demonstrated that subjects erroneously believed Iraq supported al-
Qaeda’s efforts concerning 9/11 and that Iraq played a significant role in the attacks.  On 
this, the researchers assert that a significant portion of Americans 
believed that Iraq played an important role in 9/11 and that a minority 
even expressed the belief that they had seen “conclusive evidence” of such 
involvement.  The US intelligence community has said that there is not 
evidence to support the view that Iraq was directly involved in September 
11 and there has clearly never been any observable “conclusive evidence.” 
…  [Further, a] majority did believe that Iraq had given substantial support 
to al-Qaeda (Misperceptions, 2003, p. 1). 
 
When asked after the war whether they believed that Iraq had possessed WMDs prior to 
the start of it, a significant number of Americans answered affirmatively.  Commenting 
on this finding, the researchers note: 
[o]ne of the most striking developments in the postwar period was that 
once US forces arrived in Iraq, they failed to find the weapons of mass 
destruction that had been a major rationale for going to war with Iraq.  
Nonetheless, in PIPA/KN polls conducted May through September, a 
substantial minority of the public said they believed that weapons of mass 
destruction had been found.  A substantial minority even believed that Iraq 
had used weapons of mass destruction in the war (Misperceptions, 2003, 
p. 1). 
 
Lastly, a significant number of Americans believed that a majority of nations around the 
globe supported the U.S.’s decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003.  On this, the 
authors state: 
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[i]n polls conducted throughout the world before and during the war, a 
very clear majority of world public opinion opposed the US going to war 
with Iraq without UN approval.  However, PIPA/KN found in polls 
conducted during and after the war that only a minority of Americans were 
aware of this.  A significant minority even believed that a majority of 
people in the world favored the US going to war with Iraq 
(Misperceptions, 2003, p. 1). 
 
 While only a minority of Americans held all three misperceptions, 60% of 
citizens held at least one misperception (Misperceptions, 2003, p. 7).  Ideally, informed 
citizens should not hold any misperceptions about events, and since the authors’ research 
shows that consuming more news media means that audience members will hold more 
misperceptions, modifications concerning the quality of narratives are in order.  Further, 
since our experiential environment is continually evolving, it is important for consumers 
to keep abreast of events’ recent developments if they hope to avoid misperceptions and 
keep their view of events from becoming distorted.  Developing broad-context views of 
public affairs free from misperceptions requires diligence on behalf of news consumers.  
For example, concerning the misperceptions noted above, citizens need contextually rich 
information demonstrating: the lack of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq; the lack of a 
link between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al-Qaeda; and the lack of widespread 
diplomatic support for actions undertaken within Iraq by the United States 
(Misperceptions, 2003, pp. 2-7).  Accounts presenting mere narrow-context information 
about these topics might do a great job enticing viewers to tune in (and remain so), but 
such stories do a poor job providing contextual clues that might prevent one from 
misperceiving phenomena.  For instance, contextual information (rather than mere 
personal and dramatic imagery) about the reactions that diplomatic leaders from around 
the world exhibited when the U.S. expressed interest in invading Iraq could help citizens 
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avoid assuming that most other nations agreed with the Bush administration’s views on 
the matter. 
 Avoiding the development of information sets riddled with misperceptions seems 
daunting when one considers that journalists present narrow-context narratives more 
often than hybrid accounts because citizens prefer the former to the latter.  By consuming 
narrow-context stories, viewers fail to keep abreast of the reasons why events occur as 
they do, as well as how those events might influence future incidents.  This failure 
accounts for the misperceptions news consumers hold.  To be clear, I am claiming that 
the more citizens consume news presented via narrow-context accounts, the more 
misperceptions they hold. 
§5.4 A Solution to the Problem of Misperception Accrual 
As stated above, journalists include personal and dramatic elements within news 
stories as a means to generate audience interest.  Journalists include these elements to 
attract the attention of potential audience members, as well as captivate current 
consumers, thereby increasing the rate of news consumption.  Merely providing personal 
and dramatic elements produces episodically framed narratives, as such accounts make 
events appear isolated and random.  To solve this problem, journalists could interlace 
personal and dramatic elements along with information about the causal foundation and 
future significance of events.  I find no problem with the inclusion of personal and 
dramatic elements in news stories whose framing also provides broad-context 
information, as stories that include the latter are not episodic.  If narrow-context 
information is included within a story that also provides contextual information about the 
featured event, then the audience can still develop broad-context views.  The problem 
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remains, however, that hybrid accounts fail to entice news consumers as readily as 
narrow-context accounts.  To combat this failure, citizens’ beliefs about their epistemic 
political efficacy, internal political efficacy, and external political efficacy must be 
improved.  In other words, they must begin to feel that they have the ability to attain a 
contextually rich understanding of societal problems and that they can use that 
knowledge effectively when given opportunities to discuss, vote, and express dissent in a 
system that is responsive to their efforts to produce change. 
 To be clear, I am arguing that citizens who primarily consume mere narrow-
context accounts do not perform well on political knowledge indicators and find 
deliberating with their peers difficult.  This poor civic participation performance causes 
individuals to experience low levels of confidence about their ability to be fairly certain 
about the factual aspects of politics (or low epistemic political efficacy).  Having low 
epistemic political efficacy contributes to news consumers’ failure to develop confidence 
in their ability to participate civically to produce changes within government and society 
(or low internal political efficacy).  Without confidence in their ability to civically 
participate effectively, many audience members believe that government and society is 
unresponsive to citizens’ efforts to transform politics or resolve societal problems.  
Citizens have low external political efficacy since they believe that their actions are 
performed in vain because they feel that they are unable to influence change since they 
also believe that government and society are not responsive to citizens’ efforts.  Without 
confidence in their ability to transform society and government, as well as resolve social 
issues, individuals will continue to hold a fatalistic attitude toward societal problems and 
events since citizens continue to feel discouraged as well as believe that their efforts to 
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learn more about societal problems and events are futile.  Citizens who adopt a fatalistic 
attitude toward societal problems and events become apathetic, and apathetic citizens do 
not care about resolving societal problems.  Not caring about resolving societal problems 
causes citizens’ interest in receiving contextually rich information that could help them 
resolve such problems to remain low, which causes them seek out mere narrow-context 
accounts full of dramatic and personal elements of events.  Journalists present 
information via mere narrow-context accounts brimming with personal and dramatic 
elements to entice apathetic citizens to pay attention to the news.  Doing so, however, 
exacerbates the problem and by consuming mere narrow-context information, citizens 
experience a downward slide in confidence levels that contributed to the adoption of 
fatalistic attitudes that rendered them apathetic toward politics and societal problems.  
This process is cyclical and to escape it, journalists must present accounts comprised of 
personal and dramatic elements, as well as contextually rich information about events.  In 
particular, journalists must show how citizens’ efforts to civically participate can 
influence future events, as well as society at large in hope that citizens will become less 
apathetic toward social issues and become informed and motivated. 
 Perhaps, however, one might claim that to encourage citizens to increase their 
confidence about their ability to understand information and retain it, use it effectively 
via civic participation, and do so in such a way that government and society respond to 
their efforts, journalists need to do more than merely present hybrid accounts.  Rather, 
journalists need to present hybrid accounts in just the right way.  As discussed briefly in 
chapter two, public journalism advocates argue that journalists must actively to strive to 
enhance citizens’ ability to deliberate, vote, and express feedback by assuming the role of 
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civic engagers when presenting new stories.  Such a role requires that journalists 
demonstrate why, as democratic participants, citizens should care about events being 
reported, as well as how audience members can make full use of the equal opportunity 
and equal voice they enjoy. 
§5.5 Public Journalism 
 In “Beyond Objectivity,” Jay Rosen posits that journalists must present 
information with a common object in mind: the health of democracy.  Rosen calls for 
journalists to abandon an idealistic construal of objectivity (as the title of his article 
suggests).  Rather than clinging to “a very bad, unworkable philosophy” (Rosen, 1993, p. 
51), he claims that journalists should be concerned instead, with “reengaging citizens in 
public life”43 (Rosen, 1993, p. 51).  Journalists must be reminded that 
[t]here is no such thing as context with a capital C. There’s no such thing 
as interpretation with a capital I.  You can’t supply these things in some 
simple, straightforward way.  You can only supply them from a certain 
perspective.  You need a view of the world.  That’s your added value 
(Rosen, 1993, p. 50). 
 
To accomplish this, Rosen argues that journalists must become informed and motivated 
about the projects and interests of citizens.  Doing so will enable them to present 
information in ways that enables citizens to participate civically in hope that successful 
solutions to social problems will be selected.  Rosen deems this approach “public 
journalism” (Rosen, 1993, p. 51).  Public journalism’s aim is to best enhance citizens’ 
ability to take advantage of the equal opportunity and equal voice they enjoy by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The only issue I take with Rosen’s and Merritt’s statements is with their use of the term ‘reengagement’.  
It seems to me that citizens are not born engaged.  If this is the case, then citizens will need to be 
encouraged to become “engaged” rather than “reengaged”, unless already engaged citizens somehow 
became unengaged. 
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presenting them with information germane to their projects and interests.  Furthering this 
view, David “Buzz” Merritt claims that journalists must practice 
in ways that are calculated to help public life go well by reengaging44 
people in it.  Public life “going well” means … that democracy succeeds 
in answering the core question: What shall we do?  The answer, in a 
democracy, should be found by informed and engaged citizens.  Public 
journalism does not attempt to forge its own answer to the question.  
Rather, it actively seeks to help citizens arrive at their answer [emphasis in 
original] (Merritt, 1996, p. 179). 
 
I agree with both Rosen’s and Merritt’s claims.  Primarily, it is democratic citizens who 
are responsible for the selection of successful resolutions, not journalists.  On this point, 
Merritt claims that “[p]ublic journalism is not aimed at solving problems; it is aimed at 
reengaging citizens in solving problems” (Merritt, 1996, p. 180).  The lesson for 
journalists here is that they must present information in ways that engage citizens with 
the public life and the political process, which will enhance audience members’ civic 
participation.  If citizens were better able to understand how events affected their own 
projects and interests, then they might put forth great effort to become informed and 
motivated about issues related to such events.  Rosen believes that journalists can 
demonstrate why citizens should care about events presented in news stories and how 
such information holds significance to citizens’ concerns. 
 The PEW Center for Civic Journalism45 (PCCJ), construes public journalism as 
both a philosophy and a set of values supported by some evolving 
techniques to reflect both of those in … journalism.  At its heart is a belief 
that journalism has an obligation to public life - an obligation that goes 
beyond just telling the news or unloading lots of facts.  The way we do our 
journalism affects the way public life goes.  Journalism can help empower 
a community or it can help disable it (PCCJ). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The same point applies as made in the previous footnote. 
45 Often times, theorists use the terms public journalism and civic journalism interchangeably.  To avoid 
confusion, I will uniformly use the phrase “public journalism” throughout the entirety of this dissertation. 
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Public journalism involves the commitment to make good on journalists’ obligation to 
enrich public life by helping citizens’ enhance their civic participation.  Public journalists 
recognize that their craft does not involve the mere dissemination of cold, impartial facts.  
Instead, they believe that they must present information to citizens in ways that 
demonstrate how individuals can entrench themselves in the democratic process so that 
citizens can work cooperatively toward selecting successful resolutions to societal 
problems.  In an interview with Jeffery Dvorkin, an ombudsman for NPR, Merritt echoes 
PCCJ’s construal of public journalism.  As Merritt claims: 
[p]ublic journalism is a set of values about the craft that recognizes and 
acts upon the interdependence between journalism and democracy.  It 
values the concerns of citizens over the needs of the media and political 
actors, and conceives of citizens as stakeholders in the democratic process 
rather than as merely victims, spectators or inevitable adversaries.  As 
inherent participants in the process, we should do our work in ways that 
aid in the resolution of public problems by fostering broad citizen 
engagement (Merritt and Dvorkin, 2001). 
 
Commenting further on “the interdependence between journalism and democracy” 
(Merritt and Dvorkin, 2001), the charter declaration of the Public Journalism Network 
claims: 
journalism and democracy work best when news, information and ideas 
flow freely; when news fairly portrays the full range and variety of life 
and culture of all communities; when public deliberation is encouraged 
and amplified; and when news helps people function as political actors 
and not just as political consumers (PJN). 
 
Both series of statements reinforce the notion that journalists must, as professionals 
representing the unofficial fourth estate in democracy, actively encourage citizens to 
participate civically and resist the temptation to remain passive consumers of 
information.  Without citizen participation expressed through deliberation, voting, and 
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feedback, there can be no “broad citizen engagement” (Merritt & Dvorkin, 2001), and as 
a result, resolving social issues will be difficult to achieve. 
 Perhaps one might question the need for professional journalists as mediators of 
information when ultimately it is the public that must become informed and motivated.  
Instead of relying upon middlepersons to get the job done, citizens should serve as news 
gathers and presenters.  This model of journalism is known as participatory or citizen 
journalism.  As Shayne Bowman and Chris Willis write on We Media, a web log 
commissioned by the Media Center at the American Press Institute, participatory 
journalism can be described as 
[t]he act of a citizen, or group of citizens, playing an active role in the 
process of collecting, reporting, analyzing and disseminating news and 
information.  The intent of this participation is to provide independent, 
reliable, accurate, wide-ranging and relevant information that a democracy 
requires (Bowman & Willis, 2003). 
 
The problem with this model consists in the fact that many citizens possess little training, 
resources, knowledge, or credibility needed to assume roles normally reserved for 
professional journalists.  Most citizens are less than capable “of collecting, reporting, 
analyzing[,] and disseminating news and information” (Bowman & Willis, 2003).  If 
citizens were naturally skilled in these areas, journalism, as a profession, would most 
likely not have risen to the altitude that it enjoyed for some time (i.e., 1960s-1970s).  This 
ties in with a point made by Helen Longino that I discussed in chapter one that expresses 
the view that not just anyone should have standing to criticize scientific theories.  In other 
words, being able to engage in “peer review” requires that all parties are in fact, “peers”, 
and holding such standing requires that individuals have expert credentials as certified by 
the academic community. 
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 Of course, one might wonder about the sort of training and expert credentials 
journalists have that the public at-large does not.  In other words, what skills, knowledge 
base, or ability do journalists possess that many citizens lack?  First, journalists are 
trained to write well.  Their work can be verbose and sometimes technical, yet still 
reasonably easy to understand.  They are mostly generalists, though some (e.g., 
Christiane Amanpour) represent themselves as specialists.  Specialists often limit their 
reporting to a geographic area, industry, or socio-economic or political issue, while 
generalists do not delimit their practice within specific boundaries and instead, report on 
matters as varied as the Occupy movement to the Iran Contra affair.  Lastly, journalists 
are critical thinkers.  Like philosophers, they are trained to gather information, question 
assumptions, discover better ways of framing problems, and weigh possible solutions to 
such problems.  In other words, journalists are professional skeptics. 
 Further, in order to be considered a professional journalist, one must operate in 
ways that fall within the stated aims of various journalistic codes of ethics and practices, 
as well as meet the following criteria as offered by Leonard Pitts Jr. (with my own 
modifications attached as shown below).  Being a professional journalist requires that one 
possess: (1) resources enabling one to travel to locales, often on short notice, that can 
prove quite dangerous and difficult to reach46; (2) credibility necessary for citizens to 
take one seriously; (3) an extensive knowledge base one could utilize while creating 
contextually rich narratives; (4) training necessary for understanding how to construct 
such narratives; (5) and a desire to present information to citizens in ways that render 
individuals informed and motivated. Attempting to elucidate why citizen journalists are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 This is not to say that journalists cannot practice in their own neighborhood or city, but they need to 
possess the ability to gain access to areas to which non-journalists typically do not have access. 
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not well suited to serve as news practitioners, Pitts asks: “[w]ill [citizen journalists] have 
the resources, the credibility, the knowledge, the training or even the desire to do so?” 
(Pitts, 2012).  He replies simply: “[n]o” (Pitts, 2012).  Statements like: “[e]very citizen 
can be a reporter” (Palin, 2012) misconstrue the notion of what it means to be a 
professional journalist. 
 Concerning the first criterion of professional journalism, Pitts claims: 
my Miami Herald colleague, Elinor J. Brecher, was one of the reporters 
who rushed toward the destruction in New York City on 9/11.  Another 
colleague, Jacqueline Charles, spends weeks at a time on the ground, 
reporting the devastation in Haiti.  Nicholas Kristof of the New York 
Times slips into dangerous places to cover genocide and sex slavery.  
Carolyn Cole and Brian van der Brug of the Los Angeles Times send back 
stunning images of the tragedies in Japan.  And everyday, thousands of 
their colleagues attend the council meetings, pore over the budgets, 
decipher the court rulings that help the rest of us understand our cities, 
nation and world (Pitts, 2012). 
 
Implied by Pitts’s anecdotal account describing the work of his colleagues is the idea that 
journalists must have mobility quite different from the average citizen.  Journalists must 
be able to operate close to the scene within dangerous conditions whenever and wherever 
events occur.   
Concerning the second qualification: credibility, it would be difficult for ordinary 
citizens to build such credibility, as most likely they would remain quite unknown.  One 
might argue that citizen journalists could gain credibility by continually reporting news, 
but the way many news outlets enable citizen journalists to operate makes it quite 
difficult to do so.  For instance, CNN’s iReport offers citizens a website to post stories 
pertaining to a wide array of topics.  The problem with this approach is that only on an 
infrequent basis do individual citizen journalists receive much recognition for their work.  
Without gaining such recognition, citizen journalists will remain unlikely to build 
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credibility, and this is problematic because without it, citizens-at-large are less likely to 
consume information citizen journalists provide.  This concern is practical and implies 
nothing about the quality of accounts that such journalists might provide.   
Concerning the third criterion: an extensive knowledge base one could utilize 
while creating contextually rich narratives, it should be noted that ordinary citizens are 
often hard pressed to remember the candidates running for local office, let alone at the 
state and national levels.  I addressed this unfortunate reality earlier in this chapter when I 
discussed the lack of knowledge possessed by most citizens about domestic and 
international affairs.   
The fourth criterion listed above is: training necessary for understanding how to 
construct contextually rich narratives.  Without formal education in the art of collecting 
information, searching for contextual significance, creating coherent narratives of events, 
and presenting one’s work in a professional manner, most citizen journalists lack the 
training necessary to become proficient journalists.  To be fair, some media companies do 
provide such training, though on a small scale.  One such example is the Twin Cities 
Media Alliance (TCMA), a non-profit organization that operates the Twin Cities Daily 
Planet47.  The TCMA offers courses in citizen journalism to interested parties.  Another 
organization offering similar courses is: The Oakland Press Institute for Citizen 
Journalism.  The problem remains, however, that organizations like these do not have the 
capacity to offer training as intensive as what is offered through undergraduate degree 
programs in journalism (and certainly not graduate programs).  Furthermore, the number 
of students able to undergo such training pales in comparison to the throngs of students 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Jeremy Iggers, Executive Director of the Twin Cities Media Alliance, made me aware of his 
organization’s existence via a conversation I had with him in 2009. 
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that traditional journalism schools can educate.  The last qualification requires a desire to 
present information to citizens in ways that encourage them to become informed and 
motivated.  I have no doubt that many aspiring citizen journalists share this desire with 
professional journalists.  Merely satisfying one of these criteria, however, fails to 
demonstrate that citizen journalists are suited for the task of enhancing citizens’ ability to 
participate civically. 
§5.6 Holding Journalists Accountable 
 Perhaps some might claim that journalists do not have a duty to embrace public 
journalism or present information to citizens in ways that best enhances individuals’ 
ability to participate civically effectively.  In response to this assertion, I offer that 
throughout this dissertation, I have not prescribed that journalists must do anything other 
than what most have already agreed to do.  In §5.5, I noted that professional journalists 
operate according to various codes of ethics and practices.  One such code (and perhaps 
the most popular) is the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics.  Among other 
aims, the society strives to: “promote the flow of information; stimulate high standards 
and ethical behavior in the practice of journalism;	  [and]	  foster excellence among journalists” 
(SPJ, 1996).  To achieve these goals, the SPJ cites the following in their code of ethics: “seek 
truth and report it” (SPJ, 1996).  Under this stated aim, the SPJ Code of Ethics asserts that 
journalists “should not oversimplify or highlight incidents out of context” (SPJ, 1996).  
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that journalists often oversimplify events and 
highlight phenomena out of context (and in many cases fail to provide any broad context at 
all).  If journalists truly desire to “seek truth and report it” (SPJ, 1996), then they should heed 
my advice for I have shown them a better way to accomplish this stated aim (i.e., the 
presentation of information via hybrid accounts).  Two other stated aims are: “minimize 
harm [and] be accountable” (SPJ, 1996).  To accomplish these goals, journalists must avoid 
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framing stories episodically because doing so inhibits citizens’ ability to civically participate 
in order to further their projects and interests.  If episodically framed narratives inhibit 
citizens’ ability to make informed decisions, then to minimize harm, journalists must hold 
themselves accountable for such harm and avoid framing news episodically.  Lastly, 
under the stated aim: “be accountable” (SPJ, 1996), is the following charge: “clarify and 
explain news coverage” (SPJ, 1996).  This mantra reinforces the need to present 
thematically framed stories rather than episodic narratives, because presenting the latter 
amounts to a failure to provide contextually rich information that would be enable news 
consumers to understand the significance that events hold to other socio-economic and 
political phenomena.  To be clear, the charges as expressed in this section are journalists’ 
own.  In this dissertation, in no place did I introduce duties that lay outside the scope of 
these stated aims.  What I have offered herein are simply recommendations that would 
enable journalists to better achieve these goals. 
§5.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter, I addressed a serious issue that surrounds hybrid accounts’ ability 
to attract and retain news consumers.  Recent research work suggests that even when 
broad-context information comes packaged with narrow-context data via hybrid accounts, 
citizens gain little enjoyment, leading them to prefer narratives featuring mere narrow-
context information to hybrid stories (Coleman & Thorson, 2002, pp. 414-415).  
Contributing to this preference is a fatalistic attitude that events occur deterministically 
and citizens can do little to influence their rates of incidence (Coleman & Thorson, 2002, 
p. 407).  This fatalistic attitude causes citizens to become apathetic; whereby, citizens’ 
interest regarding the consumption of information about societal problems remains low.  
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To increase citizens’ interest in consuming hybrid accounts, journalists must raise news 
consumers’ satisfaction about such accounts’ ability to enhance audience members’ 
ability to civically participate effectively.  With an increase in contextually rich news 
consumption comes an increase in citizens’ epistemic political efficacy.  
 Citizens must begin to feel confident that they are able to attain a contextually 
rich understanding of politics and societal problems (thus raising their epistemic political 
efficacy), as doing so will enhance individuals’ confidence in their ability to wield power 
effectively via civic participation (thus raising their internal political efficacy).  Further, 
the more citizens believe that they are able to acquire political knowledge and use that 
knowledge to influence politics via civic participation, the more satisfied they will begin 
to feel by consuming hybrid narratives. Citizens will then gain confidence that 
government and society is responsive to their civic participation and that they can 
influence events (thus raising their external political efficacy).  Because of this increased 
satisfaction with the process of gaining information and using it to effect change, citizens 
will be more likely than not to become enticed (and remain so) by consuming hybrid 
accounts, thus enabling journalists to attract future news consumers as well as retain 
current ones. 
 In addition to the problems associated with the consumption of episodic accounts 
addressed in earlier chapters lays one final issue buttressing my concern with citizens 
expressing preference for narrow-context accounts over hybrid ones.  A recent study 
conducted by researchers associated with the Program on International Policy Attitudes 
(PIPA) found that the more citizens consume episodic accounts, the more misperceptions 
about societal problems they hold (Misperceptions, 2003, pp. 16-17).  This is due to the 
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problems addressed earlier concerning episodically framed narratives.  In brief, citizens 
consuming mere episodic accounts often fail to appreciate elements of experience 
necessary to forming a broad-context view of events.  By developing mere narrow-
context views, many individuals acquire caricaturistic perspectives of societal problems 
that contain misperceptions of the type discussed in PIPA’s research (e.g., that Iraq 
possessed WMDs).  To remedy this problem, journalists must encourage citizens to 
develop broad-context views of events.  Only then will citizens be able to eradicate 
misperceptions that inhibit their ability to become informed and motivated. 
 The discussion of public journalism in this chapter brings together ideas presented 
throughout the entirety of this dissertation.  To best understand how journalists should 
present information to American citizens, they must understand that citizens in the United 
States are afforded the opportunity to shape government in real ways via civic 
participation.  Because of this, citizens need information presented to them that they can 
use to work together to solve problems through their cooperative labors.  More is at stake 
than ratings shares and market values.  What is at stake is citizens’ ability to attain 
knowledge and use it to work with one another to resolve social issues.  Understanding 
how journalists frame information and how various types of framing affect citizens is 
fundamental to the task I have undertaken in this work.  That task has been to employ 
philosophical methodology to better understand why citizens sometimes fail to civically 
participate effectively, what (or if any) responsibility journalists have, and how 
journalism can serve as a mechanism through which citizens are made better able to 
deliberate, vote, and express feedback. 
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 In particular, the discussion of democracy in chapter one identified the avenues of 
civic participation (i.e., deliberation, voting, and feedback) that citizens share because of 
the equalities they enjoy: that of opportunity and voice.  To lay the groundwork necessary 
for showing how some journalistic methods fail to best enable citizens to participate 
civically effectively, in chapter two, I examined the ideality of journalistic objectivity to 
demonstrate two things.  One, since all accounts are context-dependent, no account can 
ever present a view of reality in any context-independent way.  Two, rather than 
presenting news via standalone narrow- or broad-context accounts, each type can be 
intertwined to form hybrid narratives, and the latter are better suited to inform and 
motivate citizens than standalone narrow- or broad-context stories.  To elucidate how 
narratives are constructed, I discussed framing in chapter three, taking care to show how 
episodic framing exposes audience members unwittingly to framing bias.  In addition, I 
argued that episodic framing causes citizens to be more apt to attribute responsibility for 
societal problems to individuals even in cases that clearly involve complex, intertwined 
social phenomena.  This is a problem since the deliberations citizens might hold, the 
voting decisions they might make, and the feedback they might express would be directed 
toward the wrong targets (i.e., individuals rather than social phenomena).  To combat 
these problems, I argued that journalists must present audience members contextually 
rich information conveying to audience members the causal foundation and future 
significance of events so that citizens come to reasonably understand problems and 
possible solutions, their consequences, and their costs.  This requires that journalists 
present information thematically, rather than episodically, and as a result, citizens are 
best able to become informed.  Becoming informed, however, is only half the battle, as 
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individuals must also become motivated if they hope to resolve societal problems 
effectively.  To show how journalists can help motivate citizens, in chapter four I 
discussed a noncognitive view of emotional arousal to stress the need for journalists to 
include personal and dramatic elements that convey the subjective experiences of others.  
Since I consider emotional arousal as grounded upon affect and not cognition, narratives 
must include elements that encourage audience members to undergo affective appraisal 
processing in order to motivate citizens to resolve social issues.  Since reason’s role in 
emotional arousal is to provide necessary adjustment of our affective response, to do this 
properly, individuals need contextually rich information about the stimuli that triggered 
our affective appraisal processing.  By demonstrating the need for both narrow- and 
broad-context information, I further bolstered my call for journalists to present hybrid 
accounts to news consumers.  Lastly, in chapter five, I examined the serious concern that 
audience members do not enjoy consuming hybrid accounts, and instead, individuals 
would rather journalists present narrow-context narratives.  To handle this concern, I 
argued that citizens do not enjoy consuming hybrid accounts because audience members 
hold fatalistic attitudes about events, rendering citizens apathetic because individuals lack 
confidence in their ability to be fairly certain about the factual aspects of politics, or to 
participate civically to produce changes within government and society.  Many audience 
members believe that government and society is unresponsive to citizens’ efforts to 
transform politics or resolve societal problems.  Since audience members do not believe 
that they can do much about societal problems given this lack of confidence, they would 
rather journalists present entertaining narratives rather than boring drivel citizens believe 
to be useless.  To combat such apathy, I argued that journalists must present hybrid 
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accounts in ways that reinforce why citizens should participate civically, as well as how 
they can do so, rather than just disseminate information disinterestedly under the guise of 
journalistic objectivity.  In short, journalists should embrace public journalism since the 
movement seeks to transform apathetic individuals into a civically engaged citizenry. 
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